Connected Discourses on Causation

1Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthı̄ in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Bhikkhus!”

2“Venerable sir!” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

3“Bhikkhus, I will teach you dependent origination. Listen to that and attend closely, I will speak.”–“Yes, venerable sir,” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

4“And what, bhikkhus, is dependent origination? With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be];¹ Spk: When it is said, “With ignorance as condition, volitional formations,” the meaning should be understood by this method: “It is ignorance and it is a condition, hence ‘ignorance-as-condition’ (avijjā ca sā paccayo cā ti avijjāpaccayo). Through that ignorance-as-condition volitional formations come to be (tasmā avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā sambhavanti ).” This explanation suggests that the verb sambhavanti, which in the text occurs only at the end of the whole formula, should be connected to each proposition, thus establishing that each conditioned state arises through its condition. The twelve terms of the formula are treated analytically in the next sutta.
At the end of the paragraph, Ee reads ayaṁ vuccati bhikkhave samuppādo, but this must be an editorial error as both Be and Se have paṭicca-samuppādo.
with volitional formations as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, contact; with contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence; with existence as condition, birth; with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. This, bhikkhus, is called dependent origination.

5“But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; [2] with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness; with the cessation of consciousness, cessation of name-and-form; with the cessation of name-and-form, cessation of the six sense bases; with the cessation of the six sense bases, cessation of contact; with the cessation of contact, cessation of feeling; with the cessation of feeling, cessation of craving; with the cessation of craving, cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

6This is what the Blessed One said. Elated, those bhikkhus delighted in the Blessed One’s statement.

2. Analysis of Dependent Origination

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, I will teach you dependent origination and I will analyse it for you. Listen to that and attend closely, I will speak.”

2“Yes, venerable sir,” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

3“And what, bhikkhus, is dependent origination? With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations, consciousness … (as in preceding sutta) … Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

4“And what, bhikkhus, is aging-and-death? The aging of the various beings in the various orders of beings, their growing old, brokenness of teeth, greyness of hair, wrinkling of skin, decline of vitality, degeneration of the faculties: this is called aging. [3] The passing away of the various beings from the various orders of beings, their perishing, breakup, disappearance, mortality, death, completion of time, the breakup of the aggregates, the laying down of the carcass: this is called death.² Se adds, at the end of the definition of death, jīvitindriyassa upacchedo, which (according to a note in Be) is also found in the Thai and Cambodian eds. The fact that Spk does not gloss this expression may be taken as evidence that it was not in the text available to the commentator. The expression is found, however, in the definition of death at Vibh 99,23-24 and is commented upon at Vibh-a 101,8-12. Spk: By the terms from “passing away” through “completion of time” he expounds death in worldly conventional terminology (lokasammutiyā); by the expressions “breakup of the aggregates” and “the laying down of the carcass” he expounds death in the ultimate sense (paramattha ). For in the ultimate sense it is only the aggregates that break up; there is no “being” that dies. When the aggregates are breaking up one says, “A being is dying,” and when they have broken up it is said, “The being has died.”
Thus this aging and this death are together called aging-and-death.

5“And what, bhikkhus, is birth? The birth of the various beings into the various orders of beings, their being born, descent [into the womb], production, the manifestation of the aggregates, the obtaining of the sense bases. This is called birth.³ Spk: From “birth” through “production” the teaching is conventional (vohāradesanā); the last two terms are an ultimate teaching (paramatthadesanā). For in the ultimate sense it is only aggregates that become manifest, not a being.

6“And what, bhikkhus, is existence? There are these three kinds of existence: sense-sphere existence, form-sphere existence, formless-sphere existence. This is called existence.⁴ On the meaning of bhava, see the General Introduction, pp. 52-53. Spk: In the exposition of existence, sense-sphere existence is both kamma-existence (kammabhava) and rebirth-existence (upapattibhava). Of these, kamma-existence is just kamma that leads to sense-sphere existence; for the kamma, being the cause for rebirth-existence in that realm, is spoken of as “existence” by assigning the name of the result to the cause. Rebirth-existence is the set of five kammically acquired aggregates produced by that kamma; for this is called “existence” in the sense that “it comes to be there.” The same method of explanation applies to form-sphere and formless-sphere existence (except that in formless-sphere rebirth-existence only the four mental aggregates exist). It should be noted that in interpreting the expression upādānapaccayā bhavo, the commentaries take bhava as either kammabhava or upapattibhava, since both volitional activity and rebirth are conditioned by clinging; but in the expression bhavapaccayā jāti, they confine bhava to kammabhava , since upapattibhava includes jāti and thus cannot be a condition for it. See Vism 572-73 (Ppn 17:258-60) and Vism 575 (Ppn 17:270).

7“And what, bhikkhus, is clinging? There are these four kinds of clinging: clinging to sensual pleasures, clinging to views, clinging to rules and vows, clinging to a doctrine of self. This is called clinging.⁵ Spk defines clinging as tight grasping (upādānan ti daḷhaggahaṇaṁ vuccati). Definitions of the four kinds of clinging are at Dhs §§1214-17. In brief, clinging to sensual pleasures (kāmupādāna) is identical with sensual desire, sensual lust, sensual delight, sensual craving, etc. Clinging to views (diṭṭhupādāna) is the adoption of any wrong view except those included in the third and fourth types of clinging; Dhs §1215 mentions as an example the nihilist view (see 24:5). The expression sīlabbatupādāna is often translated “clinging to rites and rituals,” but neither the canon nor commentaries supports this. I render sīla as rules and vata as vows, though the intention is actual modes of behaviour prescribed by rules and vows. The laconic definition at Dhs §1222 reads: “Clinging to rules and vows is the view of ascetics and brahmins outside of here (i.e., outside the Buddhist fold) that purification is achieved by rules, by vows, by rules and vows” (condensed). The reference is evidently to the various types of austerities that the Buddha’s contemporaries adopted in the belief that they lead to heaven or to ultimate purification. An example is the “dog rule, dog vow” (kukkurasīla, kukkuravata) at MN I 387,18-20; see too the common phrase, iminā ’haṁ sīlena vā vatena vā tapena vā brahmacariyena vā devo vā bhavissāmi devaññataro vā (e.g., at MN I 102,10-11). Clinging to a doctrine of self (attavādupādāna) is defined by way of the twenty types of identity view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi), on which see 22:7, etc.

8“And what, bhikkhus, is craving? There are these six classes of craving: craving for forms, craving for sounds, craving for odours, craving for tastes, craving for tactile objects, craving for mental phenomena. This is called craving.

9“And what, bhikkhus, is feeling? There are these six classes of feeling: feeling born of eye-contact, feeling born of ear-contact, feeling born of nose-contact, feeling born of tongue-contact, feeling born of body-contact, feeling born of mind-contact. This is called feeling.

10“And what, bhikkhus, is contact? There are these six classes of contact: eye-contact, ear-contact, nose-contact, tongue-contact, body-contact, mind-contact. This is called contact.

11“And what, bhikkhus, are the six sense bases? The eye base, the ear base, the nose base, the tongue base, the body base, the mind base. These are called the six sense bases.

12“And what, bhikkhus, is name-and-form? Feeling, perception, volition, contact, attention: this is called name. The four [4] great elements and the form derived from the four great elements: this is called form. Thus this name and this form are together called name-and-form.⁶ On the translation of nāmarūpa, see the General Introduction, pp. 47-49. Vism 558,23-28 (Ppn 17:187) explains that nāma denotes the three aggregates—of feeling, perception, and volitional formations—which are called thus because of their “bending” (namana) on to an object (in the act of cognizing it). Volition, contact, and attention belong to the aggregate of volitional formations and, according to Spk, have been selected to represent that aggregate here because they are operative even in the weakest classes of consciousness.

13“And what, bhikkhus, is consciousness? There are these six classes of consciousness: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, mind-consciousness. This is called consciousness.

14“And what, bhikkhus, are the volitional formations? There are these three kinds of volitional formations: the bodily volitional formation, the verbal volitional formation, the mental volitional formation. These are called the volitional formations.⁷ On the translation of saṅkhārā, see the General Introduction, pp. 44-47. Spk: Volitional formations have the characteristic of forming (abhisaṅkharaṇa). The bodily volitional formation is a volitional formation that occurs through the body; the term is a designation for the twenty kinds of bodily volition (kāyasañcetanā)—eight sense-sphere wholesome and twelve unwholesome—that motivate activity in the body door (see CMA 1:4-7, 13). The verbal volitional formation is a volitional formation that occurs through speech; the term is a designation for the twenty kinds of verbal volition (vacīsañcetanā) that motivate verbal utterances (i.e., the same twenty kinds as mentioned just above, but expressed through speech rather than bodily action). The mental volitional formation is a volitional formation that occurs through the mind; the term is a designation for the twenty-nine mundane wholesome and unwholesome mental volitions (manosañcetanā) that occur privately in thought without motivating action in the doors of body and speech. (The additional nine volitions are the five of the form-sphere and four of the formless-sphere cittas, states of purely meditative experience; see CMA 1:18, 22.) This triad of saṅkhārā should not be confused with the triad discussed at 41:6 (IV 293,14-28, also at MN I 301,17-29). I have added “volitional” to the present set to distinguish them from the other, though the Pāli terms are identical. The latter triad is always introduced in relation to the cessation of perception and feeling and is never brought into connection with dependent origination.

15“And what, bhikkhus, is ignorance? Not knowing suffering, not knowing the origin of suffering, not knowing the cessation of suffering, not knowing the way leading to the cessation of suffering. This is called ignorance.⁸ This definition shows that ignorance, as the most basic cause of saṁsāric existence, is lack of knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. Although in popular accounts ignorance is often identified with the idea of self, the definitions here show that the view of self is an aspect of clinging, which is itself conditioned by craving, while the latter is in turn conditioned by ignorance (see AN V 116,16-21).

16“Thus, bhikkhus, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”⁹ Spk: By the term “cessation” in all these phrases Nibbāna is being expounded. For all those phenomena cease in dependence on Nibbāna, and therefore the latter is spoken of as their cessation. Thus in this sutta the Blessed One taught the round of existence (vaṭṭa) and the ending of the round (vivaṭṭa) by twelve phrases and brought the discourse to a climax in arahantship.

3. The Two Ways

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, I will teach you the wrong way and the right way. Listen to that and attend closely, I will speak.”

2“Yes, venerable sir,” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

3“And what, bhikkhus, is the wrong way? With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. This, bhikkhus, is called the wrong way. [5]

4“And what, bhikkhus, is the right way? With the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. This, bhikkhus, is called the right way.”

4. Vipassı̄

1At Sāvatthī.¹⁰ The next seven suttas describe, in identical terms, the enlightenment of the six past Buddhas and the present Buddha Gotama as the discovery of dependent origination and its cessation. The Pāli text is filled out only for Vipassī and Gotama; the others are drastically abridged. I have translated in full only the last sutta, where Gotama speaks of his own attainment of enlightenment.

2“Bhikkhus, before his enlightenment, while he was still a bodhisatta,¹¹ From the explanation of bodhisatta in Spk it appears that the Pāli commentarial tradition recognizes alternative etymologies of the word, as equivalent either to Skt bodhisattva (“an enlightenment being”) or to *bodhisakta (“one devoted to enlightenment”); see PED, s.v. satta (1). Spk: Bodhi is knowledge; a being endowed with bodhi is a bodhisatta, a knowing one, a wise one, a sagely one. For from the time he forms his aspiration at the feet of former Buddhas, that being is always wise, never a blind fool. Or else, just as a mature lotus that has risen up above the water and is due to blossom when touched by the sun’s rays is called “an awakening lotus,” so a being who has obtained the prediction (to future Buddhahood) from the Buddhas and who will inevitably fulfil the perfections (pāramī) and attain enlightenment is called an awakening being (bujjhanasatta); he is a bodhisatta. One who lives yearning for enlightenment—the knowledge of the four paths—is devoted to, attached to, enlightenment (bodhiyaṁ satto āsatto); he is a bodhisatta.
not yet fully enlightened, it occurred to Vipassı̄, the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One:¹² The Buddha Vipassī was the sixth Buddha of antiquity, counting back from the Buddha Gotama. A detailed account of his career is found at DN II 11-51. He arose in the world ninety-one aeons ago. Sikhī and Vessabhū arose thirty-one aeons ago; Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana, Kassapa, and Gotama all arose in this present “excellent aeon” (bhaddakappa ). See DN II 2,15-28. ‘Alas, this world has fallen into trouble, in that it is born, ages, and dies, it passes away and is reborn, yet it does not understand the escape from this suffering [headed by] aging-and-death. When now will an escape be discerned from this suffering [headed by] aging-and-death?’ … [6–9] …

3“‘Cessation, cessation’—thus, bhikkhus, in regard to things unheard before there arose in the Bodhisatta Vipassı̄ vision, knowledge, wisdom, true knowledge, and light.”

5. Sikhı̄

6. Vessabhū

7. Kakusandha

8. Koṇāgamana

9. Kassapa

[10]

10. Gotama the Great Sakyan Sage

(i. Origination)

1“Bhikkhus, before my enlightenment, while I was still a bodhisatta, not yet fully enlightened, it occurred to me: ‘Alas, this world has fallen into trouble, in that it is born, ages, and dies, it passes away and is reborn, yet it does not understand the escape from this suffering [headed by] aging-and-death. When now will an escape be discerned from this suffering [headed by] aging-and-death?’

2“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does aging-and-death come to be? By what is aging-and-death conditioned? ’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom:¹³ Yoniso manasikārā ahu paññāya abhisamayo. The commentaries consistently gloss yoniso manasikāra as upāyamanasikāra , pathamanasikāra, “attention that is the right means, attention on the (right) course.” There took place (in me) a breakthrough by wisdom. Spk: There was a breakthrough, a concurrence, a conjunction of the reason for aging-and-death together with wisdom (paññāya saddhiṁ jarāmaraṇakāraṇassa abhisamayo samavāyo samāyogo); the meaning is that it was seen by him, “Agingand-death has birth as its condition.” Or alternatively, the sense can be construed thus: Through careful attention and wisdom there took place a breakthrough (yoniso manasikārena ca paññāya ca abhisamayo ahu). The meaning is that the penetration of aging-and-death occurred thus, “When there is birth, aging-and-death comes to be.”
The first of these explanations is improbable, and even the second is unsatisfactory in construing careful attention and wisdom as joint causes. In general sutta usage yoniso manasikāra is the forerunner of paññā, while paññā is the efficient cause of abhisamaya. As a technical term, abhisamaya appears in the Nikāyas in two main contexts: (i) As signifying the initial breakthrough to the Dhamma, dhammābhisamaya , it is identical with the obtaining of the vision of the Dhamma (dhammacakkhupaṭilābha), and thus with the attainment of stream-entry; see 13:1 (II 134,4-5). (ii) As signifying the complete breaking through of conceit (sammā mānābhisamaya) it is equivalent to the attainment of arahantship; see 36:5 (IV 207,14-15) and I, v. 725c. A third suttanta use is to denote the Buddha’s discovery of the Dhamma, as here and in the verb form abhisameti at 12:20 below. In the commentaries abhisamaya is synonymous with paṭivedha, penetration, both terms being used interchangeably to characterize the four functions of the supramundane path; see Vism 689-91 (Ppn 22:92-97).
‘When there is birth, aging-and-death comes to be; aging-and-death has birth as its condition.’¹⁴ The two statements about the origination of aging-and-death from birth correspond respectively to the two forms of the abstract principle of conditionality. The abstract formula occurs at 12:21, 22, 49, 50, 61, and 62, with a variant at 12:41. See below n. 59. From this it would evidently be a mistake to insist that the formulation in terms of existence (sati … hoti) relates to synchronic conditionality while the formulation in terms of arising (uppādā … uppajjati) relates to diachronic conditionality. Since both apply to every pair of factors, they seem to be alternative ways of expressing the conditioning relationship, either of which subsumes under itself all possible modes of conditionality in their wide variety.

3“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does birth come to be? By what is birth conditioned?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is existence, birth comes to be; birth has existence as its condition.’

4“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does existence come to be? By what is existence conditioned?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is clinging, existence comes to be; existence has clinging as its condition.’

5“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does clinging come to be? By what is clinging conditioned?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is craving, clinging comes to be; clinging has craving as its condition.’

6“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does craving come to be? By what is craving conditioned?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is feeling, craving comes to be; craving has feeling as its condition.’

7“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does feeling come to be? By what is feeling conditioned?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is contact, feeling comes to be; feeling has contact as its condition.’

8“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does contact come to be? By what is contact conditioned?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there are the six sense bases, contact comes to be; contact has the six sense bases as its condition.’

9“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists do the six sense bases come to be? By what are the six sense bases conditioned? ’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is name-and-form, the six sense bases come to be; the six sense bases have name-and-form as their condition.’

10“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does name-and-form come to be? By what is name-and-form conditioned? ’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is consciousness, name-and-form comes to be; name-and-form has consciousness as its condition.’

11“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does consciousness come to be? By what is consciousness conditioned? ’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there are volitional formations, consciousness comes to be; consciousness has volitional formations as its condition.’¹⁵ In the account of his enlightenment at 12:65 (II 104,13 foll.) the Buddha traces the sequence of conditions back only as far as consciousness, which he then shows to arise in dependence on name-and-form. The same difference in treatment occurs in the corresponding passage on cessation (II 105,20 foll.

12“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists do volitional formations come to be? By what are volitional formations conditioned?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is ignorance, volitional formations come to be; volitional formations have ignorance as their condition.’

13“Thus with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

14“‘Origination, origination’—thus, bhikkhus, in regard to things unheard before there arose in me vision, knowledge, wisdom, true knowledge, and light.¹⁶ The five Pāli words are cakkhu, ñāṇa, paññā, vijjā, and āloka. While vijjā is actually derived from vindati, Spk here glosses it as paṭivedha, penetration, as though it derived from vijjhati, to pierce.

(ii. Cessation)

15“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what does not exist does aging-and-death not come to be? With the cessation of what does the cessation of aging-and-death come about?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is no birth, aging-and-death does not come to be; with the cessation of birth comes cessation of aging-and-death.’

16“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: [11] ‘When what does not exist does birth not come to be? By the cessation of what does the cessation of birth come about?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is no existence, birth does not come to be; with the cessation of existence comes cessation of birth.’… ‘When there is no clinging, existence does not come to be; with the cessation of clinging comes cessation of existence.’… ‘When there is no craving, clinging does not come to be; with the cessation of craving comes cessation of clinging.’… ‘When there is no feeling, craving does not come to be; with the cessation of feeling comes cessation of craving.’… ‘When there is no contact, feeling does not come to be; with the cessation of contact comes cessation of feeling.’… ‘When there are no six sense bases, contact does not come to be; with the cessation of the six sense bases comes cessation of contact. ’… ‘When there is no name-and-form, the six sense bases do not come to be; with the cessation of name-and-form comes cessation of the six sense bases.’… ‘When there is no consciousness, name-and-form does not come to be; with the cessation of consciousness comes cessation of name-and-form.’… ‘When there are no volitional formations, consciousness does not come to be; with the cessation of volitional formations comes cessation of consciousness.’… ‘When there is no ignorance, volitional formations do not come to be; with the cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations.’

17“Thus with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

18“‘Cessation, cessation’—thus, bhikkhus, in regard to things unheard before there arose in me vision, knowledge, wisdom, true knowledge, and light.”

1Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthı̄ in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park….

2“Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be.¹⁷ Bhūtānaṁ vā sattānaṁ ṭhitiyā sambhavesīnaṁ vā anuggahāya. On sambhavesin as a future active participle formed from -esi(n), see Geiger, Pāli Grammar, §193A, EV I, n. to 527, and CPD, s.v. -esi(n) (2). The commentators apparently were not acquainted with this grammatical form (of which only very few instances exist in Pāli) and hence explain sambhavesin as if it was a bahubbīhi compound made up of the noun sambhava and the adjectival termination -esin. Thus Spk comments on the above line: “Beings who have already come to be are those who have been born, been produced. Those about to come to be (or, on Spk’s interpretation, ‘seekers of new existence’) are those seeking, searching for, a new existence, birth, production (sambhavesino ti ye sambhavaṁ jātiṁ nibbattiṁ esanti gavesanti).” What four? The nutriment edible food, gross or subtle; second, contact; third, mental volition; fourth, consciousness. These are the four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be.¹⁸ Spk: The nutriments are conditions (paccayā), for conditions are called nutriments (āhārā) because they nourish (or bring forth, āharanti) their own effects. Although there are other conditions for beings, these four alone are called nutriments because they serve as special conditions for the personal life-continuity (ajjhattikasantatiyā visesapaccayattā). For edible food (kabaliṅkāra āhāra) is a special condition for the physical body of those beings who subsist on edible food. In the mental body, contact is the special condition for feeling, mental volition for consciousness, and consciousness for name-and-form. As to what they bring forth (or nourish): Edible food, as soon as it is placed in the mouth, brings forth the groups of form with nutritive essence as the eighth (ojaṭṭhamakarūpāni; an Abhidhamma term for the simplest cluster of material phenomena); the nutriment contact brings forth the three kinds of feeling; the nutriment mental volition brings forth the three kinds of existence; and the nutriment consciousness brings forth name-and-form on the occasion of rebirth. In SN, nutriment is further discussed at 12:12, 31, 63, and 64. For general remarks on the four nutriments, see too Vism 341,7-18 (Ppn 11:1-3). Nyanaponika Thera, The Four Nutriments of Life, offers a collection of relevant suttas with commentaries. Āhāra is also used in a broader sense of “special condition,” without reference to the four nutriments, at 46:51 and 55:31.

3“Bhikkhus, these four kinds of nutriment have what as their source, [12] what as their origin, from what are they born and produced? These four kinds of nutriment have craving as their source, craving as their origin; they are born and produced from craving.¹⁹ These four kinds of nutriment have craving as their source. Spk: Beginning with the moment of rebirth, these kinds of nutriment comprised in the individual existence (attabhāva, the sentient organism) should be understood to originate by way of prior craving (purimataṇhā; the craving of the previous life that generated rebirth). How? At the moment of rebirth, firstly, there exists nutritive essence (ojā) produced within the arisen (bodily) form; this is the kammically acquired edible food originating from prior craving. Then the contact and volition associated with the rebirth-consciousness, and that consciousness itself, are respectively the kammically acquired nutriments of contact, mental volition, and consciousness originating from (prior) craving. Thus at rebirth the nutriments have their source in prior craving. And as at rebirth, so those produced subsequently at the moment of the first bhavaṅgacitta should be similarly understood. On the conditioning role of the nutriments, see CMA 8:23. The commentarial explanation of how craving is the cause of the four nutriments seems roundabout. A simpler explanation, more consonant with the spirit of the suttas, might be that it is craving which impels beings into the perpetual struggle to obtain physical and mental nutriment, both in the present life and in future lives.

4“And this craving has what as its source, what as its origin, from what is it born and produced? This craving has feeling as its source, feeling as its origin; it is born and produced from feeling.

5“And this feeling has what as its source…? Feeling has contact as its source…. And this contact has what as its source…? Contact has the six sense bases as its source…. And these six sense bases have what as their source…? The six sense bases have name-and-form as their source…. And this name-and-form has what as its source…? Name-and-form has consciousness as its source…. And this consciousness has what as its source…? Consciousness has volitional formations as its source…. And these volitional formations have what as their source, what as their origin, from what are they born and produced? Volitional formations have ignorance as their source, ignorance as their origin; they are born and produced from ignorance.

6“Thus, bhikkhus, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

12. Moḷiyaphagguna

1At Sāvatthı̄. [13] “Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be. What four? The nutriment edible food, gross or subtle; second, contact; third, mental volition; fourth, consciousness. These are the four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be.”²⁰ Spk: The Blessed One stopped the teaching at this point because he knew that a theorist (diṭṭhigatika) was sitting in the assembly and he wanted to give him an opportunity to ask his questions.

2When this was said, the Venerable Moḷiyaphagguna said to the Blessed One: “Venerable sir, who consumes the nutriment consciousness?” ²¹ Spk explains that the name “Moḷiya” was given to him in lay life because he wore his hair in a huge topknot (moḷi), and the nickname stuck with him after he went forth as a monk. At MN I 122-24 he is admonished by the Buddha for his excessively familiar relations with the bhikkhunīs; in 12:32 below it is announced that he has left the Order and returned to lay life.

3“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One consumes.’²² Phagguna’s question, “Who consumes...?” is “pregnant” with an implicit view of self. He sees someone—a self—standing behind consciousness in the role of a substantial subject. The Buddha must therefore reject as invalid the question itself, which is based on an illegitimate assumption. Spk: “I do not say, ‘One consumes’”: “I do not say someone—a being or a person (koci satto vā puggalo vā)—consumes.” If I should say, ‘One consumes,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who consumes?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, for what is the nutriment consciousness [a condition]?’²³ In the valid question, the Buddha replaces the personal pronoun ko, fraught with substantialist connotations, with the impersonal form kissa, genitive singular of the stem ki- (see Geiger, Pāli Grammar, §111.1). Although all eds. read here kissa nu kho bhante viññāṇāhāro, the sense seems to require that we add paccayo at the end. Spk glosses: Bhante ayaṁ viññāṇāhāro katamassa dhammassa paccayo? Paccayo does in fact occur in the reply. this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘The nutriment consciousness is a condition for the production of future renewed existence.²⁴ Spk: The nutriment consciousness: rebirth-consciousness (paṭisandhicitta). The production of future renewed existence (āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbatti): the name-and-form arisen along with that same consciousness. At AN I 223-24 it is said: “Kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture, for consciousness ... to become established in a low (middling, superior) realm; thus there is production of future renewed existence (kammaṁ khettaṁ viññāṇaṁ bījaṁ taṇhā sineho ... hīnāya (majjhimāya, paṇitāya) dhātuyā viññāṇaṁ patiṭṭhitaṁ; evaṁ āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti).” This implies that it is the stream of consciousness coming from the preceding existence that functions as the nutriment consciousness by generating, at the moment of conception, the initial rebirth-consciousness, which in turn brings forth (or “nourishes”) the concomitant name-and-form.
When that which has come into being exists, the six sense bases [come to be];²⁵ Tasmiṁ bhūte sati saḷāyatanaṁ. Spk: When that name-and-form called “the production of renewed existence” is generated, when it exists, the six sense bases come to be. The conjunction bhūte sati is unusual and the redundancy can only be avoided if the past participle bhūte is here understood to function as a noun denoting the being that has come to be. with the six sense bases as condition, contact.’”

4“Venerable sir, who makes contact?”

5“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One makes contact.’ If I should say, ‘One makes contact,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who makes contact?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does contact [come to be]?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With the six sense bases as condition, contact [comes to be]; with contact as condition, feeling.’”

6“Venerable sir, who feels?”

7“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One feels.’ If I should say, ‘One feels,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who feels?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does feeling [come to be]?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving.’”

8“Venerable sir, who craves?”

9“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One craves.’ [14] If I should say, ‘One craves,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who craves?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does craving [come to be]?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With feeling as condition, craving [comes to be]; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence....²⁶ Spk: Why didn’t the theorist ask, “Who comes to be?”? Because he held the belief that it is a being that comes to be, and the Buddha’s answer would directly contradict his belief. Further, after being contradicted so many times, he became convinced, and also the Teacher continued the discourse without pause in order to prevent him from asking any more pointless questions. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.’

10“But, Phagguna, with the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six bases for contact comes cessation of contact; with the cessation of contact, cessation of feeling; with the cessation of feeling, cessation of craving; with the cessation of craving, cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

13. Ascetics and Brahmins (1)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, those ascetics or brahmins who do not understand aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation;²⁷ Spk: They do not understand aging-and-death by way of the truth of suffering; nor its origin by way of the truth of the origin, i.e., that aging-and-death arises from birth and craving; nor its cessation by way of the truth of cessation; nor the way to its cessation by way of the truth of the path. Similarly, in all the following passages, the meaning should be understood by way of the four truths. Ignorance is not mentioned in the sequence because it is already implied by reference to the origin of volitional formations.
who do not understand birth ... existence ... clinging ... craving ... feeling ... contact ... the six sense bases ... name-and-form ...consciousness ... volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation: [15] these I do not consider to be ascetics among ascetics or brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones do not, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of asceticism or the goal of brahminhood.²⁸ Sāmaññatthaṁ vā brahmaññatthaṁ vā. Spk: Here the noble path is asceticism and brahminhood, and in both cases the goal should be understood as the noble fruit. See 45:35-38.

2“But, bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who understand aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation; who understand birth ... volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation: these I consider to be ascetics among ascetics and brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of asceticism and the goal of brahminhood.”

14. Ascetics and Brahmins (2)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, as to those ascetics and brahmins who do not understand these things, the origin of these things, the cessation of these things, and the way leading to the cessation of these things: what are those things that they do not understand, whose origin they do not understand, whose cessation they do not understand, and the way leading to whose cessation they do not understand?

2“They do not understand aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. They do not understand birth ... existence ... clinging ... craving ... feeling ... contact ... the six sense bases ... name-and-form ... consciousness ... volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation. These are the things that they do not understand, whose origin they do not understand, [16] whose cessation they do not understand, and the way leading to whose cessation they do not understand.

3“These I do not consider to be ascetics among ascetics or brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones do not, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of asceticism or the goal of brahminhood.

4“But, bhikkhus, as to those ascetics and brahmins who understand these things, the origin of these things, the cessation of these things, and the way leading to the cessation of these things: what are those things that they understand, whose origin they understand, whose cessation they understand, and the way leading to whose cessation they understand?

5“They understand aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. They understand birth ... volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation. These are the things that they understand, whose origin they understand, whose cessation they understand, and the way leading to whose cessation they understand.

6“These I consider to be ascetics among ascetics and brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of asceticism and the goal of brahminhood.”

15. Kaccānagotta

1At Sāvatthı̄. [17] Then the Venerable Kaccānagotta approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him: “Venerable sir, it is said, ‘right view, right view.’ In what way, venerable sir, is there right view?”

2“This world, Kaccāna, for the most part depends upon a duality—upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence. ²⁹ Dvayanissito khvāyaṁ Kaccāna loko yebhuyyena atthitañ c’ eva natthitañ ca. Spk: “For the most part” (yebhuyyena) means: for the great multitude, with the exception of the noble individuals (ariyapuggala). The notion of existence (atthitā) is eternalism (sassata); the notion of nonexistence (natthitā) is annihilationism (uccheda). Spk-pṭ: The notion of existence is eternalism because it maintains that the entire world (of personal existence) exists forever. The notion of nonexistence is annihilationism because it maintains that the entire world does not exist (forever) but is cut off. In view of these explanations it would be misleading to translate the two terms, atthitā and natthitā, simply as “existence” and “nonexistence” and then to maintain (as is sometimes done) that the Buddha rejects all ontological notions as inherently invalid. The Buddha’s utterances at 22:94, for example, show that he did not hesitate to make pronouncements with a clear ontological import when they were called for. In the present passage atthitā and natthitā are abstract nouns formed from the verbs atthi and natthi. It is thus the metaphysical assumptions implicit in such abstractions that are at fault, not the ascriptions of existence and nonexistence themselves. I have tried to convey this sense of metaphysical abstraction, conveyed in Pāli by the terminal -tā, by rendering the two terms “the notion of existence” and “the notion of nonexistence,” respectively. On the two extremes rejected by the Buddha, see 12:48, and for the Buddha’s teaching on the origin and passing away of the world, 12:44.
Unfortunately, atthitā and bhava both had to be rendered by “existence,” which obscures the fact that in Pāli they are derived from different roots. While atthitā is the notion of existence in the abstract, bhava is concrete individual existence in one or another of the three realms. For the sake of marking the difference, bhava might have been rendered by “being” (as was done in MLDB), but this English word, I feel, is too broad (suggestive of “Being,” the absolute object of philosophical speculation) and does not sufficiently convey the sense of concreteness intrinsic to bhava.
But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world.³⁰ Spk: The origin of the world: the production of the world of formations. There is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world: there does not occur in him the annihilationist view that might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding “They do not exist.” Spk-pṭ: The annihilationist view might arise in regard to the world of formations thus: “On account of the annihilation and perishing of beings right where they are, there is no persisting being or phenomenon.” It also includes the wrong view, having those formations as its object, which holds: “There are no beings who are reborn.” That view does not occur in him; for one seeing with right understanding the production and origination of the world of formations in dependence on such diverse conditions as kamma, ignorance, craving, etc., that annihilationist view does not occur, since one sees the uninterrupted production of formations. Spk: The cessation of the world: the dissolution (bhaṅga) of formations. There is no notion of existence in regard to the world: There does not occur in him the eternalist view which might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding “They exist.” Spk-pṭ: The eternalist view might arise in regard to the world of formations, taking it to exist at all times, owing to the apprehension of identity in the uninterrupted continuum occurring in a cause-effect relationship. But that view does not occur in him; because he sees the cessation of the successively arisen phenomena and the arising of successively new phenomena, the eternalist view does not occur.
Spk: Further, “the origin of the world” is direct-order conditionality (anuloma-paccayākāra); “the cessation of the world,” reverse-order conditionality (paṭiloma-paccayākāra). [Spk-pṭ: “Direct-order conditionality” is the conditioning efficiency of the conditions in relation to their own effects; “reverse-order conditionality” is the cessation of the effects through the cessation of their respective causes.] For in seeing the dependency of the world, when one sees the nontermination of the conditionally arisen phenomena owing to the nontermination of their conditions, the annihilationist view, which might otherwise arise, does not occur. And in seeing the cessation of conditions, when one sees the cessation of the conditionally arisen phenomena owing to the cessation of their conditions, the eternalist view, which might otherwise arise, does not occur.

3“This world, Kaccāna, is for the most part shackled by engagement, clinging, and adherence.³¹ The reading I prefer is a hybrid of Be and Se: upayupādānābhinivesavinibaddho . I take upay- from Be (Se and Ee: upāy-) and -vinibaddho from Se (Be and Ee: -vinibandho). The rendering at KS 2:13, “grasping after systems and imprisoned by dogmas,” echoed by SN-Anth 2:17, is too narrow in emphasis. Spk explains that each of the three nouns—engagement, clinging, and adherence—occurs by way of craving and views (taṇhā, diṭṭhi), for it is through these that one engages, clings to, and adheres to the phenomena of the three planes as “I” and “mine.” But this one [with right view] does not become engaged and cling through that engagement and clinging, mental standpoint, adherence, underlying tendency; he does not take a stand about ‘my self.’³² Tañ cāyaṁ upayupādānaṁ cetaso adhiṭṭhānaṁ abhinivesānusayaṁ na upeti na upādiyati nādhiṭṭhāti “attā me” ti. I have unravelled the difficult syntax of this sentence with the aid of Spk, which glosses ayaṁ as “this noble disciple” (ayaṁ ariyasāvako). Spk says that craving and views are also called “mental standpoints” (adhiṭṭhāna) because they are the foundation for the (unwholesome) mind, and “adherences and underlying tendencies” (abhinivesānusaya) because they adhere to the mind and lie latent within it. Spk connects the verb adhiṭṭhāti to the following “attā me,” and I conform to this interpretation in the translation. He has no perplexity or doubt that what arises is only suffering arising, what ceases is only suffering ceasing. His knowledge about this is independent of others. It is in this way, Kaccāna, that there is right view.³³ Spk explains dukkha here as “the mere five aggregates subject to clinging” (pañcupādānakkhandhamattam eva). Thus what the noble disciple sees, when he reflects upon his personal existence, is not a self or a substantially existent person but a mere assemblage of conditioned phenomena arising and passing away through the conditioning process governed by dependent origination. In this connection see the verses of the bhikkhunī Vajirā, I, vv. 553-55. Spk: By just this much—the abandonment of the idea of a being (sattasaññā )—there is right seeing. Aparappaccayā ñāṇaṁ, “knowledge independent of others,” is glossed by Spk as “personal direct knowledge without dependence on another” (aññassa apattiyāyetvā attapaccakkhañāṇaṁ ). This is said because the noble disciple, from the point of stream-entry on, has seen the essential truth of the Dhamma and thus is not dependent on anyone else, not even the Buddha, for his or her insight into the Dhamma. Until arahantship is attained, however, such a disciple might still approach the Buddha (or another enlightened teacher) for practical guidance in meditation.
“‘All exists’: Kaccāna, this is one extreme. ‘All does not exist’: this is the second extreme. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.” [18]

16. A Speaker on the Dhamma

1At Sāvatthı̄. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him: “Venerable sir, it is said, ‘a speaker on the Dhamma, a speaker on the Dhamma.’ In what way, venerable sir, is one a speaker on the Dhamma?”

2“Bhikkhu, if one teaches the Dhamma for the purpose of revulsion towards aging-and-death, for its fading away and cessation, one is fit to be called a bhikkhu who is a speaker on the Dhamma. If one is practising for the purpose of revulsion towards aging-and-death, for its fading away and cessation, one is fit to be called a bhikkhu who is practising in accordance with the Dhamma.³⁴ Dhammānudhammapaṭipanno. Spk: Lokuttarassa nibbānadhammassa anudhammabhūtaṁ paṭipadaṁ paṭipanno; “one practising the way that is in accordance with the supramundane Nibbāna-dhamma.” Spk-pṭ glosses nibbānadhamma as “the noble path bringing Nibbāna,” and explains “(the way) that is in accordance with” it as meaning “(the way) whose nature is appropriate for the achievement of Nibbāna” (nibbānādhigamassa anucchavikasabhāvabhūtaṁ). This statement shows the sekha, the trainee. Cp. III, n. 51. If, through revulsion towards aging-and-death, through its fading away and cessation, one is liberated by nonclinging, one is fit to be called a bhikkhu who has attained Nibbāna in this very life.³⁵ Diṭṭhadhammanibbānappatto. This statement shows the arahant, or asekha, who has completed the training.

3“Bhikkhu, if one teaches the Dhamma for the purpose of revulsion towards birth … for the purpose of revulsion towards ignorance, for its fading away and cessation, one is fit to be called a bhikkhu who is a speaker on the Dhamma. If one is practising for the purpose of revulsion towards ignorance, for its fading away and cessation, one is fit to be called a bhikkhu who is practising in accordance with the Dhamma. If, through revulsion towards ignorance, through its fading away and cessation, one is liberated by nonclinging, one is fit to be called a bhikkhu who has attained Nibbāna in this very life.”

17. The Naked Ascetic Kassapa

1Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary. [19] Then, in the morning, the Blessed One dressed and, taking bowl and robe, entered Rājagaha for alms. The naked ascetic Kassapa saw the Blessed One coming in the distance. Having seen him, he approached the Blessed One and exchanged greetings with him. When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he stood to one side and said to him: “We would like to ask Master Gotama about a certain point, if he would grant us the favour of answering our question.”

2“This is not the right time for a question, Kassapa. We have entered among the houses.”³⁶ Spk: Why does the Blessed One refuse three times? In order to inspire reverence; for if theorists are answered too quickly they do not show reverence, but they do so if they are refused two or three times. Then they wish to listen and develop faith. Also, the Master refused in order to create an opportunity for the ascetic’s faculty of knowledge to ripen.

3A second time and a third time the naked ascetic Kassapa said to the Blessed One: “We would like to ask Master Gotama about a certain point, if he would grant us the favour of answering our question.”

4“This is not the right time for a question, Kassapa. We have entered among the houses.”

5Then the naked ascetic Kassapa said to the Blessed One: “We do not wish to ask Master Gotama much.”

6“Then ask what you want, Kassapa.”

7“How is it, Master Gotama: is suffering created by oneself?”

8“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.

9“Then, Master Gotama, is suffering created by another?”

10“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.

11“How is it then, Master Gotama: is suffering created both by oneself and by another?”

12“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said. [20]

13“Then, Master Gotama, has suffering arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another?”³⁷ Of the four alternatives, the first and second, as will be shown, are respectively implicit formulations of eternalism and annihilationism. The third is a syncretic solution, perhaps a form of partial-eternalism (ekaccasassatavāda; see DN I 17-21). The fourth is the doctrine of fortuitous origination (adhiccasamuppannavāda; see DN I 28-29).

14“Not so, Kassapa,” the Blessed One said.

15“How is it then, Master Gotama: is there no suffering?”

16“It is not that there is no suffering, Kassapa; there is suffering.”

17“Then is it that Master Gotama does not know and see suffering?”

18“It is not that I do not know and see suffering, Kassapa. I know suffering, I see suffering.”

19“Whether you are asked: ‘How is it, Master Gotama: is suffering created by oneself?’ or ‘Is it created by another?’ or ‘Is it created by both?’ or ‘Is it created by neither?’ in each case you say: ‘Not so, Kassapa.’ When you are asked: ‘How is it then, Master Gotama: is there no suffering?’ you say: ‘It is not that there is no suffering, Kassapa; there is suffering.’ When asked: ‘Then is it that Master Gotama does not know and see suffering?’ you say: ‘It is not that I do not know and see suffering, Kassapa. I know suffering, I see suffering.’ Venerable sir, let the Blessed One explain suffering to me. Let the Blessed One teach me about suffering.”³⁸ Spk points out that the change of address, from the familiar bho Gotama to the respectful bhante bhagavā, indicates that he has acquired reverence for the Teacher. “Kassapa, [if one thinks,] ‘The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences [the result],’ [then one asserts] with reference to one existing from the beginning: ‘Suffering is created by oneself.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism.³⁹ Spk glosses ādito sato as ādimhi yeva, and explains it as meaning “(if) at the beginning (one thinks)....” It seems to me more likely that this phrase is part of the eternalist view itself and means “of one existing from the beginning,” i.e., of a being that has always existed. This interpretation can marshal support from the fact that the phrase is omitted just below in the corresponding restatement of the annihilationist view, which is otherwise constructed according to the same logic and thus, if Spk were correct, should include ādito sato. Spk says “it should be brought in,” but the fact that the text replaces it by another phrase is strong evidence that it does not belong there; see n. 40. Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences (the result),” in such a case the belief (laddhi) afterwards follows, “Suffering is created by oneself.” And here, what is meant by suffering is the suffering of the round (vaṭṭadukkha). Asserting thus, from the beginning one declares eternalism, one grasps hold of eternalism. Why? Because that view of his amounts to this. Eternalism comes upon one who conceives the agent and the experiencer to be one and the same.
Spk-pṭ: Prior to the belief that suffering is created by oneself there are the distortions of perception and of mind (saññācittavipallāsā) in the notion, “The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences (the result),” and then a wrong adherence to these distortions develops, namely, the belief “Suffering is created by oneself” (a distortion of views, diṭṭhivipallāsa).
On the three levels of distortion with their four modes, see AN II 52.
But, Kassapa, [if one thinks,] ‘The one who acts is one, the one who experiences [the result] is another,’ [then one asserts] with reference to one stricken by feeling: ‘Suffering is created by another.’ When one asserts thus, this amounts to annihilationism. ⁴⁰ In this passage the phrase ādito sato found in the preceding statement of eternalism is replaced by vedanābhitunnassa sato, which countermands Spk’s proposal that ādito sato should be brought in here. Spk interprets the sentence as stating that the annihilationist view is held by one who experiences the feeling associated with the view, but I understand the point to be that the view is held with reference to one “stricken by feeling,” perhaps by painful feeling. Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The one who acts is one, the one who experiences (the result) is another,” in such a case afterwards there comes the belief, “Suffering is created by another,” held by one stricken by—that is, pierced by—the feeling associated with the annihilationist view that arises thus: “The agent is annihilated right here, and someone else (‘another’) experiences (the results) of his deeds.” Asserting thus, from the beginning one declares annihilationism, one grasps hold of annihilationism. Why? Because the view one holds amounts to this. Annihilationism comes upon him.
Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle:⁴¹ Spk: The Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle without veering to either of these extremes—eternalism and annihilationism—having abandoned them without reservation. He teaches while being established in the middle way. What is that Dhamma? By the formula of dependent origination, the effect is shown to occur through the cause and to cease with the cessation of the cause, but no agent or experiencer (kāraka, vedaka) is described. ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. [21] But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’”

20When this was said, the naked ascetic Kassapa said to the Blessed One: “Magnificent, venerable sir! Magnificent, venerable sir! The Dhamma has been made clear in many ways by the Blessed One, as though he were turning upright what had been turned upside down, revealing what was hidden, showing the way to one who was lost, or holding up a lamp in the dark for those with eyesight to see forms. I go for refuge to the Blessed One, and to the Dhamma, and to the Bhikkhu Saṅgha. May I receive the going forth under the Blessed One, may I receive the higher ordination?”⁴² The going forth (pabbajjā) is the initial ordination as a novice (sāmaṇera); the higher ordination (upasampadā) admits the novice to full membership in the Saṅgha as a bhikkhu.

21“Kassapa, one formerly belonging to another sect who desires the going forth and the higher ordination in this Dhamma and Discipline lives on probation for four months. At the end of the four months, if the bhikkhus are satisfied with him, they may if they wish give him the going forth and the higher ordination to the state of a bhikkhu. But individual differences are recognized by me.”⁴³ For details on the ordination of a wanderer formerly belonging to another sect, see Vin I 69-71. Spk: The candidate is actually given the going forth and lives as a novice during the probationary period, after which the bhikkhus give him the higher ordination if they are satisfied with him. The Buddha, however, is entitled to waive the usual procedure when he recognizes that the candidate is sufficiently competent and need not be tested. In Kassapa’s case he had the going forth given to him; then, immediately after, Kassapa was brought back to him and he called an assembly of bhikkhus and administered the higher ordination.

22“If, venerable sir, one formerly belonging to another sect who desires the going forth and the higher ordination in this Dhamma and Discipline lives on probation for four months, and if at the end of the four months the bhikkhus, being satisfied with him, may if they wish give him the going forth and the higher ordination to the state of a bhikkhu, then I will live on probation for four years. At the end of the four years, if the bhikkhus are satisfied with me, let them if they wish give me the going forth and the higher ordination to the state of a bhikkhu.”

23Then the naked ascetic Kassapa received the going forth under the Blessed One, and he received the higher ordination. And soon, not long after his higher ordination, dwelling alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and resolute, the Venerable Kassapa, [22] by realizing it for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life entered and dwelt in that unsurpassed goal of the holy life for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from the household life into homelessness. He directly knew: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.” And the Venerable Kassapa became one of the arahants.⁴⁴ See I, n. 376.

18. Timbaruka

1At Sāvatthı̄. Then the wanderer Timbaruka approached the Blessed One and exchanged greetings with him. When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and said to him: “How is it, Master Gotama: are pleasure and pain created by oneself?”⁴⁵ Spk: In this sutta pleasure and pain as feeling (vedanāsukhadukkha) are being discussed; it is also acceptable to say the subject is resultant pleasure and pain (vipākasukhadukkha).

2“Not so, Timbaruka,” the Blessed One said.

3“Then, Master Gotama, are pleasure and pain created by another?”

4“Not so, Timbaruka,” the Blessed One said.

5“How is it then, Master Gotama: are pleasure and pain created both by oneself and by another?”

6“Not so, Timbaruka,” the Blessed One said.

7“Then, Master Gotama, have pleasure and pain arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another?”

8“Not so, Timbaruka,” the Blessed One said.

9“How is it then, Master Gotama: is there no pleasure and pain?”

10“It is not that there is no pleasure and pain, Timbaruka; there is pleasure and pain.”

11“Then is it that Master Gotama does not know and see pleasure and pain?”

12“It is not that I do not know and see pleasure and pain, Timbaruka. I know pleasure and pain, I see pleasure and pain.”

13“Whether you are asked: ‘How is it, Master Gotama: are pleasure and pain created by oneself?’ or ‘Are they created by another? ’ [23] or ‘Are they created by both?’ or ‘Are they created by neither?’ in each case you say: ‘Not so, Timbaruka.’ When you are asked: ‘How is it then, Master Gotama: is there no pleasure and pain?’ you say: ‘It is not that there is no pleasure and pain, Timbaruka; there is pleasure and pain.’ When asked: ‘Then is it that Master Gotama does not know and see pleasure and pain?’ you say: ‘It is not that I do not know and see pleasure and pain, Timbaruka. I know pleasure and pain, I see pleasure and pain.’ Venerable sir, let the Blessed One explain pleasure and pain to me. Let the Blessed One teach me about pleasure and pain.”

14“Timbaruka, [if one thinks,] ‘The feeling and the one who feels it are the same,’ [then one asserts] with reference to one existing from the beginning: ‘Pleasure and pain are created by oneself.’ I do not speak thus.⁴⁶ Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The feeling and the one who feels it are the same,” there then comes the belief, “Pleasure and pain are created by oneself.” For in this case feeling is created by feeling itself, and asserting thus one admits the existence of this feeling already in the past. One declares eternalism, grasps hold of eternalism. But, Timbaruka, [if one thinks,] ‘The feeling is one, the one who feels it is another,’ [then one asserts] with reference to one stricken by feeling: ‘Pleasure and pain are created by another.’ Neither do I speak thus.⁴⁷ Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), “The feeling is one, the one who feels it is another,” there then comes the belief, “Pleasure and pain are created by another,” held by one stricken by the feeling associated with the annihilationist view that arises thus: “The feeling of the agent (kārakavedanā ) in the past has been annihilated, and someone else (‘another’) experiences (the result) of his deeds.” Asserting thus, one declares and grasps the annihilationist view that the agent is annihilated and rebirth is taken by someone else. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’”

15When this was said, the naked ascetic Timbaruka said to the Blessed One: “Magnificent, Master Gotama!… I go for refuge to Master Gotama, and to the Dhamma, and to the Bhikkhu Saṅgha. From today let Master Gotama remember me as a lay follower who has gone for refuge for life.”

19. The Wise Man and the Fool

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, [24] this body has thereby originated. So there is this body and external name-and-form: thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad there is contact. There are just six sense bases, contacted through which—or through a certain one among them—the fool experiences pleasure and pain.⁴⁸ Spk: This body has thereby originated (evam ayaṁ kāyo samudāgato ): This body has been produced thus because he has been hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving. So there is this body: one’s own conscious body. And external name-and-form (bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṁ): the conscious body of others externally. The meaning should be explained in terms of the five aggregates and six sense bases of oneself and others. This interpretation of bahiddhā nāmarūpa seems dubious. We may have here, rather, a rare example of the term nāmarūpa being employed to represent the entire field of experience available to consciousness, “external name” being the concepts used to designate the objects cognized. See the common expression imasmiṁ saviññāṇake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu, “in regard to this conscious body and all external signs,” at 18:21, 22; 22:71, 72etc., and explained below in n. 340. Spk interprets this dyad (etaṁ dvayaṁ) as the internal and external sense bases, which it calls “the great dyad” (mahādvaya). However, while the sense bases are usually shown to be the condition for contact (e.g., at 12:43, 44) and are also called a dyad (e.g., at 35:92, 93), it seems that here the text intends the term dyad to denote one’s own conscious body and “external name-and-form.” The six sense bases are introduced only in the next sentence, after contact has already been said to arise from a duality. At DN II 62,12-37 too the Buddha demonstrates that name-and-form can be a direct condition for contact without mention of the six sense bases.

2“Bhikkhus, for the wise man, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has thereby originated. So there is this body and external name-and-form: thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad there is contact. There are just six sense bases, contacted through which—or through a certain one among them—the wise man experiences pleasure and pain. What, bhikkhus, is the distinction here, what is the disparity, what is the difference between the wise man and the fool?”

3“Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One, guided by the Blessed One, take recourse in the Blessed One. It would be good if the Blessed One would clear up the meaning of this statement. ⁴⁹ Bhagavantaṁ yeva paṭibhātu etassa bhāsitassa. Lit. “Let the meaning of this statement occur to the Blessed One.” I translate this Pāli idiom freely in accordance with the sense. See I, n. 227. Having heard it from him, the bhikkhus will remember it.”

4“Then listen and attend closely, bhikkhus, I will speak.”

5“Yes, venerable sir,” the bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

6“Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has originated. For the fool that ignorance has not been abandoned and that craving has not been utterly destroyed. For what reason? Because the fool has not lived the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering. Therefore, with the breakup of the body, the fool fares on to [another] body. Faring on to [another] body, he is not freed from birth, aging, and death; not freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; not freed from suffering, I say.

7“Bhikkhus, for the wise man, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has originated. For the wise man that ignorance has been abandoned and that craving has been utterly destroyed. For what reason? Because the wise man has lived the holy life [25] for the complete destruction of suffering. Therefore, with the breakup of the body, the wise man does not fare on to [another] body. Not faring on to [another] body, he is freed from birth, aging, and death; freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; freed from suffering, I say.

8“This, bhikkhus, is the distinction, the disparity, the difference between the wise man and the fool, that is, the living of the holy life.”⁵⁰ In this brief sutta we find clearly adumbrated the later exegetical scheme of “the four groups” (catusaṅkhepa) and “twenty modes” (vīsatākāra), explained at Paṭis I 51-52; Vism 579-81 (Ppn 17:288-98); and CMA 8:7. See Table 4, p. 519. The past causes are the ignorance and craving that brought both the fool and the wise man into the present existence; the present results—the conscious body, name-and-form, the six sense bases, contact, and feeling; the present causes—the ignorance and craving that the fool does not abandon; the future results—the birth, aging, and death to which the fool is subject in the next existence. This should also help establish the validity of the “three-life” interpretation of paṭicca-samuppāda and demonstrate that such an interpretation is not a commentarial innovation.

20. Conditions

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, I will teach you dependent origination and dependently arisen phenomena. Listen and attend closely, I will speak.”

2“Yes, venerable sir,” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

3“And what, bhikkhus, is dependent origination? ‘With birth as condition, aging-and-death [comes to be]’: whether there is an arising of Tathāgatas or no arising of Tathāgatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality.⁵¹ Ṭhitā va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā . Spk: That element (sā dhātu), the intrinsic nature of the conditions (paccayasabhāva), still persists; never is it the case that birth is not a condition for aging-and-death. By the next two terms too he indicates just the condition. For the dependently arisen phenomena stand because of the condition (paccayena hi paccayuppannā dhammā tiṭṭhanti); therefore the condition itself is called the stableness of the Dhamma (dhammaṭṭhitatā). The condition fixes (or determines) the dependent phenomena (paccayo dhamme niyameti); thus it is called the fixed course of the Dhamma (dhammaniyāmatā). Specific conditionality (idappaccayatā) is the set of specific conditions for aging-and-death, etc. Spk-pṭ: Whether it is unpenetrated before and after the arising of Tathāgatas, or penetrated when they have arisen, that element still persists; it is not created by the Tathāgatas, but aging-and-death always occurs through birth as its condition. A Tathāgata simply discovers and proclaims this, but he does not invent it.
At AN I 286,8-24 exactly the same statement is made about the three characteristics: “All formations are impermanent /suffering” and “All phenomena are nonself.” The two expressions, dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā, must thus have a meaning that is common to both dependent origination and the three characteristics, and it therefore seems unfitting to explain them here, as Spk does, in a way that is specifically tied to conditionality. Moreover, it is more likely that here dhamma means the principle or law-fulness that holds sway over phenomena, not the phenomena subject to that principle. See too below n. 105, n. 211.
A Tathāgata awakens to this and breaks through to it.⁵² Abhisambujjhati abhisameti. The former verb, which is reserved for the Buddha’s enlightenment, is transitive. I thus render it “awakens to (with the object),” though otherwise I generally translate words derived from the verb bujjhati as expressing the sense of “enlightenment.” Abhisameti is the verb corresponding to abhisamaya, on which see n. 13. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. And he says: ‘See! With birth as condition, bhikkhus, aging-and-death.’⁵³ Se contains a footnote which explains that the statement below, “Thus, bhikkhus, the actuality in this ...” should be inserted at the end of each section on the conditioning relationships; and each following section should begin with the statement, “whether there is an arising of Tathāgatas....”

4“‘With existence as condition, birth’ … ‘With clinging as condition, existence’ … ‘With craving as condition, clinging’ … ‘With feeling as condition, craving’ ... ‘With contact as condition, feeling’ … ‘With the six sense bases as condition, contact’ … ‘With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases’ … ‘With consciousness as condition, name-and-form’ … ‘With volitional formations as condition, consciousness’ … ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations’: whether there is an arising of Tathāgatas or no arising of Tathāgatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality. A Tathāgata awakens to this and [26] breaks through to it. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. And he says: ‘See! With ignorance as condition, bhikkhus, volitional formations.’

5“Thus, bhikkhus, the actuality in this, the inerrancy, the nototherwiseness, specific conditionality: this is called dependent origination.⁵⁴ At 56:20, 27the Four Noble Truths are said to be tatha, avitatha , anaññatha—the adjectives corresponding to the first three abstract nouns here. Spk gives a very specific interpretation (translated just below), though we might suspect the original sense was simply that the teaching of dependent origination is true, not false, and not other than real. Spk: Actuality (tathatā) is said to indicate the occurrence of each particular phenomenon when its assemblage of appropriate conditions is present. Inerrancy (avitathatā) means that once its conditions have reached completeness there is no nonoccurrence, even for a moment, of the phenomenon due to be produced from those conditions. Nototherwiseness (anaññathatā) means that there is no production of one phenomenon by another’s conditions. The phrase specific conditionality is used to refer to the (individual) conditions for aging-and-death, etc., or to the conditions taken as a group (paccayasamūhato).

6“And what, bhikkhus, are the dependently arisen phenomena? Aging-and-death, bhikkhus, is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation. Birth is impermanent ... Existence is impermanent … Clinging is impermanent … Craving is impermanent … Feeling is impermanent ... Contact is impermanent ... The six sense bases are impermanent ... Name-and-form is impermanent … Consciousness is impermanent … Volitional formations are impermanent … Ignorance is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation. These, bhikkhus, are called the dependently arisen phenomena.

7“When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has clearly seen with correct wisdom⁵⁵ Sammappaññāya. Spk: With path wisdom together with insight (savipassanāya maggapaññāya). as it really is this dependent origination and these dependently arisen phenomena, it is impossible that he will run back into the past, thinking: ‘Did I exist in the past? Did I not exist in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what did I become in the past?’ Or that he will run forward into the future, thinking: ‘Will I exist in the future? Will I not exist [27] in the future? What will I be in the future? How will I be in the future? Having been what, what will I become in the future?’ Or that he will now be inwardly confused about the present thus: ‘Do I exist? Do I not exist? What am I? How am I? This being—where has it come from, and where will it go?’⁵⁶ The sixteen cases of doubt are also mentioned at MN I 8,4-15. For a discussion of their abandonment, see Vism 599 (Ppn 19:5-6) and 603-5 (Ppn 19:21-27). Spk explains that the basic division expressed in the doubts—between existing and not existing in the past, etc.—reflects the antinomy of eternalism and annihilationism. The other doubts pertaining to past existence arise within an eternalist framework. Similar distinctions apply among the doubts pertaining to the future and the present.

8“For what reason [is this impossible]? Because, bhikkhus, the noble disciple has clearly seen with correct wisdom as it really is this dependent origination and these dependently arisen phenomena.”

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, possessing the ten powers and the four grounds of self-confidence, the Tathāgata claims the place of the chief bull of the herd, roars his lion’s roar in the assemblies, and sets rolling the Brahma-wheel thus:⁵⁷ The ten powers, which are powers of knowledge (ñāṇabala), are expounded at MN I 69-71, where they are called Tathāgata powers (tathāgatabala). The ten types of knowledge are also claimed by the Venerable Anuruddha at 52:15-24, but in part only, according to Spk. A detailed analysis is at Vibh 335-44. The four grounds of self-confidence (vesārajja) are explained at MN I 71-72. In brief, they are the confidence: (i) that no one can challenge his claim to be enlightened about all phenomena; (ii) that no one can challenge his claim to have eradicated all the taints; (iii) that no one can challenge him regarding the states he declares to be obstacles; and (iv) that no one can challenge his claim that his teaching leads the one who practises it to liberation from suffering. Spk glosses brahma as seṭṭha, uttama, “the best, the highest,” and explains the Brahma-wheel as the purified Wheel of the Dhamma (visuddhadhammacakka). This is twofold, the knowledge of penetration (paṭivedhañāṇa) and the knowledge of teaching (desanāñāṇa). The former originates from wisdom and brings the Buddha’s own attainment of the noble fruits; the latter originates from compassion and enables him to teach in such a way that his disciples attain the fruits. The knowledge of penetration is supramundane (lokuttara), the knowledge of teaching mundane (lokiya). Both are self-begotten types of knowledge belonging exclusively to the Buddhas, not held in common with others.
[28] ‘Such is form, such its origin, such its passing away; such is feeling, such its origin, such its passing away; such is perception, such its origin, such its passing away; such are volitional formations, such their origin, such their passing away; such is consciousness, such its origin, such its passing away.⁵⁸ This stock meditation formula on the five aggregates is also found in SN at 12:23, 22:78, 89, 101. It occurs too in the two versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta at DN II 301,29-302,13 and MN I 61,3-8. The origin (samudaya) and the passing away (atthaṅgama) of the aggregates are explained from the standpoint of diachronic conditionality at 22:5 and from the standpoint of synchronic conditionality at 22:56, 57. See too n. 123. Thus when this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases.⁵⁹ This is the abstract formula of dependent origination: imasmiṁ sati idaṁ hoti, imass’ uppādā idaṁ uppajjati; imasmiṁ asati idaṁ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṁ nirujjhati. Spk-pṭ explains that what is meant by existence in the first part of the formula is not actual presence as such but “the state of not having been brought to cessation by the path”; similarly, what is meant by nonexistence in the second part of the formula is not mere absence as such but “the state of having been brought to cessation by the path.” A long, complex explanation of the formula (abridged in Spk-pṭ) is found at Ud-a 38-42 (translated in Masefield, The Udāna Commentary, 1:66-72). See too n. 14 above. The use of the formula here, immediately following the statement on the aggregates, connects the origin and passing away of the five aggregates to dependent origination, indicating that the former should be understood in terms of the latter. That is, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’”

22. The Ten Powers (2)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, possessing the ten powers and the four grounds of self-confidence, the Tathāgata claims the place of the chief bull of the herd, roars his lion’s roar in the assemblies, and sets rolling the Brahma-wheel thus: ‘Such is form ... (as in §21) ... Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’

2“Bhikkhus, the Dhamma has thus been well expounded by me, elucidated, disclosed, revealed, stripped of patchwork.⁶⁰ Chinnapilotika. Spk: Patchwork (pilotika) is an old cloth, cut up and torn, that has been sewn and stitched here and there. If one does not wear this, but is clothed in a sheet of uncut cloth, one is said to be “free of patchwork.” This Dhamma is similar, for in no way is it sewn up and stitched together by deceitful means, etc. This encomium of the Dhamma is also at MN I 141-42. At 16:11 (II 220,1 and 221,5 foll.) there occurs the expression paṭapilotikānaṁ saṅghāti, “an outer robe of patches.”
When, bhikkhus, the Dhamma has thus been well expounded by me, elucidated, disclosed, revealed, stripped of patchwork, this is enough for a clansman who has gone forth out of faith to arouse his energy thus: ‘Willingly, let only my skin, sinews, and bones remain, and let the flesh and blood dry up in my body, but I will not relax my energy so long as I have not attained what can be attained by manly strength, by manly energy, by manly exertion. ’⁶¹ Spk calls this four-factored energy (caturaṅgasamannāgataṁ viriyaṁ); the four factors are to be understood by way of skin, sinews, bones, and flesh-and-blood. The vow recurs below at 21:3 (II 276,12-16) and is also at MN I 481,1-5. At Ja I 71,24-27 the Bodhisatta makes the same resolve when he takes his seat at the foot of the Bodhi Tree. [29]

3“Bhikkhus, the lazy person dwells in suffering, soiled by evil unwholesome states, and great is the personal good that he neglects. ⁶² Spk glosses sadatthaṁ: sobhanaṁ vā atthaṁ sakaṁ vā atthaṁ, “beautiful good or own good.” The latter explanation is more likely. The common translation of the expression as “true good,” taking sad to represent sant, does not seem to have the support of the commentaries. But the energetic person dwells happily, secluded from evil unwholesome states, and great is the personal good that he achieves. It is not by the inferior that the supreme is attained; rather, it is by the supreme that the supreme is attained.⁶³ Spk: It is not by inferior faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom that the supreme—namely, arahantship—is to be attained. The supreme must be attained by supreme faith and so forth. Bhikkhus, this holy life is a beverage of cream; the Teacher is present.⁶⁴ Spk explains maṇḍapeyya as a compound of maṇḍa in the sense of clear (pasanna) and peyya in the sense of what is to be drunk (pātabba). It seems that maṇḍa originally meant the best part of milk or butter, i.e., the cream, and like the English word came to signify the essence or finest part of anything. At 34:1, etc., we find sappimaṇḍa, “cream-of-ghee,” the finest of dairy products. Spk: There are three types of cream: (i) the cream of teachings (desanāmaṇḍa), i.e., the Four Noble Truths and the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment; (ii) the cream of recipients (paṭiggahamaṇḍa), i.e., disciples capable of understanding those teachings; and (iii) the cream of holy lives (brahmacariyamaṇḍa ), i.e., the Noble Eightfold Path. The words “while the Teacher is present” (satthā sammukhībhūto) show the reason: since the Teacher is present, having made an energetic effort, you should drink this cream.
This sentence serves as the heading for an entire treatise of Paṭis (No. 10; II 86-91), which applies the metaphor of cream in detail to all the factors of the Buddhist training.
Therefore, bhikkhus, arouse your energy for the attainment of the as-yet-unattained, for the achievement of the as-yetunachieved, for the realization of the as-yet-unrealized, [with the thought]: ‘In such a way this going forth of ours will not be barren, but fruitful and fertile; and when we use the robes, almsfood, lodgings, and medicinal requisites [offered to us by others], these services they provide for us will be of great fruit and benefit to them.’⁶⁵ We should read, with Be and Se, tesaṁ te kārā amhesu mahapphalā bhavissanti, as against tesaṁ vo kārā in Ee. The sense of this line has been missed by C.Rh.D at KS 2:24, and Walshe follows her at SN-Anth 3:20. Cp. MN I 140,23-24, 31-32: Yaṁ kho idaṁ pubbe pariññātaṁ tattha me (no) evarūpā kārā karīyanti. PED recognizes kāra in the sense of “service, act of mercy or worship,” but does not include these references. Thus, bhikkhus, should you train yourselves.

4“Considering your own good, bhikkhus, it is enough to strive for the goal with diligence; considering the good of others, it is enough to strive for the goal with diligence; considering the good of both, it is enough to strive for the goal with diligence.”⁶⁶ Alam eva appamādena sampādetuṁ. These words anticipate the Buddha’s final injunction at 6:15 (I 157,34-158,2).

23. Proximate Cause

1At S̄vatthı̄.⁶⁷ For an essay based on this important sutta, see Bodhi, Transcendental Dependent Arising. The opening paragraph recurs at 22:101, but with a different sequel; see too n. 58. Spk states that the destruction of the taints (āsavakkhaya) is arahantship, which gains this name because it arises at the end of the destruction of the taints (āsavānaṁ khayante jātattā). “Bhikkhus, I say that the destruction of the taints is for one who knows and sees, not for one who does not know and does not see. For one who knows what, for one who sees what, does the destruction of the taints come about? ‘Such is form, such its origin, such its passing away; such is feeling ... such is perception … such are volitional formations … such is consciousness, such its origin, such its passing away’: it is for one who knows thus, for one who sees thus, that the destruction of the taints comes about. [30]

2“I say, bhikkhus, that the knowledge of destruction in regard to destruction has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for the knowledge of destruction? It should be said: liberation.⁶⁸ Spk: Having set up the teaching with its climax in arahantship, the Buddha next shows the preliminary practice along which the arahant has travelled. The knowledge of destruction in regard to destruction (khayasmiṁ khaye ñāṇaṁ) is the reviewing knowledge (paccavekkhaṇañāṇa) which occurs when the destruction of the taints—namely, arahantship—has been obtained (see I, n. 376 and Vism 676; Ppn 22:19-21). Liberation is the liberation of the fruit of arahantship (arahattaphalavimutti), which is a condition for reviewing knowledge by way of decisive-support condition (upanissayapaccaya). First the fruit of arahantship arises, then the knowledge of destruction. Spk glosses sa-upanisā as sakāraṇa, sappacayya, “with cause, with condition.” Spk-pṭ adds: upanisīdati phalaṁ etthā ti kāraṇaṁ upanisā; “the cause is called the proximate cause because the effect rests upon it.” Thus the commentators take upanisā to be the equivalent of Skt upaniṣad, not a contraction of upanissaya. Although, as CPD points out, “a semantic blend” with the latter takes place, the two words must be kept distinct because not everything that is an upanisā (proximate cause) for other things is an upanissayapaccaya (decisive support condition) for those things. The latter refers solely to something which plays a strong causal role.

3“I say, bhikkhus, that liberation too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for liberation? It should be said: dispassion.

4“I say, bhikkhus, that dispassion too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for dispassion? It should be said: revulsion.

5“I say, bhikkhus, that revulsion too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for revulsion? It should be said: the knowledge and vision of things as they really are.

6“I say, bhikkhus, that the knowledge and vision of things as they really are too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for the knowledge and vision of things as they really are? It should be said: concentration.

7“I say, bhikkhus, that concentration too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for concentration? It should be said: happiness.

8“I say, bhikkhus, that happiness too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for happiness? It should be said: tranquillity.

9“I say, bhikkhus, that tranquillity too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for tranquillity? It should be said: rapture.

10“I say, bhikkhus, that rapture too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for rapture? It should be said: gladness.

11“I say, bhikkhus, that gladness too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for gladness? It should be said: faith.

12“I say, bhikkhus, that faith too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. [31] And what is the proximate cause for faith? It should be said: suffering.⁶⁹ Spk glosses the terms in the above sequence thus (starting from the end): Suffering is the suffering of the round (vaṭṭadukkha ). Faith is repeatedly arising faith (aparāparaṁ uppajjanasaddhā ; that is, tentative faith, not the unwavering faith of a noble disciple). Gladness (pāmojja) is weak rapture, while rapture proper (pīti) is strong rapture. Tranquillity (passaddhi) is the subsiding of distress, a condition for the happiness preliminary to absorption. Happiness is the happiness in the preliminary phase of meditative absorption, concentration the jhāna used as a basis (for insight; pādakajjhānasamādhi). Knowledge and vision of things as they really are (yathābhūtañāṇadassana) is weak insight, namely, the knowledges of the discernment of formations, of the overcoming of doubt, of exploration, and of what is and what is not the path (see Vism chaps. 18-20). Revulsion (nibbidā ) is strong insight, namely, knowledge of appearance as fearful, of contemplation of danger, of reflection, and of equanimity about formations (Vism 645-57; Ppn 21:29-66). Dispassion (virāga) is the path, which arises expunging defilements. Note that in the next paragraph suffering replaces aging-and-death of the usual formula.

13“I say, bhikkhus, that suffering too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for suffering? It should be said: birth.

14“I say, bhikkhus, that birth too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for birth? It should be said: existence.

15“I say, bhikkhus, that existence too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for existence? It should be said: clinging.

16“I say, bhikkhus, that clinging too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for clinging? It should be said: craving.

17“I say, bhikkhus, that craving too has a proximate cause; it does not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for craving? It should be said: feeling.

18“For feeling, it should be said: contact. For contact: the six sense bases. For the six sense bases: name-and-form. For name-and-form: consciousness. For consciousness: volitional formations.

19“I say, bhikkhus, that volitional formations too have a proximate cause; they do not lack a proximate cause. And what is the proximate cause for volitional formations? It should be said: ignorance.

20“Thus, bhikkhus, with ignorance as proximate cause, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as proximate cause, consciousness; with consciousness as proximate cause, name-and-form; with name-and-form as proximate cause, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as proximate cause, contact; with contact as proximate cause, feeling; with feeling as proximate cause, craving; with craving as proximate cause, clinging; with clinging as proximate cause, existence; with existence as proximate cause, birth; with birth as proximate cause, suffering; with suffering as proximate cause, faith; with faith as proximate cause, gladness; with gladness as proximate cause, rapture; with rapture as proximate cause, tranquillity; with tranquillity as proximate cause, happiness; with happiness as proximate cause, concentration; with concentration as proximate cause, the knowledge and vision of things as they really are; [32] with the knowledge and vision of things as they really are as proximate cause, revulsion; with revulsion as proximate cause, dispassion; with dispassion as proximate cause, liberation; with liberation as proximate cause, the knowledge of destruction.

21“Just as, bhikkhus, when rain pours down in thick droplets on a mountain top, the water flows down along the slope and fills the cleft, gullies, and creeks; these being full fill up the pools; these being full fill up the lakes; these being full fill up the streams; these being full fill up the rivers; and these being full fill up the great ocean;⁷⁰ The simile also occurs at 55:38, AN I 243,27-32, and AN V 114,6-14. so too, with ignorance as proximate cause, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as proximate cause, consciousness … with liberation as proximate cause, the knowledge of destruction.”

24. Wanderers of Other Sects

At Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove.

(i)

1Then, in the morning, the Venerable Sāriputta dressed and, taking bowl and robe, entered Rājagaha for alms. Then it occurred to him: “It is still too early to walk for alms in Rājagaha. Let me go to the park of the wanderers of other sects.”

2Then the Venerable Sāriputta [33] went to the park of the wanderers of other sects. He exchanged greetings with those wanderers and, when they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side. The wanderers then said to him:

3“Friend Sāriputta, some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that suffering is created by oneself; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that suffering is created by another; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another.⁷¹ On the identity of the four views see above n. 37. Now, friend Sāriputta, what does the ascetic Gotama say about this? What does he teach? How should we answer if we are to state what has been said by the ascetic Gotama and not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact? And how should we explain in accordance with the Dhamma so that no reasonable consequence of our assertion would give ground for criticism?”⁷² A stock passage in the Nikāyas, recurring in SN in slightly different forms determined by the context, at 12:25, 12:26, 22:2, 22:86, 35:81, 42:13, 44:2, and 45:5. The readings alternate, even within the same volume, between vādānuvādo and vādānupāto, and it is uncertain which of the two is more original. The passage has stumped previous translators, mainly because of the phrase koci sahadhammiko vādānupāto, which at KS 2:28 is rendered “one who is of his doctrine, a follower of his views.” To avoid such errors two meanings of sahadhammika must be distinguished: (i) a noun meaning a follower of the same doctrine (unambiguously so at MN I 64,13); and (ii) an adjective meaning legitimate, reasonable (unambiguously so at 41:8; IV 299,25 foll.). Here the second meaning is applicable. Spk explains: “How (should we answer) so that not the slightest consequence or implication (vādānupāto vādappavatti) of the ascetic Gotama’s assertion—(a consequence) which is reasonable because of the reason stated (vutta-kāraṇena sakāraṇo hutvā)—might give ground for criticism?” This is meant: “How can there be no ground for criticism in any way of the ascetic Gotama’s assertion?” I dissent from Spk on what is to be safeguarded against criticism: Spk takes it to be the Buddha’s assertion, while I understand it to be the inquirer’s account of the Buddha’s assertion. In other words, the inquirer wants to be sure he is representing the Buddha’s position correctly, whether or not he agrees with it.
At AN III 4,10, 19 sahadhammikā vādānuvādā gārayhā ṭhānā āgacchanti occurs in a context where it means simply “reasonable rebukes, grounds for criticism, come up,” and is contrasted with sahadhammikā pāsaṁsā ṭhānā āgacchanti, “reasonable grounds for praise come up.”

4“Friends, the Blessed One has said that suffering is dependently arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. If one were to speak thus one would be stating what has been said by the Blessed One and would not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact; one would explain in accordance with the Dhamma, and no reasonable consequence of one’s assertion would give ground for criticism.

5“Therein, friends, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that suffering is created by oneself, that is conditioned by contact.⁷³ On the expression tadapi phassapaccayā, “that (too) is conditioned by contact,” Spk says that this may be known from the fact that there is no experience of suffering without contact. It seems to me, however, that the point being made here is not that suffering does not arise without contact (though this is true), but that the adoption of a view does not occur without contact. The Brahmajāla Sutta states the same point in relation to the sixty-two speculative views—that the proclamation of each of these views is conditioned by contact and the views cannot be experienced without contact. See DN I 41-43, translated in Bodhi, All-Embracing Net of Views, pp. 85-87, with the commentary at pp. 197-98. Also, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that suffering is created by another, that too is conditioned by contact. Also, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another, that too is conditioned by contact. [34] Also, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another, that too is conditioned by contact.

6“Therein, friends, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that suffering is created by oneself, it is impossible that they will experience [anything] without contact. Also, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that suffering is created by another, it is impossible that they will experience [anything] without contact. Also, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another, it is impossible that they will experience [anything] without contact. Also, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another, it is impossible that they will experience [anything] without contact.”

(ii)

7The Venerable Ānanda heard this conversation between the Venerable Sāriputta and the wanderers of other sects. Then, when he had walked for alms in Rājagaha and had returned from the alms round, after his meal he approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and reported to the Blessed One the entire conversation between the Venerable Sāriputta and those wanderers of other sects. [The Blessed One said:]

8“Good, good, Ānanda! Anyone answering rightly would answer just as Sāriputta has done. I have said, Ānanda, that suffering is dependently arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. If one were to speak thus one would be stating what has been said by me and would not misrepresent me with what is contrary to fact; one would explain in accordance with the Dhamma, and no reasonable consequence of one’s assertion would give ground for criticism.

9“Therein, Ānanda, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that suffering is created by oneself ... [35] … and those who maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another, that too is conditioned by contact.

10“Therein, Ānanda, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that suffering is created by oneself ... and those who maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another, it is impossible that they will experience [anything] without contact.

11“On one occasion, Ānanda, I was dwelling right here in Rājagaha, in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary. Then, in the morning, I dressed and, taking bowl and robe, I entered Rājagaha for alms. Then it occurred to me: ‘It is still too early to walk for alms in Rājagaha. Let me go to the park of the wanderers of other sects.’ Then I went to the park of the wanderers of other sects. I exchanged greetings with those wanderers and, when we had concluded our greetings and cordial talk, I sat down to one side. The wanderers then said to me as I was sitting to one side: … (the wanderers ask exactly the same question as they had asked Sāriputta and receive an identical reply) [36] … it is impossible that they will experience [anything] without contact.”

12“It is wonderful, venerable sir! It is amazing, venerable sir! How the entire meaning can be stated by a single phrase! Can this same meaning be stated in detail in a way that is deep and deep in implications?”⁷⁴ Gambhīro c’ eva assa gambhīrāvabhāso ca. The same two terms are used at 12:60 and at DN II 55,9-10 to describe paṭiccasamuppāda . For the explanation of Sv, see Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 64-67. Spk explains “that same meaning” (es’ ev’ attho) to be the meaning of dependent origination implicit in the proposition, “Suffering is dependent on contact.”

13“Well then, Ānanda, clear up that same matter yourself.”

14“Venerable sir, if they were to ask me: ‘Friend Ānanda, what is the source of aging-and-death, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced?’—being asked thus, I would answer thus: ‘Friends, aging-and-death has birth as its source, birth as its origin; it is born and produced from birth.’ Being asked thus, I would answer in such a way. [37]

15“Venerable sir, if they were to ask me: ‘Friend Ānanda, what is the source of birth, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced?’—being asked thus, I would answer thus: ‘Friends, birth has existence as its source, existence as its origin; it is born and produced from existence…. Existence has clinging as its source ... Clinging has craving as its source ... Craving has feeling as its source ... Feeling has contact as its source ... Contact has the six sense bases as its source, the six sense bases as its origin; it is born and produced from the six sense bases. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six bases for contact comes cessation of contact; with the cessation of contact, cessation of feeling; with the cessation of feeling, cessation of craving; with the cessation of craving, cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’ Being asked thus, venerable sir, I would answer in such a way.”

25. Bhūmija

At Sāvatthı̄.

(i)

1Then, in the evening, the Venerable Bhūmija emerged from seclusion and approached the Venerable S̄riputta.⁷⁵ He gives his name to the Bhūmija Sutta (MN No. 126), where he answers some questions of Prince Jayasena and then engages in conversation with the Buddha. The first part of the present sutta repeats the first part of the preceding one except that it is phrased in terms of “pleasure and pain.” [38] He exchanged greetings with the Venerable Sāriputta and, when they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and said to him:

2“Friend Sāriputta, some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that pleasure and pain are created by oneself; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that pleasure and pain are created by another; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that pleasure and pain are created both by oneself and by another; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that pleasure and pain have arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another.⁷⁶ It is difficult to understand how these ascetics could be “proponents of kamma” (kammavādā) when they hold that pleasure and pain arise fortuitously. Neither Spk nor Spkpṭ offers any clarification. Now, friend Sāriputta, what does the Blessed One say about this? What does he teach? How should we answer if we are to state what has been said by the Blessed One and not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact? And how should we explain in accordance with the Dhamma so that no reasonable consequence of our assertion would give ground for criticism?”

3“Friend, the Blessed One has said that pleasure and pain are dependently arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. If one were to speak thus one would be stating what has been said by the Blessed One and would not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact; one would explain in accordance with the Dhamma, and no reasonable consequence of one’s assertion would give ground for criticism.

4“Therein, friend, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that pleasure and pain are created by oneself, and those who maintain that pleasure and pain are created by another, and those who maintain that pleasure and pain are created both by oneself and by another, and those who maintain that pleasure and pain have arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another—in each case that is conditioned by contact.

5“Therein, friends, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that pleasure and pain are created by oneself, and those who maintain that pleasure and pain are created by another, and those who maintain that pleasure and pain are created both by oneself and by another, and those [39] who maintain that pleasure and pain have arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another—in each case it is impossible that they will experience [anything] without contact.”

(ii)

6The Venerable Ānanda heard this conversation between the Venerable Sāriputta and the Venerable Bhūmija. He then approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and reported to the Blessed One the entire conversation between the Venerable Sāriputta and the Venerable Bhūmija. [The Blessed One said:]

7“Good, good, Ānanda! Anyone answering rightly would answer just as Sāriputta has done. I have said, Ānanda, that pleasure and pain are dependently arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. If one were to speak thus one would be stating what has been said by me and would not misrepresent me with what is contrary to fact; one would explain in accordance with the Dhamma, and no reasonable consequence of one’s assertion would give ground for criticism.

8“Therein, Ānanda, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that pleasure and pain are created by oneself ... and those who maintain that pleasure and pain have arisen fortuitously … in each case that is conditioned by contact.

9“Therein, Ānanda, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, who maintain that pleasure and pain are created by oneself ... and those who maintain that pleasure and pain have arisen fortuitously … in each case it is impossible that they will experience [anything] without contact.

(iii)

10“Ānanda, when there is the body, because of bodily volition pleasure and pain arise [40] internally; when there is speech, because of verbal volition pleasure and pain arise internally; when there is the mind, because of mental volition pleasure and pain arise internally—and with ignorance as condition.⁷⁷ This passage is also at AN II 157-59. Spk says that the Buddha added this section to show that pleasure and pain do not arise with contact alone as condition, but with other conditions as well. In this case the bodily, verbal, and mental volitions (kāya-, vacī-, manosañcetanā) are the kammically effective volitions that function as conditions for the resultant pleasure and pain (vipākasukhadukkha). I follow Be and Se in reading avijjāpaccayā ca and in taking this clause to belong to the end of the present paragraph. This has the support of Spk, which explains that this is said to show that these volitions are conditioned by ignorance. Ee reads va for ca and places the clause at the beginning of the next paragraph. “Either on one’s own initiative, Ᾱnanda one generates that bodily volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally; or prompted by others one generates that bodily volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally. Either deliberately, Ānanda, one generates that bodily volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally; or undeliberately one generates that bodily volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally.⁷⁸ Spk identifies the three volitional formations—kāyasaṅkhāra, vacīsaṅkhāra, manosaṅkhāra—with the three types of volition mentioned just above. One generates them “on one’s own initiative” (sāmaṅ) when one acts without inducement by others, with an unprompted mind (asaṅkhārikacitta); one generates them “prompted by others” when one acts with a prompted mind (sasaṅkhārikacitta). One acts deliberately (sampajāno) when one acts with knowledge of kamma and its fruit; undeliberately (asampajāno), when one acts without such knowledge. This text may be the original basis for the Abhidhamma distinction between sasaṅkhārikacitta and asaṅkhārikacitta, on which see CMA 1:4.

11“Either on one’s own initiative, Ānanda, one generates that verbal volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally; or prompted by others one generates that verbal volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally. Either deliberately, Ānanda, one generates that verbal volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally; or undeliberately one generates that verbal volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally.

12“Either on one’s own initiative, Ānanda, one generates that mental volitional formation⁷⁹ The term used here is manosaṅkhāra, but from the context this is clearly synonymous with cittasaṅkhāra at 12:2. There is no textual justification for identifying the latter with the cittasaṅkhāra at 41:6 (IV 293,17) and MN I 301,28-29, defined as saññā and vedanā. conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally; or prompted by others one generates that mental volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally. Either deliberately, Ānanda, one generates that mental volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally; or undeliberately one generates that mental volitional formation conditioned by which pleasure and pain arise internally.

13“Ignorance is comprised within these states.⁸⁰ I read with Be and Se, imesu Ānanda dhammesu avijjā anupatitā . The chasu in Ee appears superfluous. Spk: Ignorance is included among these states under the heading of decisive support (upanissaya); for they are all comprehended under this phrase, “With ignorance as condition, volitional formations.” (On the interpretation of paṭicca-samuppāda by way of the twenty-four conditional relations of the Paṭṭhāna, see Vism, chap. 17, concisely explained in Nyanatiloka Thera, Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, pp. 159-73.)
But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance that body does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally; that speech does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally; that mind does not exist conditioned by which [41] that pleasure and pain arise internally.⁸¹ Spk: That body does not exist which, if it existed, would enable pleasure and pain to arise conditioned by bodily volition; the same method of explanation applies to speech and mind. (Query:) But an arahant acts, speaks, and thinks, so how is it that his body, etc., do not exist? (Reply:) In the sense that they do not generate kammic results. For the deeds done by an arahant are neither wholesome nor unwholesome kamma, but merely functional (kiriyamatta); thus for him it is said, “that body, etc., do not exist.” On the functional consciousness of the arahant, see CMA 1:15. An alternative explanation might be simply that with the elimination of ignorance there will be no further arising of the five aggregates, the basis of all experience, and thus no further experiencing of pleasure and pain.
That field does not exist, that site does not exist, that base does not exist, that foundation does not exist conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise internally.”⁸² Spk: There is no field (khetta) in the sense of a place of growth; no site (vatthu) in the sense of a support; no base (āyatana) in the sense of a condition; no foundation (adhikaraṇa) in the sense of a cause.

26. Upavāṇa

1At Sāvatthı̄. Then the Venerable Upavāṇa approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:⁸³ Upavāṇa is the Buddha’s attendant at 7:13. The present sutta is almost identical with the first part of 12:24 except that it omits the qualifying expression kammavādā in the description of the ascetics and brahmins.

2“Venerable sir, some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering is created by oneself; some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering is created by another; some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another; some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another. Now, venerable sir, what does the Blessed One say about this? What does he teach? How should we answer if we are to state what has been said by the Blessed One and not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact? And how should we explain in accordance with the Dhamma so that no reasonable consequence of our assertion would give ground for criticism?”

3“Upavāṇa, I have said that suffering is dependently arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. If one were to speak thus one would be stating what has been said by me and would not misrepresent me with what is contrary to fact; one would explain in accordance with the Dhamma, and no reasonable consequence of one’s assertion would give ground for criticism.

4“Therein, Upavāṇa, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins who maintain that suffering is created by oneself, and those who maintain that suffering is created by another, and those who maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another, and those who maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another—in each case that is conditioned by contact. [42]

5“Therein, Upavāṇa, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins who maintain that suffering is created by oneself, and those who maintain that suffering is created by another, and those who maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another, and those who maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another—in each case it is impossible that they will experience [anything] without contact.”

27. Conditions

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness … Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

2“And what, bhikkhus, is aging-and-death? The aging of the various beings ... (as in §2) … thus this aging and this death are together called aging-and-death. With the arising of birth there is the arising of aging-and-death; with the cessation of birth there is the cessation of aging-and-death. Just this Noble Eightfold Path is the way leading to the cessation of aging-and-death; that is, right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.

3“And what, bhikkhus, is birth?… existence?… clinging?… [43] … craving?… feeling?… contact?… the six sense bases?… name-and-form? … consciousness?… volitional formations? There are these three kinds of volitional formations: the bodily volitional formation, the verbal volitional formation, the mental volitional formation. With the arising of ignorance there is the arising of volitional formations. With the cessation of ignorance there is the cessation of volitional formations. Just this Noble Eightfold Path is the way leading to the cessation of volitional formations; that is, right view ... right concentration.

4“When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple thus understands the condition; thus understands the origin of the condition; thus understands the cessation of the condition; thus understands the way leading to the cessation of the condition,⁸⁴ Spk: He understands the condition by way of the truth of suffering, and the origin of the condition, etc., by way of the truth of the origin, etc. he is then called a noble disciple who is accomplished in view, accomplished in vision, who has arrived at this true Dhamma, who sees this true Dhamma, who possesses a trainee’s knowledge, a trainee’s true knowledge, who has entered the stream of the Dhamma, a noble one with penetrative wisdom, one who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless.”⁸⁵ This whole passage is repeated at 12:28, 33, 49, and 50. Spk: He is endowed with the view of the path (maggadiṭṭhi), the vision of the path, etc. Sekha is used here as an adjective to qualify ñāṇa and vijjā. The sekha or trainee is one who has arrived at the supramundane path and is training in it but has not yet reached arahantship, i.e., a stream-enterer, once-returner, or nonreturner; on reaching arahantship he becomes an asekha, “one beyond training.”
The rendering of amatadvāraṁ āhacca tiṭṭhati at KS 2:33 as “who stands knocking at the door of the Deathless,” if intended literally, shows a misunderstanding of the idiom āhacca tiṭṭhati. In both canon and commentaries the expression is often used to mean “reaching right up to, standing up against,” and does not imply knocking on a door, which in Pāli is expressed by the verb ākoṭeti (e.g., at Vin I 248,5). The idiom is also at 17:28, 29(II 238,5, 16-17). For other instances, see CPD, s.v. āhacca. The Deathless, of course, is Nibbāna. Spk identifies the door to the Deathless as the noble path.

28. Bhikkhu

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Herein, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. He understands birth ... existence ... clinging [44] … craving ... feeling ... contact ... the six sense bases ... name-and-form … consciousness ... volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation.

2“And what, bhikkhus, is aging-and-death?… (as in preceding sutta) … Just this Noble Eightfold Path is the way leading to the cessation of volitional formations; that is, right view ... right concentration.

3“When, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu thus understands aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation; when he thus understands birth ... existence ... clinging ... craving ... feeling ... contact ... the six sense bases ... name-and-form ... [45] consciousness ... volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation, he is then called a bhikkhu who is accomplished in view, accomplished in vision, who has arrived at this true Dhamma, who sees this true Dhamma, who possesses a trainee’s knowledge, a trainee’s true knowledge, who has entered the stream of the Dhamma, a noble one with penetrative wisdom, one who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless.”

29. Ascetics and Brahmins (1)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, those ascetics or brahmins who do not fully understand aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation;⁸⁶ This sutta is almost identical with 12:13; the only difference is in the operative verb, there pajānāti and here parijānāti. Spk says this sutta was spoken in accordance with the inclination (ajjhāsaya) of the bhikkhus who recite the words, for they are able to penetrate (the sense) when the prefix pari- is used. who do not fully understand birth ... existence ... clinging ... craving ... feeling ... contact ... the six sense bases … name-and-form … consciousness … volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation: these I do not consider to be ascetics among ascetics or brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones do not, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of asceticism or the goal of brahminhood.

2“But, bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who fully understand aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation; who fully understand birth … volitional formations, [46] their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation: these I consider to be ascetics among ascetics and brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of asceticism and the goal of brahminhood.”

30. Ascetics and Brahmins (2)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, as to those ascetics or brahmins who do not understand aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation: it is impossible that they will abide having transcended aging-and-death. As to those ascetics and brahmins who do not understand birth … existence … clinging … craving ... feeling ... contact ... the six sense bases … name-and-form … consciousness … volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation: it is impossible that they will abide having transcended volitional formations.

2“But, bhikkhus, as to those ascetics or brahmins who understand aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation: it is possible that they will abide having transcended aging-and-death. As to those ascetics and brahmins who understand birth … volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation: it is possible that they will abide having transcended volitional formations.”

1On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthı̄.… There the Blessed One addressed the Venerable Sāriputta thus: “Sāriputta, in ‘The Questions of Ajita’ of the Pārāyana it is said:⁸⁷ The Pārāyana, the “Going to the Far Shore,” is the last chapter of Sn. It consists of sixteen sections (plus prologue and epilogue), in each of which the Buddha replies to questions posed by one of sixteen brahmin students. “The Questions of Ajita” is the first of the sixteen sections.

2‘Those who have comprehended the Dhamma,
And the manifold trainees here:
Asked about their way of conduct,
Being discreet, tell me, dear sir.’⁸⁸ Spk-pṭ: Those who have comprehended the Dhamma (saṅkhātadhammā ) are the arahants, who have penetrated the (four) truths. The trainees (sekhā) are the seven types of persons—those on the four paths and the lower three fruits. Saṅkhātadhammā could be understood to mean either “those who have comprehended the Dhamma,” i.e., the teaching, or “those who have comprehended things,” i.e., phenomena and their principles. Nidd II 34-35 (Be) glosses in both ways: as those who have known the Dhamma (ñātadhammā), by knowing all formations as impermanent, etc.; and as those who have comprehended the aggregates, elements, sense bases, etc. The trainees (sekhā) are so called because they train in the higher virtue, the higher mind (the jhānas), and the higher wisdom. Though Norman says that Pj II and Nidd II do not take sekhā and puthū as going together (GD, p. 367, n. to 1038), read correctly both these texts do place the two words in apposition. The trainees are manifold (puthū) because they fall into the seven types.

3How should the meaning of this, stated in brief, be understood in detail?”

4When this was said, the Venerable Sāriputta was silent. A second time and a third time the Blessed One addressed the Venerable Sāriputta thus: “Sāriputta, in ‘The Questions of Ajita’ in the Pārāyana it is said ... [48] How should the meaning of this, stated in brief, be understood in detail?” A second time and a third time the Venerable Sāriputta was silent.⁸⁹ Spk: Why did he remain silent up to the third time? He was not puzzled by the question but by the Buddha’s intention (ajjhāsaya). For it was possible to answer in many ways—by way of the aggregates, elements, sense bases, or conditionality—and he wanted to catch the Teacher’s intention. Then the Teacher, aware of the reason for his silence, gave him the method with the words, “Do you see...?”

5“Sāriputta, do you see: ‘This has come to be’? Sāriputta, do you see: ‘This has come to be’?”

6“Venerable sir, one sees as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘This has come to be.’ Having seen as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘This has come to be,’ one is practising for the purpose of revulsion towards what has come to be, for its fading away and cessation.⁹⁰ Spk: This has come to be (bhūtam idaṁ): this is said of the five aggregates. Thus the Teacher gave the elder the method, implying, “Answer my question by way of the five aggregates.” Then, just as the great ocean appears as one open expanse to a man standing on the shore, so as soon as he was given the method the answer to the question appeared to the elder with a hundred and a thousand methods. With correct wisdom (sammā paññāya): one sees it with path-wisdom together with insight. One is practising: from the stage of virtue as far as the path of arahantship one is said to be practising for the purpose of revulsion, etc. This section shows the practice of the trainee. One sees as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘Its origination occurs with that as nutriment.’⁹¹ Tadāhārasambhavaṁ. On nutriment see 12:11, 12and n. 18 above. No doubt it is the dependence of the five aggregates on nutriment that accounts for the inclusion of this sutta in the Nidānasaṁyutta. A similar treatment of nutriment, in catechism form, is at MN I 260,7-32. Spk resolves tadāhārasambhavaṁ as taṁ āhārasambhavaṁ, apparently taking tad to represent the five aggregates. I see the whole expression as qualifying an implicit subject (“its”) and take tad (“that”) as a specification of āhāra. Such an interpretation seems required by the parallel statement on cessation. See too the use of the expression tadāhāra at SN II 85,6, 86,12, 87,6, etc., which supports this interpretation.
Having seen as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘Its origination occurs with that as nutriment, ’ one is practising for the purpose of revulsion towards its origination through nutriment, for its fading away and cessation. One sees as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘With the cessation of that nutriment, what has come to be is subject to cessation.’ Having seen as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘With the cessation of that nutriment, what has come to be is subject to cessation, ’ one is practising for the purpose of revulsion towards what is subject to cessation, for its fading away and cessation. It is in such a way that one is a trainee.

7“And how, venerable sir, has one comprehended the Dhamma? Venerable sir, one sees as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘This has come to be.’ Having seen as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘This has come to be,’ through revulsion towards what has come to be, through its fading away and cessation, one is liberated by nonclinging. One sees as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘Its origination occurs with that as nutriment.’ Having seen as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘Its origination occurs with that as nutriment,’ through revulsion towards its origination through nutriment, through its fading away and cessation, one is liberated by nonclinging. One sees as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘With the cessation of that nutriment, what has come to be is subject to cessation.’ Having seen as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘With the cessation of that nutriment, what has come to be is subject to cessation,’ through revulsion towards what is subject to cessation, through its fading away [49] and cessation, one is liberated by nonclinging.⁹² Anupādā vimutto. Spk: One is liberated by not grasping anything at all with the four kinds of clinging (upādāna). This section shows the arahant. It is in such a way that one has comprehended the Dhamma.

8“Thus, venerable sir, when it is said in ‘The Questions of Ajita’ of the Pārāyana:

9‘Those who have comprehended the Dhamma,
And the manifold trainees here:
Asked about their way of conduct,
Being discreet, tell me, dear sir.’—

10“Good, good, Sāriputta!… (the Buddha repeats here the entire statement of the Venerable Sāriputta) [50] … it is in such a way that the meaning of this, stated in brief, should be understood in detail.”

32. The Kaḷāra

At Sāvatthı̄.

(i)

1Then the bhikkhu Kaḷāra the Khattiya approached the Venerable Sāriputta and exchanged greetings with him. When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and said to the Venerable Sāriputta: “Friend Sāriputta, the bhikkhu Moḷiyaphagguna has abandoned the training and returned to the lower life.”⁹³ The bhikkhu Kaḷāra the Khattiya is met only here. Moḷiyaphagguna appears in 12:12; see n. 21. “Returned to the lower life” (hīnāyāvatto) means that he reverted to the state of a layman. Spk and Spk-pṭ together help to illuminate this cryptic exchange thus: “He did not find solace (assāsa)” means that he had not attained the three (lower) paths; for if he had attained them he would not have reverted to the lower life since then he would not have been tempted by sensual pleasures (his reason for disrobing). Sāriputta says “I have no perplexity” (na kaṅkhāmi) about having attained solace since his support is the knowledge of a disciple’s perfection (sāvakapāramīñāṇa). “As to the future” (āyatiṁ) refers to future rebirth; the question is an indirect way of asking if he has attained arahantship.

2“Then surely that venerable did not find solace in this Dhamma and Discipline.”

3“Well then, has the Venerable Sāriputta attained solace in this Dhamma and Discipline?”

4“I have no perplexity, friend.”

5“But as to the future, friend?”

6“I have no doubt, friend.”

7Then the bhikkhu Kaḷāra the Khattiya rose from his seat and approached the Blessed One. Having approached, he paid homage to the Blessed One, sat down to one side, [51] and said to him: “Venerable sir, the Venerable Sāriputta has declared final knowledge thus: ‘I understand: Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.’”⁹⁴ Spk remarks that Sāriputta did not declare final knowledge in such words, but the elder Kaḷāra Khattiya had ascribed this statement to him because he was happy and pleased. Final knowledge (aññā) is arahantship.

8Then the Blessed One addressed a certain bhikkhu thus: “Come, bhikkhu, tell Sāriputta in my name that the Teacher calls him.”

9“Yes, venerable sir,” that bhikkhu replied, and he went to the Venerable Sāriputta and told him: “The Teacher calls you, friend Sāriputta.”

10“Yes, friend,” the Venerable Sāriputta replied, and he approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, and sat down to one side. The Blessed One then said to him: “Is it true, Sāriputta, that you have declared final knowledge thus: ‘I understand: Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being’?”

11“Venerable sir, I did not state the matter in those terms and phrases.”

12“In whatever way, Sāriputta, a clansman declares final knowledge, what he has declared should be understood as such.”

13“Venerable sir, didn’t I too speak thus: ‘Venerable sir, I did not state the matter in those terms and phrases’?”

14“If, Sāriputta, they were to ask you:⁹⁵ Spk: The Blessed One asked him this question to get him to declare final knowledge, thinking: “He will not declare final knowledge of his own accord, but he will do so when answering my question.” ‘Friend Sāriputta, how have you known, how have you seen, that you have declared final knowledge thus: ‘I understand: Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being’—being asked thus, how would you answer?”

15“If they were to ask me this, venerable sir, [52] I would answer thus: ‘With the destruction of the source from which birth originates, I have understood: “When [the cause] is destroyed, [the effect] is destroyed.” Having understood this, I understand: Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.’ Being asked thus, venerable sir, I would answer in such a way.”⁹⁶ Spk: Here too (as in 12:31) the elder was puzzled not by the question but by the Buddha’s intention; he was unsure how the Teacher wanted him to declare arahantship. But he started to speak in terms of conditionality, which was what the Teacher wanted. When he realized that he had grasped the Teacher’s intention, the answer appeared to him with a hundred and a thousand methods. I have translated the first part of Sāriputta’s reply in accordance with the gloss of Spk thus: “With the destruction of the specific condition for birth, I have understood, ‘As the condition for birth is destroyed, the effect, namely birth, is destroyed.’”

16“But, Sāriputta, if they were to ask you: ‘But, friend Sāriputta, what is the source of birth, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced?’—being asked thus, how would you answer?”

17“If they were to ask me this, venerable sir, I would answer thus: ‘Birth, friends, has existence has its source, existence as its origin; it is born and produced from existence.’ Being asked thus, venerable sir, I would answer in such a way.”

18“But, Sāriputta, if they were to ask you: ‘But, friend Sāriputta, what is the source of existence…?’—being asked thus, how would you answer?”

19“If they were to ask me this, venerable sir, I would answer thus: ‘Existence, friends, has clinging as its source….’”

20“But, Sāriputta, if they were to ask you: ‘But, friend Sāriputta, what is the source of clinging…? What is the source of craving, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced?’—being asked thus, how would you answer?” [53]

21“If they were to ask me this, venerable sir, I would answer thus: ‘Craving, friends, has feeling as its source, feeling as its origin; it is born and produced from feeling.’ Being asked thus, venerable sir, I would answer in such a way.”

22“But, Sāriputta, if they were to ask you: ‘Friend Sāriputta, how have you known, how have you seen, that delight in feelings no longer remains present in you?’—being asked thus, how would you answer?”⁹⁷ Spk: The Buddha asks this to get Sāriputta to roar a lion’s roar in his own proper domain. For Sāriputta attained the knowledge of a disciple’s perfection after he had discerned the three feelings while the Buddha taught the wanderer Dīghanakha “The Discourse on the Discernment of Feelings” and this became his own domain (savisaya). Spk refers here to the Dīghanakha Sutta (MN No. 74; see esp. MN I 500,9-501,6), and seems to be using “Vedanāpariggaha Sutta” as an alternative title for that text. Ee (S II 53,8-9, 12) should be amended to read vedanāsu nandī.

23“If they were to ask me this, venerable sir, I would answer thus: ‘Friends, there are these three feelings. What three? Pleasant feeling, painful feeling, neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. These three feelings, friends, are impermanent; whatever is impermanent is suffering. When this was understood, delight in feelings no longer remained present in me.’ Being asked thus, venerable sir, I would answer in such a way.”

24“Good, good, Sāriputta! This is another method of explaining in brief that same point: ‘Whatever is felt is included within suffering. ’⁹⁸ Yaṁ kiñci vedayitaṁ taṁ dukkhasmiṁ. See 36:11 (IV 216,20-217,3). But, Sāriputta, if they were to ask you: ‘Friend Sāriputta, through what kind of deliverance have you declared final knowledge thus: “I understand: Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being”?’—being asked thus, how would you answer?”

25“If they were to ask me this, venerable sir, I would answer thus: [54] ‘Friends, through an internal deliverance, through the destruction of all clinging, I dwell mindfully in such a way that the taints do not flow within me and I do not despise myself.’ Being asked thus, venerable sir, I would answer in such a way.”⁹⁹ Spk: Internal deliverance (ajjhattaṁ vimokkho): he attained arahantship while comprehending the internal formations. Spk refers here to a fourfold distinction in how the path emerges, found also at Vism 661-62 (Ppn 21:84-85). Spk: The taints do not flow within me (āsavā nānussavanti): The three taints, the taint of sensuality, etc., do not flow through the six sense doors towards the six sense objects, i.e., they do not arise in me. And I do not despise myself (attānañ ca nāvajānāmi): by this the abandoning of self-contempt (omāna) is indicated. C.Rh.D, at KS 2:40, has misunderstood this expression, rendering it “and I admit no (immutable) soul.”

26“Good, good, Sāriputta! This is another method of explaining in brief that same point: ‘I have no perplexity in regard to the taints spoken of by the Ascetic; I do not doubt that they have been abandoned by me.’”

27This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Fortunate One rose from his seat and entered his dwelling.

(ii)

28Then, soon after the Blessed One had departed, the Venerable Sāriputta addressed the bhikkhus thus:

29“Friends, the first question that the Blessed One asked me had not been previously considered by me:¹⁰⁰ Pubbe appaṭisaṁviditaṁ. Spk: “I had not previously known or understood, ‘He will ask me this.’ His hesitancy was for the purpose of finding out the Teacher’s intention.” The past participle appaṭisaṁvidita suggests the Skt noun pratisaṁvid, counterpart of Pāli paṭisambhidā, the analytical knowledges in which Sāriputta excelled.
thus I hesitated over it. But when the Blessed One approved of my answer, it occurred to me: ‘If the Blessed One were to question me about this matter with various terms and with various methods for a whole day, for a whole day I would be able to answer him with various terms and with various methods. If he were to question me about this matter with various terms and with various methods for a whole night, for a day and night, [55] for two days and nights, for three, four, five, six, or seven days and nights—for seven days and nights I would be able to answer him with various terms and with various methods.’”

30Then the bhikkhu Kaḷāra the Khattiya rose from his seat and approached the Blessed One. Having approached, he paid homage to the Blessed One, sat down to one side, and said to him: “Venerable sir, the Venerable Sāriputta has roared his lion’s roar thus: ‘Friends, the first question that the Blessed One asked me had not been previously considered by me: thus I hesitated over it. But when the Blessed One approved of my answer, it occurred to me: “If the Blessed One were to question me about this matter for up to seven days and nights, [56] for up to seven days and nights I would be able to answer him with various terms and with various methods.”’”

31“Bhikkhu, the Venerable Sāriputta has thoroughly penetrated that element of the Dhamma by the thorough penetration of which, if I were to question him about that matter with various terms and with various methods for up to seven days and nights, for up to seven days and nights he would be able to answer me with various terms and with various methods.”¹⁰¹ Spk: That element of the Dhamma (sā dhammadhātu): Here, “element of the Dhamma” is the knowledge of a disciple’s perfection, which is capable of seeing the principle of conditionality without obscuration (paccayākārassa vivaṭabhāvadassanasamatthaṁ sāvakapāramīñāṇaṁ).

33. Cases of Knowledge (1)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, I will teach you forty-four cases of knowledge. Listen to that and attend closely, I will speak.”

2“Yes, venerable sir,” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

3“Bhikkhus, what are the forty-four cases of knowledge? [57] Knowledge of aging-and-death, knowledge of its origin, knowledge of its cessation, knowledge of the way leading to its cessation. Knowledge of birth ... Knowledge of existence … Knowledge of clinging ... Knowledge of craving ... Knowledge of feeling ... Knowledge of contact ... Knowledge of the six sense bases ... Knowledge of name-and-form … Knowledge of consciousness … Knowledge of volitional formations, knowledge of their origin, knowledge of their cessation, knowledge of the way leading to their cessation. These, bhikkhus, are the forty-four cases of knowledge.

4“And what, bhikkhus, is aging-and-death?… (definition as in §2) … Thus this aging and this death are together called aging-and-death. With the arising of birth there is the arising of aging-and-death. With the cessation of birth there is the cessation of aging-and-death. This Noble Eightfold Path is the way leading to the cessation of aging-and-death; that is, right view ... right concentration.

5“When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple thus understands aging-and-death, its origin, [58] its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, this is his knowledge of the principle.¹⁰² Dhamme ñāṇa. Spk explains the Dhamma here as the Four Noble Truths (catusaccadhamma) or path knowledge (maggañāṇadhamma ). By means of this principle that is seen, understood, immediately attained, fathomed,¹⁰³ Iminā dhammena diṭṭhena viditena akālikena pattena pariyogāḷhena. Note that the string of participles here corresponds exactly to the terms used in the standard description of one who has gained “the vision of the Dhamma” (dhammacakkhu): diṭṭhadhammo, pattadhammo, viditadhammo, pariyogāḷhadhammo (“seen the Dhamma, attained the Dhamma, understood the Dhamma, fathomed the Dhamma,” e.g., at DN I 110,14-15). This implies that the Dhamma which the stream-enterer has seen is dependent origination, an inference additionally confirmed by the closing passage of the present sutta. Spk here treats akālikena as an independent adjective qualifying dhammena and explains it to mean that the path yields its fruit immediately after it is penetrated, without passage of time (kiñci kālaṁ anatikkamitvā paṭivedhānantaraṁ yeva phaladāyakena). However, in commenting on 42:11 (IV 328,21-22), where the same statement is found, Spk explains akālikena as an adverb of manner used in apposition to pattena (see IV, n. 352). I understand akālikena in the present passage in exactly the same way; otherwise it is difficult to see why it should be included amidst a string of past participles. Moreover, since the word here characterizes the relationship between temporal events like birth and aging, the common rendering of it as “timeless” is not entirely satisfactory. The desired sense in this context is “not involving the passage of time,” i.e., immediate, which qualifies the knowledge of the conditional relationship between the factors, not the factors themselves. The point is that this knowledge is a matter of direct “ocular” experience rather than of reasoning and inference.
he applies the method to the past and to the future thus: ‘Whatever ascetics and brahmins in the past directly knew aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, all these directly knew it in the very same way that I do now. Whatever ascetics and brahmins in the future will directly know aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, all these will directly know it in the very same way that I do now.’ This is his knowledge of entailment. ¹⁰⁴ Anvaye ñāṇa. Spk: The knowledge (that follows) as a consequence of the knowledge of the principle; this is a name for reviewing knowledge (see n. 68). It is not possible to apply the method to the past and future by means of the dhamma of the four truths or the dhamma of path knowledge, but when the four paths have been penetrated by path knowledge, reviewing knowledge subsequently occurs, and one applies the method by means of that. This explanation is difficult to square with the account of reviewing knowledge at Vism 676 and elsewhere as knowledge of the path and fruit attained, the defilements abandoned, those remaining, and Nibbāna. What is meant here, rather, is an inference extended to past and future, based on the immediate discernment of the conditionality operative between any given pair of factors.
The following paragraph is also at 12:27, 28. Spk says that the arahant’s (prior) plane of traineeship (khīṇāsavassa sekhabhūmi) is being discussed, on which Spk-pṭ remarks: the moment of the supreme path (aggamaggakhaṇa).

6“When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has purified and cleansed these two kinds of knowledge—knowledge of the principle and knowledge of entailment—he is then called a noble disciple who is accomplished in view, accomplished in vision, who has arrived at this true Dhamma, who sees this true Dhamma, who possesses a trainee’s knowledge, a trainee’s true knowledge, who has entered the stream of the Dhamma, a noble one with penetrative wisdom, one who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless.

7“And what, bhikkhus, is birth?… What are the volitional formations? … (definitions as in §2) [59] … This Noble Eightfold Path is the way leading to the cessation of volitional formations; that is, right view ... right concentration.

8“When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple thus understands volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation, this is his knowledge of the principle. By means of this principle that is seen, understood, immediately attained, fathomed, he applies the method to the past and to the future…. This is his knowledge of entailment.

9“When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has purified and cleansed these two kinds of knowledge—knowledge of the principle and knowledge of entailment—he is then called a noble disciple who is accomplished in view ... one who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless.”

34. Cases of Knowledge (2)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, I will teach you seventy-seven cases of knowledge. Listen to that and attend closely, I will speak.” [60]

2“Yes, venerable sir,” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

3“Bhikkhus, what are the seventy-seven cases of knowledge? The knowledge: ‘Aging-and-death has birth as its condition.’ The knowledge: ‘When there is no birth, there is no aging-and-death.’ The knowledge: ‘In the past too aging-and-death had birth as its condition.’ The knowledge: ‘In the past too, had there been no birth, there would have been no aging-and-death.’ The knowledge: ‘In the future too aging-and-death will have birth as its condition.’ The knowledge: ‘In the future too, should there be no birth, there will be no aging-and-death.’ The knowledge: ‘That knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma is also subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation.’¹⁰⁵ Spk: The knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma (dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇa ) is the knowledge of the principle of conditionality. For the principle of conditionality is called “the stability of the Dhamma” because it is the cause for the continued occurrence of phenomena (pavattiṭṭhitikāraṇattā); the knowledge of it is “the knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma.” This is a designation for just this sixfold knowledge. I render dhammaṭṭhitatā (at 12:20; n. 51) “stableness of the Dhamma” and dhammaṭṭhiti “stability of the Dhamma.” The latter also occurs at 12:70 (II 124,10). The two seem to be effectively synonymous.
The knowledge that this knowledge too is subject to destruction is called by Spk “counter-insight into insight” (vipassanā-paṭivipassanā), i.e., insight into the dissolution of the very act of insight knowledge that had just cognized the dissolution of the primary object. See Vism 641-42 (Ppn 21:11-13), where, however, the expression vipassanāpaṭivipassanā does not occur.

4“The knowledge: ‘Birth has existence as its condition.’… The knowledge: ‘Volitional formations have ignorance as their condition. ’ The knowledge: ‘When there is no ignorance, there are no volitional formations.’ The knowledge: ‘In the past too volitional formations had ignorance as their condition.’ The knowledge: ‘In the past too, had there been no ignorance, there would have been no volitional formations.’ The knowledge: ‘In the future too volitional formations will have ignorance as their condition.’ The knowledge: ‘In the future too, should there be no ignorance, there will be no volitional formations.’ The knowledge: ‘That knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma is also subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation.’

5“These, bhikkhus, are called the seventy-seven cases of knowledge.”

35. With Ignorance as Condition (1)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.”

2When he had said this, a certain bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: “Venerable sir, what now is aging-and-death, and for whom is there this aging-and-death?”

3“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied.¹⁰⁶ Kassa ca pan’ idaṁ jarāmaraṇaṁ. This question, and the following ones moulded on the same pattern, presuppose the reality of a self and thus, like the questions at 12:12, must be rejected by the Buddha as invalid. Spk: Even though the question, “What is aging-and-death?” is properly formulated, because it is combined with the question, “For whom is there aging-and-death?” —which implicitly affirms belief in a being (sattūpaladdhi-vāda )—the entire question becomes wrongly formulated. This is like a dish of delicious food served on a golden platter, on top of which a small lump of excrement is placed: all the food becomes inedible and must be discarded.
[61] “Bhikkhu, whether one says, ‘What now is aging-and-death, and for whom is there this aging-and-death?’ or whether one says, ‘Aging-and-death is one thing, the one for whom there is this aging-and-death is another’—both these assertions are identical in meaning; they differ only in the phrasing. If there is the view, ‘The soul and the body are the same,’ there is no living of the holy life; and if there is the view, ‘The soul is one thing, the body is another,’ there is no living of the holy life.¹⁰⁷ Spk: The living of the holy life (brahmacariyavāsa) is the living of the noble path. One who holds the view “the soul and the body are the same” (taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīraṁ) holds that the soul and the body are annihilated together (at death). For one who holds this, the annihilationist view follows, for he holds that “a being is annihilated.” Now this noble path arises to stop and eradicate the round of existence. But on the annihilationist view the round ceases even without the development of the path, and thus the development of the path becomes purposeless. In the second case, one holding the view “the soul is one thing, the body another” (aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīraṁ) holds that the body alone is annihilated here, while the soul goes about freely like a bird released from a cage. This view is eternalism. But if there were even one formation that is permanent, stable, and eternal, the noble path would not be able to bring the round to an end; thus again the development of the path would be purposeless. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With birth as condition, aging-and-death. ’”

4“Venerable sir, what now is birth, and for whom is there this birth?”

5“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “Bhikkhu, whether one says, ‘What now is birth, and for whom is there this birth?’ or whether one says, ‘Birth is one thing, the one for whom there is this birth is another’—both these assertions are identical in meaning; they differ only in the phrasing…. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With existence as condition, birth.’”

6“Venerable sir, what now is existence, and for whom is there this existence?”

7“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “Bhikkhu, whether one says, ‘What now is existence, and for whom is there this existence?’ or whether one says, ‘Existence is one thing, the one for whom there is this existence is another’—both these assertions are identical in meaning; they differ only in the phrasing…. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With clinging as condition, existence…. With craving as condition, clinging…. With feeling as condition, craving…. With contact as condition, feeling…. With the six sense bases as condition, contact…. With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases…. [62] With consciousness as condition, name-and-form…. With volitional formations as condition, consciousness.’”

8“Venerable sir, what now are volitional formations, and for whom are there these volitional formations?”

9“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “Bhikkhu, whether one says, ‘What now are volitional formations, and for whom are there these volitional formations?’ or whether one says, ‘Volitional formations are one thing, the one for whom there are these volitional formations is another’—both these assertions are identical in meaning; they differ only in the phrasing. If there is the view, ‘The soul and the body are the same,’ there is no living of the holy life; and if there is the view, ‘The soul is one thing, the body is another,’ there is no living of the holy life. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations.’

10“But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance, whatever kinds of contortions, manoeuvres, and vacillations there may be¹⁰⁸ I read with Be: yāni ’ssa tāni visūkāyikāni visevitāni vipphanditāni kānici kānici. Se is almost the same, but the orthography in Ee is very unsatisfactory. Spk explains that the three nouns are all synonyms for wrong view. This is called a contortion (visūkāyika) because it is an obstruction to oneself, being like a spike (visūkam iva; Spk-pṭ: = kaṇṭaka, a thorn) in the sense that it punctures right view (sammādiṭṭhiyā vinivijjhanaṭṭhena). It is a manoeuvre (visevita) because it fails to conform to right view but instead runs contrary to it; and a vacillation (vipphandita) because of grasping now annihilationism, now eternalism. Spk takes visūkāyika to be related to sūci, needle, but it would be difficult to justify this derivation by the actual use of the term. The three synonyms also occur at 4:24 (I 123,30-31) and MN I 234,19-20; at MN I 446,12-13 they describe the behaviour of an untrained horse.
—‘What now is aging-and-death, and for whom is there this aging-and-death?’ or ‘Aging-and-death is one thing, the one for whom there is this aging-and-death is another,’ or ‘The soul and the body are the same,’ or ‘The soul is one thing, the body is another’—all these are abandoned, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that they are no more subject to future arising.¹⁰⁹ Spk glosses tālāvatthukatāni as tālavatthu viya katāni, “made like a palm-base,” and explains: “Made like a palm with cut-off head (i.e., a palm stump) in the sense of never growing again; and made like a place for the support of a palm after it has been extricated along with its root” (puna aviruhaṇaṭṭhena matthakacchinnatālo viya samūlaṁ tālaṁ uddharitvā tassa patiṭṭhitaṭṭhānaṁ viya ca katāni). Spk-pṭ first accepts the original reading tālāvatthu (lit. “palm-nonbase”) as it stands and explains: “The palm itself is the ‘palm-non-base’ because it is not a base for leaves, flowers, fruit, and sprouts. But some read tālavatthukatāni, which means: ‘made like a palm because of being without a base.’”

11“With the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance, whatever kinds of contortions, manoeuvres, and vacillations there may be—‘What now is birth, and for whom is there this birth?’... [63] ... ‘What now are volitional formations, and for whom are there these volitional formations?’ or ‘Volitional formations are one thing, the one for whom there are these volitional formations is another,’ or ‘The soul and the body are the same,’ or ‘The soul is one thing, the body is another’—all these are abandoned, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that they are no more subject to future arising.”

36. With Ignorance as Condition (2)

1(This sutta is identical with the preceding one, differing only in that the bhikkhus are addressed collectively throughout, and there is no interlocutor who asks inappropriate questions. The Buddha simply cites the invalid types of assertions on his own.) [64]

37. Not Yours

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, this body is not yours, nor does it belong to others.¹¹⁰ Spk: Since there actually is no self, there is nothing belonging to self; thus he says, “It is not yours” (na tumhākaṁ). And since there is no self of others, he says, “Neither does it belong to others” (na pi aññesaṁ). See too 22:33 and 35:101. [65] It is old kamma, to be seen as generated and fashioned by volition, as something to be felt.¹¹¹ Spk: It is old kamma (purāṇam idaṁ kammaṁ): This body is not actually old kamma, but because it is produced by old kamma it is spoken of in terms of its condition. It should be seen as generated (abhisaṅkhata), in that it is made by conditions; as fashioned by volition (abhisañcetayita), in that it is based on volition, rooted in volition; and as something to be felt (vedaniya), in that it is a basis for what is to be felt [Spkpṭ: because it is a basis and object of feeling]. See too 35:146, where the same idea is extended to the six internal sense bases. To reflect upon the body in terms of dependent origination, one considers that this body can be subsumed under “form” in the compound “name-and-form.” One then reflects that name-and-form comes into being with consciousness, i.e., the rebirth-consciousness, as a conascent condition, and that both consciousness and name-and-form originate from the volitional formations, i.e., the kammic activities of the preceding existence. Thus the theme of this sutta ties up with the three that immediately follow.
Therein, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple attends carefully and closely to dependent origination itself thus: ‘When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases. That is, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

38. Volition (1)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, what one intends, and what one plans, and whatever one has a tendency towards: this becomes a basis for the maintenance of consciousness. When there is a basis there is a support for the establishing of consciousness. When consciousness is established and has come to growth, there is the production of future renewed existence. When there is the production of future renewed existence, future birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.¹¹² Spk: Here, the phrase one intends (ceteti) includes all wholesome and unwholesome volition of the three planes; one plans (pakappeti), the mental fabrications of craving and views (taṇhādiṭṭhikappā) in the eight cittas accompanied by greed [Spk-pṭ: the fabrications of views occur only in the four cittas associated with views]; and whatever one has a tendency towards (anuseti) implies the underlying tendencies (anusaya) under the headings of conascence and decisive-support conditions for the twelve (unwholesome) volitions. (On the twelve unwholesome cittas, see CMA 1:4-7.) This becomes a basis (ārammaṇam etaṁ hoti): These various states such as volition become a condition; for here the word ārammaṇa is intended as condition (paccaya; that is, here ārammaṇa does not signify an object of consciousness, the usual meaning in the Abhidhamma). For the maintenance of consciousness (viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā): for the purpose of maintaining the kammic consciousness. When there is this condition, there is a support for the establishing of consciousness (patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti), i.e., for the establishing of that kammic consciousness [Spk-pṭ: it has a capacity to yield fruit in one’s mental continuum]. When that (kammic) consciousness is established and has come to growth (tasmiṁ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe ... virūḷhe): when, having impelled kamma, it has grown, produced roots, through its ability to precipitate rebirth, there is the production of future renewed existence, i.e., production consisting in renewed existence.
Cp. 12:64 and 22:53-54 below. AN I 223-24 explains the process of renewed existence in similar terms (see n. 24). I see the verbs ceteti and pakappeti as allusions to saṅkhārā (which, as kammic activities, are expressive of cetanā—see AN III 415,7-8). Anuseti clearly refers to the anusaya or underlying tendencies, which include avijjānusaya, the underlying tendency to ignorance (= ignorance in the usual formula of dependent origination) and rāgānusaya, the underlying tendency to lust (= craving in the usual formula). The way they maintain consciousness is thus no different from the way the volitional formations, fueled by ignorance and craving, serve as the condition for consciousness: together, they underlie the flow of consciousness, infuse it with kammic potentials for renewed existence, and project it into a new existence, thereby initiating the process that will culminate in birth. I am not in full agreement with Spk in taking the viññāṇa that is “maintained” and “established” as the kammic consciousness. I interpret it simply as the ongoing process of consciousness, including both the kammically active and resultant phases. At 22:53-54 the other four aggregates are spoken of as the ārammaṇa and patiṭṭhā of viññāṇa, but I am doubtful that this application will work here. To use the categories of the Abhidhamma, it seems that in this sutta the terms ārammaṇa and patiṭṭhā denote the decisive-support condition (upanissayapaccaya) for consciousness, while in the two suttas in the Khandhasaṁyutta they denote the conascence and support conditions (sahajātapaccaya, nissayapaccaya).
I use “volition” as a rendering for cetanā but “intends” for the corresponding verb ceteti; I use “intention” for the unrelated noun saṅkappa. I justify this apparent inconsistency on the ground that in Pāli the verb saṅkappeti (corresponding to saṅkappa) occurs very rarely (if at all), while English lacks a simple verb corresponding to “volition.” “A support for the establishing of consciousness” renders patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa. I find that “established” works consistently better as a rendering for the participle patiṭṭhita, but “support” for the noun patiṭṭhā, so to bridge the participle and the noun in the present passage (and at 22:53, 54) I have coined this compound expression.

2“If, bhikkhus, one does not intend, and one does not plan, but one still has a tendency towards something, this becomes a basis for the maintenance of consciousness. When there is a basis, there is a support for the establishing of consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.¹¹³ Spk: This refers to a moment when there is no occurrence of [wholesome and unwholesome] volition of the three planes, and no occurrence of the mental fabrications of craving and views. But one still has a tendency: by this the underlying tendencies are included because they have not been abandoned here in the resultants of the three planes, in the limited functional states (the five-door adverting and mind-door adverting cittas), and in form. As long as the underlying tendencies exist, they become a condition for the kammic consciousness, for there is no way to prevent its arising. Spk-pṭ: This second section is stated to show that wholesome and unwholesome kamma capable of producing rebirth is accumulated in the preliminary portion (of the path of practice), and that even without planning (through craving and views), the volitions of insight meditation in a meditator who has seen the dangers in existence are still conditioned by the underlying tendencies and are capable of generating rebirth. It is also stated to show that even when wholesome and unwholesome states are not occurring there is still an establishing of kammic consciousness with underlying defilements as condition; for so long as these have not been abandoned they lie latent in the existing resultants of the three planes, etc.

3“But, bhikkhus, when one does not intend, and one does not plan, and one does not have a tendency towards anything, no basis exists for the maintenance of consciousness. [66] When there is no basis, there is no support for the establishing of consciousness. When consciousness is unestablished and does not come to growth, there is no production of future renewed existence. When there is no production of future renewed existence, future birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”¹¹⁴ Spk: When one does not intend, etc.: By the first phrase (“does not intend”) he shows that the wholesome and unwholesome volitions pertaining to the three planes have ceased; by the second (“does not plan”), that the craving and views in the eight cittas (accompanied by greed) have ceased; by the third (“does not have a tendency”), that the underlying tendencies lying latent in the aforesaid states have ceased. What is being discussed here? The function of the path of arahantship (arahattamaggassa kiccaṁ). It can also be interpreted as the arahant’s doing of his task (khīṇāsavassa kiccakaraṇaṁ) and the nine supramundane states (navalokuttaradhammā; i.e., the four paths, their fruits, and Nibbāna). Spk-pṭ: In this third section the function of the path of arahantship is discussed because that path completely stops the production of the underlying tendencies. The “arahant’s doing of his task” can be said because of the exclusion of feeling, etc. (meaning unclear). The nine supramundane states can be said because the underlying tendencies are extirpated by the series of paths, and the fruits follow immediately upon the paths, and Nibbāna is the object of both.
I understand the “unestablished consciousness” (appatiṭṭhita viññāṇa) here to mean a consciousness without the prospect of a future rebirth through the propulsive power of ignorance, craving, and the volitional formations. The arahant is said to expire with consciousness “unestablished,” as at 4:23 and 22:87.

39. Volition (2)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, what one intends, and what one plans, and whatever one has a tendency towards: this becomes a basis for the maintenance of consciousness. When there is a basis, there is a support for the establishing of consciousness. When consciousness is established and has come to growth, there is a descent of name-and-form.¹¹⁵ Nāmarūpassa avakkanti. See 12:12, where the production of future renewed existence is placed between consciousness and the six sense bases. Taken in conjunction, the two suttas imply that the “descent of name-and-form” and the “production of future renewed existence” are interchangeable (this in spite of the commentarial predilection for always seeing the latter as kammically active existence). Spk states that there is a “link” (sandhi) between consciousness and name-and-form; thus on this interpretation consciousness denotes the kammically generative consciousness of the previous existence, name-and-form the beginning of the present existence. It seems to me, however, more likely that viññāṇa straddles both the past life and the present life, as the principle of personal continuity. With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases [come to be]; with the six sense bases as condition, contact; with contact as condition, feeling ... craving ... clinging ... existence ... birth; with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

2“If, bhikkhus, one does not intend, and one does not plan, but one still has a tendency towards something, this becomes a basis for the maintenance of consciousness. When there is a basis, there is a support for the establishing of consciousness. When consciousness is established and has come to growth, there is a descent of name-and-form. With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases [come to be]…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

3“But, bhikkhus, when one does not intend, and one does not plan, and one does not have a tendency towards anything, no basis exists for the maintenance of consciousness. When there is no basis, there is no support for the establishing of consciousness. When consciousness is unestablished and does not come to growth, there is no descent of name-and-form. With the cessation of name-and-form comes cessation of the six sense bases…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

40. Volition (3)

1At Sāvatthı̄. [67] “Bhikkhus, what one intends, and what one plans, and whatever one has a tendency towards: this becomes a basis for the maintenance of consciousness. When there is a basis, there is a support for the establishing of consciousness. When consciousness is established and has come to growth, there is inclination. When there is inclination, there is coming and going. When there is coming and going, there is passing away and being reborn.¹¹⁶ Spk: Inclination (nati) is craving, called “inclination” in the sense of inclining (namanaṭṭhena) towards pleasant forms, etc. There is coming and going (āgatigati): there is a going of consciousness by way of rebirth towards what has come up (at death), presenting itself as kamma or the sign of kamma or the sign of future destiny. (The allusion is to the three objects of the last conscious process preceding death; see CMA 5:35-37.) There is passing away, passing from here, and being reborn, rebirth there. When there is passing away and being reborn, future birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

2“If, bhikkhus, one does not intend, and one does not plan, but one still has a tendency towards something, this becomes a basis for the maintenance of consciousness. When there is a basis, there is a support for the establishing of consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

3“But, bhikkhus, when one does not intend, and one does not plan, and one does not have a tendency towards anything, no basis exists for the maintenance of consciousness. When there is no basis, there is no support for the establishing of consciousness. When consciousness is unestablished and does not come to growth, there is no inclination. When there is no inclination, there is no coming and going. When there is no coming and going, there is no passing away and being reborn. When there is no passing away and being reborn, future birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”¹¹⁷ Cp. the “teaching of the Blessed One” recited by Mahācunda at 35:87 (IV 59,10-14).

1At Sāvatthı̄. Then the householder Anāthapiṇḍika approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, and sat down to one side. The Blessed One then said to him:

2“Householder, when five fearful animosities have subsided in a noble disciple, and he possesses the four factors of stream-entry, and he has clearly seen and thoroughly penetrated with wisdom the noble method, if he wishes he could by himself declare of himself: ‘I am one finished with hell, finished with the animal realm, finished with the domain of ghosts, finished with the plane of misery, the bad destinations, the nether world. I am a stream-enterer, no longer bound to the nether world, fixed in destiny, with enlightenment as my destination.’¹¹⁸ The sutta is also at 55:28 and at AN V 182-84. Spk glosses bhayāni verāni as volitions (bringing) fear and enmity (bhayaveracetanāyo). Spk-pṭ: The destruction of life and so forth are fearful and dreadful both for the perpetrator and for the victim; they are productive of fear and enmity, which are to be feared. The self-assured declaration of stream-entry is also at 55:8-10. The stream-enterer is exempt from the prospect of rebirth in the lower realms; he is fixed in destiny (niyata), as he cannot take more than seven rebirths, all in the human or celestial realms; and he has enlightenment as his destination (sambodhiparāyaṇa), as he will necessarily attain the enlightenment of arahantship.

3“What are the five fearful animosities that have subsided? Householder, one who destroys life engenders, on account of such behaviour, fearful animosity pertaining to the present life and fearful animosity pertaining to the future life, and he experiences mental pain and displeasure.¹¹⁹ The version at AN V 183 includes another line here: “But one who abstains from the destruction of life (etc.) does not engender fearful animosity pertaining to the present life and fearful animosity pertaining to the future life, and he does not experience mental pain and displeasure” pāṇātipātā paṭivirato n’ eva diṭṭhadhammikaṁ bhayaṁ veraṁ pasavati, na samparāyikaṁ bhayaṁ veraṁ pasavati, na cetasikaṁ dukkhaṁ domanassaṁ paṭisaṁvedeti). It seems that the logic of the discourse requires this addition; its omission from the present text could be an early scribal error. Thus for one who abstains from destroying life, this fearful animosity has subsided.

4“One who takes what is not given … [69] … who engages in sexual misconduct … who speaks falsely ... who indulges in wine, liquor, and intoxicants that are a basis for negligence engenders, on account of such behaviour, fearful animosity pertaining to the present life and fearful animosity pertaining to the future life, and he experiences mental pain and displeasure. Thus for one who abstains from wine, liquor, and intoxicants that are a basis for negligence, this fearful animosity has subsided.

5“These are the five fearful animosities that have subsided.

6“What are the four factors of stream-entry that he possesses?¹²⁰ Spk: The factors of stream-entry (sotāpattiyaṅga) are of two kinds: (i) the factors for stream-entry, the preliminary practices that lead to the attainment of stream-entry, namely, associating with superior persons, hearing the true Dhamma, careful attention, and practice in accordance with the Dhamma (see 55:55); (ii) the factors of one who abides having attained stream-entry. The latter are intended here. Confirmed confidence is unshakable confidence (gained) through what has been achieved [Spk-pṭ: namely, the path] (aveccappasādenā ti adhigatena [maggena] acalappasādena). Aveccappasāda is a syntactical compound (see I, n. 68), with avecca (Skt avetya) absolutive of *aveti, to undergo, to know, to experience. The formulas for recollection of the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha are analysed in detail at Vism 197-221 (Ppn 7:1-100).
Here, householder, the noble disciple possesses confirmed confidence in the Buddha thus: ‘The Blessed One is an arahant, perfectly enlightened, accomplished in true knowledge and conduct, fortunate, knower of the world, unsurpassed leader of persons to be tamed, teacher of devas and humans, the Enlightened One, the Blessed One.’

7“He possesses confirmed confidence in the Dhamma thus: ‘The Dhamma is well expounded by the Blessed One, directly visible, immediate, inviting one to come and see, applicable, to be personally experienced by the wise.’

8“He possesses confirmed confidence in the Saṅgha thus: ‘The Saṅgha of the Blessed One’s disciples is practising the good way, practising the straight way, practising the true way, practising the proper way; that is, the four pairs of persons, the eight types of individuals—this [70] Saṅgha of the Blessed One’s disciples is worthy of gifts, worthy of hospitality, worthy of offerings, worthy of reverential salutation, the unsurpassed field of merit for the world.’

9“He possesses the virtues dear to the noble ones—unbroken, untorn, unblemished, unmottled, freeing, praised by the wise, ungrasped, leading to concentration.¹²¹ Spk: The virtues dear to the noble ones (ariyakantāni sīlāni) are the five precepts, which the noble ones do not forsake even when they pass on to a new existence. The terms are explained at Vism 222 (Ppn 7:104). These virtues are “ungrasped” (aparāmaṭṭha) in the sense that they are not adhered to with craving and wrong view.

10“These are the four factors of stream-entry that he possesses.

11“And what is the noble method that he has clearly seen and thoroughly penetrated with wisdom?¹²² Spk: The method (ñāya) is both dependent origination and the stable knowledge after one has known the dependently arisen. As he says: “It is dependent origination that is called the method; the method is also the Noble Eightfold Path” (untraced). Wisdom here is repeatedly arisen insight-wisdom (aparāparaṁ uppannā vipassanāpaññā). Spk-pṭ: Dependent origination is called “the method” because, with the application of the right means, it is what is known (ñāyati) as it actually is in the dependently arisen. But knowledge (ñāṇa) is called “the method” because it is by this that the latter is known.
Despite the commentators, ñāya has no relation to ñāṇa but is derived from ni + i.
Here, householder, the noble disciple attends closely and carefully to dependent origination itself thus: ‘When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases. That is, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’

12“This is the noble method that he has clearly seen and thoroughly penetrated with wisdom.

13“When, householder, these five fearful animosities have subsided in a noble disciple, and he possesses these four factors of stream-entry, and he has clearly seen and thoroughly penetrated with wisdom this noble method, if he wishes he could by himself declare of himself: ‘I am one finished with hell, finished with the animal realm, finished with the domain of ghosts, finished with the plane of misery, the bad destinations, the nether world. I am a stream-enterer, no longer bound to the nether world, fixed in destiny, with enlightenment as my destination.’”

42. Five Fearful Animosities (2)

1(This sutta is identical with the preceding one except that it is addressed to “a number of bhikkhus.”) [71]

43. Suffering

1At Sāvatthı̄. [72] “Bhikkhus, I will teach you the origin and the passing away of suffering. Listen to that and attend closely, I will speak.”¹²³ Spk: Suffering here is the suffering of the round (vaṭṭadukkha ). There are two kinds of origin, momentary origin (khaṇikasamudaya) and origin through conditions (paccaya-samudaya ). A bhikkhu who sees the one sees the other. Passing away is also twofold, final passing away (accantatthaṅgama; Spk-pṭ: nonoccurrence, cessation, Nibbāna) and dissolutional passing away (bhedatthaṅgama; Spk-pṭ: the momentary cessation of formations). One who sees the one sees the other.

2“Yes, venerable sir,” the bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

3“And what, bhikkhus, is the origin of suffering? In dependence on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving. This is the origin of suffering.

4“In dependence on the ear and sounds ... In dependence on the nose and odours ... In dependence on the tongue and tastes ... In dependence on the body and tactile objects ... In dependence on the mind and mental phenomena, mind-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving. This is the origin of suffering.

5“And what, bhikkhus, is the passing away of suffering? In dependence on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving comes cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. This is the passing away of suffering.

6“In dependence on the ear and sounds ... In dependence on the mind and mental phenomena, mind-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving comes cessation of clinging … cessation of existence … cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, [73] sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. This is the passing away of suffering.”

44. The World

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, I will teach you the origin and the passing away of the world. Listen to that and attend closely, I will speak.”¹²⁴ Spk: The world here is the world of formations (saṅkhāraloka ). On the nature of the world in the Buddha’s teaching, see I, n. 182.

2“Yes, venerable sir,” the bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

3“And what, bhikkhus, is the origin of the world? In dependence on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence; with existence as condition, birth; with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. This, bhikkhus, is the origin of the world.

4“In dependence on the ear and sounds ... In dependence on the nose and odours … In dependence on the tongue and tastes ... In dependence on the body and tactile objects ... In dependence on the mind and mental phenomena, mind-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging … existence … birth; with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. This, bhikkhus, is the origin of the world.

5“And what, bhikkhus, is the passing away of the world? In dependence on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving comes cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. This, bhikkhus, is the passing away of the world.

6“In dependence on the ear and sounds … [74] … In dependence on the mind and mental phenomena, mind-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving comes cessation of clinging … cessation of existence … cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. This, bhikkhus, is the passing away of the world.”

45. At Ñātika

1Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Ñātika in the Brick Hall. Then, while the Blessed One was alone in seclusion, he uttered this Dhamma exposition:¹²⁵ Dhammapariyāya, a method of presenting the teaching. This sutta recurs at 35:113, where it is called Upassuti, “Listening In.” On Ñātika, see V, n. 330. “In dependence on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

2“In dependence on the ear and sounds ... In dependence on the mind and mental phenomena, mind-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

3“In dependence on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving comes cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. [75]

4“In dependence on the ear and sounds … In dependence on the mind and mental phenomena, mind-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [comes to be]; with feeling as condition, craving. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving comes cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

5Now on that occasion a certain bhikkhu was standing listening in on the Blessed One. The Blessed One saw him standing there listening in and said to him: “Did you hear that Dhamma exposition, bhikkhu?”

6“Yes, venerable sir.”

7“Learn that Dhamma exposition, bhikkhu, master it and remember it. That Dhamma exposition is beneficial and relevant to the fundamentals of the holy life.”

46. A Certain Brahmin

1At Sāvatthı̄. Then a certain brahmin approached the Blessed One and exchanged greetings with him. When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and said to him:

2“How is it, Master Gotama: is the one who acts the same as the one who experiences [the result]?”¹²⁶ See 12:17, 18and n. 39, n. 40.

3“‘The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences [the result]’: this, brahmin, is one extreme.” [76]

4“Then, Master Gotama, is the one who acts one, and the one who experiences [the result] another?”

5“‘The one who acts is one, and the one who experiences [the result] is another’: this, brahmin, is the second extreme. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’”

6When this was said, that brahmin said to the Blessed One: “Magnificent, Master Gotama!… I go for refuge to Master Gotama, and to the Dhamma, and to the Bhikkhu Saṅgha. From today let Master Gotama remember me as a lay follower who has gone for refuge for life.”

47. Jāṇussoṇi

1At Sāvatthı̄. Then the brahmin Jāṇussoṇi approached the Blessed One and exchanged greetings with him. When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and said to him:¹²⁷ A brahmin Jāṇussoṇi is mentioned at 45:4 and elsewhere in the Nikāyas. Spk says that he was a great chaplain (mahāpurohita) of much wealth who had gained his name by reason of his position. On the theme of this sutta see 12:15.

2“How is it, Master Gotama: does all exist?”

3“‘All exists’: this, brahmin, is one extreme.”

4“Then, Master Gotama, does all not exist?”

5“‘All does not exist’: this, brahmin, is the second extreme. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle….”

6When this was said, the brahmin Jāṇussoṇi said to the Blessed One: [77] “Magnificent, Master Gotama!… From today let Master Gotama remember me as a lay follower who has gone for refuge for life.”

48. A Cosmologist

1At Sāvatthı̄. Then a brahmin who was a cosmologist¹²⁸ Lokāyatika. Spk says that he was versed in lokāyata, the science of debate (vitaṇḍasatthe lokāyate kataparicayo). Spk-pṭ explains the etymology of the word thus: “Lokāyata is so called because by means of this the world does not strive for, does not advance towards, future welfare (āyatiṁ hitaṁ tena loko na yatati na īhatī ti lokāyataṁ). For on account of this belief, beings do not arouse even the thought of doing deeds of merit, much less do they make the effort.” Spk-pṭ’s explanation seems to reflect the understanding of lokāyata held at the time of the commentaries, as seen in MW’s definition of the word as “materialism, the system of atheistical philosophy (taught by Cārvāka).” There is cogent evidence, however, that the word acquired these connotations only in a later period. As Rhys Davids points out in a detailed discussion (at Dialogues of the Buddha, 1:166-72), lokāyata is used in the Nikāyas in a complimentary sense to designate a branch of brahmanical learning (as at DN I 88,7, 114,3, etc.). He suggests that the word originally meant nature-lore and only gradually acquired the negative meaning of sophistry and materialism. Jayatilleke has proposed that since the word is always used with reference to loka, the world, or sabba, the all, it originally signified, not nature-lore in general, but cosmology, and that the arrangement of lokāyata theses in opposing pairs indicates that the brahmins used the rival cosmological theories as topics of debate (Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp. 48-57).
approached the Blessed One … and said to him:

2“How is it, Master Gotama: does all exist?”

3“‘All exists’: this, brahmin, is the oldest cosmology.”¹²⁹ Jeṭṭhaṁ etaṁ lokāyataṁ. Spk glosses jeṭṭhaṁ with paṭhamaṁ and explains: “Lokāyata is an inferior, tainted speculative view that appears great and deep” (mahantaṁ gambhīran ti upaṭṭhitaṁ parittaṁ sāsavaṁ diṭṭhigataṁ; reading as in Se, which seems more reliable here than Be).

4“Then, Master Gotama, does all not exist?”

5“‘All does not exist’: this, brahmin, is the second cosmology.”

6“How is it, Master Gotama: is all a unity?”¹³⁰ Ekattaṁ. Spk: He asks whether it has a permanent nature (niccasabhāva); the first and third views are forms of the eternalist view (sassatadiṭṭhi).

7“‘All is a unity’: this, brahmin, is the third cosmology.”

8“Then, Master Gotama, is all a plurality?”¹³¹ Puthuttaṁ. Spk: This means a nature different from the previous nature; the second and fourth views are forms of the annihilationist view (ucchedadiṭṭhi).

9“‘All is a plurality’: this, brahmin, is the fourth cosmology. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle….”

10When this was said, that brahmin said to the Blessed One: “Magnificent, Master Gotama!… From today let Master Gotama remember me as a lay follower who has gone for refuge for life.”

49. The Noble Disciple (1)

1At Sāvatthı̄. [78] “Bhikkhus, an instructed noble disciple does not think: ‘When what exists does what come to be? With the arising of what does what arise? [When what exists do volitional formations come to be? When what exists does consciousness come to be?]¹³² The bracketed passages here and below are enclosed in brackets in all three eds., with notes to the effect that they are not found in certain eds. (Se says they are not found in the Thai ed. or in Sinhalese mss). It is really necessary to exclude them, for if they are included nothing would distinguish this sutta from the following one. Spk confirms this with its comment on 12:50 that this sutta differs from the preceding one only by stating the two methods together (dve nayā ekato vuttā), on which Spk-pṭ remarks: “This is said because the method stated in the ninth sutta, beginning ‘When there is consciousness, name-and-form comes to be,’ is included by the method stated in the tenth sutta, beginning ‘When there is ignorance, volitional formations come to be.’” When what exists does name-and-form come to be?… When what exists does aging-and-death come to be?’

2“Rather, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple has knowledge about this that is independent of others: ‘When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. [When there is ignorance, volitional formations come to be. When there are volitional formations, consciousness comes to be.] When there is consciousness, name-and-form comes to be…. When there is birth, aging-and-death comes to be.’ He understands thus: ‘In such a way the world originates.’

3“Bhikkhus, an instructed noble disciple does not think: ‘When what does not exist does what not come to be? With the cessation of what does what cease? [When what does not exist do volitional formations not come to be? When what does not exist does consciousness not come to be?] When what does not exist does name-and-form not come to be?… When what does not exist does aging-and-death not come to be?’”

4“Rather, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple has knowledge about this that is independent of others: ‘When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases. [When there is no ignorance, volitional formations do not come to be. When there are no volitional formations, consciousness does not come to be.] When there is no consciousness, name-and-form does not come to be…. When there is no birth, aging-and-death does not come to be.’ He understands thus: ‘In such a way the world ceases.’ [79]

5“Bhikkhus, when a noble disciple thus understands as they really are the origin and the passing away of the world, he is then called a noble disciple who is accomplished in view, accomplished in vision, who has arrived at this true Dhamma, who sees this true Dhamma, who possesses a trainee’s knowledge, a trainee’s true knowledge, who has entered the stream of the Dhamma, a noble one with penetrative wisdom, one who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless.”

50. The Noble Disciple (2)

1(This sutta is identical with the preceding one except that the passages enclosed in brackets there as absent in some editions are here clearly included in all editions.) [80]

1Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthı̄ in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Bhikkhus!”

2“Venerable sir!” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

3“Bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu is making a thorough investigation, in what way should he thoroughly investigate for the utterly complete destruction of suffering?”¹³⁴ Kittāvatā ... bhikkhu parivīmaṁsamāno parivīmaṁseyya sabbaso sammā dukkhakkhayāya. Spk glosses parivīmaṁsamāno with upaparikkhamāno.

4“Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One, guided by the Blessed One, [81] take recourse in the Blessed One. It would be good if the Blessed One would clear up the meaning of this statement. Having heard it from him, the bhikkhus will remember it.”

5“Then listen and attend closely, bhikkhus, I will speak.”

6“Yes, venerable sir,” the bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

7“Here, bhikkhus, when he makes a thorough investigation, a bhikkhu thoroughly investigates thus: ‘The many diverse kinds of suffering that arise in the world [headed by] aging-and-death: what is the source of this suffering, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced? When what exists does aging-and-death come to be? When what does not exist does aging-and-death not come to be?’

8“As he thoroughly investigates he understands thus: ‘The many diverse kinds of suffering that arise in the world [headed by] aging-and-death: this suffering has birth as its source, birth as its origin; it is born and produced from birth. When there is birth, aging-and-death comes to be; when there is no birth, aging-and-death does not come to be.’

9“He understands aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading on that is in conformity with its cessation.¹³⁵ Jarāmaraṇanirodhasāruppagāminī paṭipadā. Spk: The way leading on that is in conformity with the cessation of aging-and-death means the way leading on by its conformation with the cessation of aging-and-death, being similar (to cessation) by reason of its undefiled nature, its purity. In the repetition series just below, Ee omits jāti panāyaṁ kinnidānā, no doubt an editorial oversight.
He practises that way and conducts himself accordingly. This is called a bhikkhu who is practising for the utterly complete destruction of suffering, for the cessation of aging-and-death.

10“Then, investigating further, he thoroughly investigates thus: ‘What is the source of this birth, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced?… What is the source of this existence?… this clinging?… this craving?… this feeling?… this contact?… these six sense bases?… this name-and-form?… this consciousness? … What is the source of these volitional formations, what is their origin, from what are they born and produced? When what exists do volitional formations come to be? When what does not exist do volitional formations not come to be?’

11“As he thoroughly investigates he understands thus: ‘Volitional formations have ignorance as their source, ignorance as their origin; they are born and produced from ignorance. [82] When there is ignorance, volitional formations come to be; when there is no ignorance, volitional formations do not come to be.’

12“He understands volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading on that is in conformity with their cessation. He practises that way and conducts himself accordingly. This is called a bhikkhu who is practising for the utterly complete destruction of suffering, for the cessation of volitional formations.

13“Bhikkhus, if a person immersed in ignorance generates a meritorious volitional formation, consciousness fares on to the meritorious; if he generates a demeritorious volitional formation, consciousness fares on to the demeritorious; if he generates an imperturbable volitional formation, consciousness fares on to the imperturbable.¹³⁶ Spk: A meritorious volitional formation (puññaṁ saṅkhāraṁ) is the thirteen kinds of volition (i.e., the volitions of the eight wholesome sense-sphere cittas and the five wholesome cittas of the form sphere; see n. 7). Consciousness fares on to the meritorious (puññūpagaṁ hoti viññāṇaṁ): the kammic consciousness becomes associated with a meritorious kamma, the resultant consciousness with the fruits of merit. A demeritorious volitional formation (apuññaṁ saṅkhāraṁ) is the twelve kinds of volition (i.e., in the twelve unwholesome cittas; see n. 7). An imperturbable volitional formation (āneñjaṁ saṅkhāraṁ): the four kinds of volition (i.e., in the four wholesome cittas of the formless sphere). And here by mentioning the three kinds of kammic formations, the twelve-factored principle of conditionality is implied. To this extent the round of existence is shown. An analysis of these three types of volitional formations is at Vibh 135. At MN II 262-63 the Buddha explains in detail how viññāṇa becomes āneñjūpaga.
But when a bhikkhu has abandoned ignorance and aroused true knowledge, then, with the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, he does not generate a meritorious volitional formation, or a demeritorious volitional formation, or an imperturbable volitional formation. Since he does not generate or fashion volitional formations, he does not cling to anything in the world. Not clinging, he is not agitated.¹³⁷ Paritassati clearly represents Skt paritṛṣyati, “to crave, to thirst for,” and is connected etymologically with taṇhā. However, in Pāli (and perhaps in MIA dialects generally) the verbal stem has become conflated with tasati = to fear, to tremble, and thus its noun derivatives such as paritassanā and paritasita acquire the sense of nouns derived from tasati. This convergence of meanings, already evident in the Nikāyas, is made explicit in the commentaries. I have tried to capture both nuances by rendering the verb “to be agitated” and the noun “agitation.” Here Spk glosses na paritassati: “He is not agitated with the agitation of craving (taṇhāparitassanā) or the agitation of fear (bhayaparitassanā); the meaning is, he does not crave and does not fear.” Neither Spk nor Spk-pṭ comment on parinibbāyati, but what is meant is obviously the attainment of kilesaparinibbāna, the full quenching of defilements, on which see the General Introduction, pp. 49-50. On the arahant’s reviewing knowledge, see I, n. 376.
Not being agitated, he personally attains Nibbāna. He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.’

14“If he feels a pleasant feeling,¹³⁸ Spk: After the arahant’s reviewing knowledge has been shown, this passage is stated to show his constant dwelling (satatavihāra). The passage recurs, but with a different simile, at 22:88, 36:7, 8, and 54:8. he understands: ‘It is impermanent’; he understands: ‘It is not held to’; he understands: ‘It is not delighted in.’ If he feels a painful feeling, he understands: ‘It is impermanent’; he understands: ‘It is not held to’; he understands: ‘It is not delighted in.’ If he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he understands: ‘It is impermanent’; he understands: ‘It is not held to’; he understands: ‘It is not delighted in.’

15“If he feels a pleasant feeling, he feels it detached; if he feels a painful feeling, he feels it detached; if he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he feels it detached. [83]

16“When he feels a feeling terminating with the body, he understands: ‘I feel a feeling terminating with the body.’ When he feels a feeling terminating with life, he understands: ‘I feel a feeling terminating with life.’¹³⁹ Spk: A feeling terminating with the body (kāyapariyantikaṁ vedanaṁ) is one delimited by the body (kāyaparicchinnaṁ); a feeling terminating with life (jīvitapariyantikaṁ vedanaṁ) is one delimited by life. As long as the body with its five sense doors continues, the feelings occurring at the five sense doors continue; as long as life continues, the feelings occurring at the mind door continue. He understands: ‘With the breakup of the body, following the exhaustion of life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool right here; mere bodily remains will be left.’¹⁴⁰ Spk: Will become cool right here (idh’ eva ... sītibhavissanti): Right here, without having gone elsewhere by way of rebirth, they will become cool, subject to no further occurrence, devoid of the palpitation and disturbance of their occurrence.

17“Suppose, bhikkhus, a man would remove a hot clay pot from a potter’s kiln and set it on smooth ground: its heat would be dissipated right there and potsherds would be left. So too, when he feels a feeling terminating with the body ... terminating with life…. He understands: ‘With the breakup of the body, following the exhaustion of life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool right here; mere bodily remains will be left.’¹⁴¹ The unusual use of the plural sarīrāni here mirrors the unusual use of the plural kapillāni to mean potsherds. Spk glosses sarīrāni as dhātusarīrāni, bodily elements, which Spk-pṭ identifies as the bones (aṭṭhikakaṅkala). Kapilla usually means a pot or a bowl, but Spk says the plural here denotes potsherds bound together along with the rim. Spk elaborates the simile: The blazing potter’s oven represents the three realms of existence, the potter the meditator, and his rod the knowledge of the path of arahantship. The smooth piece of ground represents Nibbāna. The time when the potter removes the hot clay pot from the oven and places it on the ground is like the time when the meditator, having attained the supreme fruit of arahantship, removes his individual form from the four realms of misery and places it on the surface of Nibbāna by way of fruition attainment. Just as the hot clay pot (does not break up at once), so the arahant does not attain parinibbāna on the same day he reaches arahantship. He lives on for fifty or sixty years, striving to sustain the Buddha’s dispensation. When he reaches his last thought-moment, with the breakup of the aggregates he attains parinibbāna by the Nibbāna element without residue. Then, as with the potsherds of the pot, only inanimate bodily remains are left behind.
“What do you think, bhikkhus, can a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed generate a meritorious volitional formation, or a demeritorious volitional formation, or an imperturbable volitional formation?”

18“No, venerable sir.”

19“When there are utterly no volitional formations, with the cessation of volitional formations, would consciousness be discerned?”¹⁴² Spk: “Would a rebirth-consciousness (paṭisandhiviññāṇa) be discerned?” “No, venerable sir.”

20“When there is utterly no consciousness, with the cessation of consciousness, would name-and-form be discerned?”

21“No, venerable sir.”

22“When there is utterly no name-and-form … no six sense bases ... [84] ... no contact ... no feeling ... no craving ... no clinging ... no existence … no birth, with the cessation of birth, would aging-and-death be discerned?”

23“No, venerable sir.”

24“Good, good, bhikkhus! It is exactly so and not otherwise! Place faith in me about this, bhikkhus, resolve on this. Be free from perplexity and doubt about this. Just this is the end of suffering.” ¹⁴³ Spk: “Just this is the end of the suffering of the round, its termination, that is, Nibbāna.”

52. Clinging

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating gratification in things that can be clung to,¹⁴⁴ Upādāniyesu dhammesu. Spk: In the phenomena of the three planes, which are the conditions for the four kinds of clinging. On upādāniyā dhammā, see 22:121, 35:110, 123where clinging (upādāna) is explained simply as desire and lust (chandarāga) for the things that can be clung to. craving increases. With craving as condition, clinging [comes to be]; with clinging as condition, existence; with existence as condition, birth; with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

2“Suppose, bhikkhus, [85] a great bonfire was burning, consuming ten, twenty, thirty, or forty loads of wood, and a man would cast dry grass, dry cowdung, and dry wood into it from time to time. Thus, sustained by that material, fuelled by it, that great bonfire would burn for a very long time. So too, when one lives contemplating gratification in things that can be clung to, craving increases…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

3“Bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating danger in things that can be clung to, craving ceases. With the cessation of craving comes cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence … cessation of birth … aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.¹⁴⁵ Spk: The great bonfire represents the three realms of existence; the man tending the fire, the blind worldling attached to the round. His casting of fuel into the fire is like the worldling who contemplates gratification, creating wholesome and unwholesome kamma through the six sense doors on account of craving. The increase of the bonfire is like the blind worldling’s repeated production of the suffering of the round by the accumulation of kamma.

4“Suppose, bhikkhus, a great bonfire was burning, consuming ten, twenty, thirty, or forty loads of wood, and a man would not cast dry grass, dry cowdung, or dry wood into it from time to time. Thus, when the former supply of fuel is exhausted, that great bonfire, not being fed with any more fuel, lacking sustenance, would be extinguished. So too, when one lives contemplating danger in things that can be clung to, craving ceases…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”¹⁴⁶ Spk: A benefactor might come along and teach the man how to extinguish the fire, and the man would follow his advice. The benefactor represents the Buddha; his advice, the explanation of a meditation subject and an exhortation to gain release from suffering. The time the man follows the instructions is like the time the meditator is sitting in an empty hut applying insight to the phenomena of the three planes. The time when the man has bathed and adorned himself and is sitting tranquil and happy represents the time when the meditator, having cleansed himself of defilements by the noble path, sits absorbed in the attainment of fruition having Nibbāna as object. The time when the great bonfire is extinguished represents the time when the arahant’s aggregates break up and he passes away into the Nibbāna element without residue. [86]

53. Fetters (1)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating gratification in things that can fetter,¹⁴⁷ Saṁyojaniyesu dhammesu. Spk: The conditions for the ten fetters. On “things that can fetter,” see 22:120, 35:109, 122. Here too “the fetter” is explained simply as desire and lust. craving increases. With craving as condition, clinging [comes to be]; with clinging as condition, existence; with existence as condition, birth; with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

2“Suppose, bhikkhus, an oil lamp was burning in dependence on oil and a wick, and a man would pour oil into it and adjust the wick from time to time. Thus, sustained by that oil, fuelled by it, that oil lamp would burn for a very long time. So too, when one lives contemplating gratification in things that can fetter, craving increases…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

3“Bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating danger in things that can fetter, craving ceases. With the cessation of craving comes cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence … cessation of birth … aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

4“Suppose, bhikkhus, an oil lamp was burning in dependence on oil and a wick, and the man would not pour oil into it or adjust the wick from time to time. Thus, when the former supply of fuel is exhausted, that oil lamp, not being fed with any more fuel, lacking sustenance, would be extinguished. So too, when one lives contemplating danger in things that can fetter, craving ceases…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.” [87]

54. Fetters (2)

(This sutta is identical with the preceding one except that in both the sections on origination and cessation the similes come first and their applications only afterwards.)

55. The Great Tree (1)

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating gratification in things that can be clung to, craving increases. With craving as condition, clinging [comes to be]…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

2“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a great tree, and all its roots going downwards and across would send the sap upwards. Sustained by that sap, nourished by it, that great tree would stand for a very long time. So too, when one lives contemplating gratification in things that can be clung to, craving increases…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.¹⁴⁸ Spk: The great tree represents the round of existence with its three planes; the roots, the sense bases; the sending up of the sap through the roots, the building up of kamma through the six sense doors; the stability of the tree, the blind worldling’s long continuation in saṁsāra as he repeatedly sustains the round by building up kamma. [88]

3“When, bhikkhus, one dwells contemplating danger in things that can be clung to, craving ceases. With the cessation of craving comes cessation of clinging…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

4“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a great tree. Then a man would come along bringing a shovel and a basket. He would cut down the tree at its foot, dig it up, and pull out the roots, even the fine rootlets and root-fibre. He would cut the tree into pieces, split the pieces, and reduce them to slivers. Then he would dry the slivers in the wind and sun, burn them in a fire, and collect the ashes. Having done so, he would winnow the ashes in a strong wind or let them be carried away by the swift current of a river. Thus that great tree would be cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is no more subject to future arising.

5“So too, bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating danger in things that can be clung to, craving ceases…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”¹⁴⁹ Spk: The man wishing to destroy the great tree represents the meditator, his shovel (or axe) knowledge, the basket concentration. The time the tree is cut down at its root is like the occasion when wisdom arises in the meditator as he attends to his meditation subject. The cutting of the tree into pieces is like attending to the body in brief by way of the four great elements; the splitting of the pieces is like attending to the body in detail in forty-two aspects (Vism 348-51; Ppn 11:31-38); reducing the pieces to slivers is like the discernment of name-and-form by way of derived form and consciousness; cutting up the roots is like the search for the conditions of name-and-form. The time of burning the slivers is like the time when the meditator attains the supreme fruit (of arahantship). The collecting of the ashes is like the arahant’s life up to the time of his parinibbāna. The winnowing of the ashes, or their being carried away by the river, is like the stilling of the round when the arahant attains parinibbāna by the Nibbāna element without residue.

56. The Great Tree (2)

1(This sutta is identical with the preceding one except that in both the sections on origination and cessation the similes come first and their applications only afterwards.) [89]

57. The Sapling

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating gratification in things that can fetter, craving increases. With craving as condition, clinging [comes to be]…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

2“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a sapling, and from time to time a man would clear the area around the roots, from time to time provide it with good soil, from time to time water it. Sustained by that care, nourished by it, that sapling would attain to growth, increase, and expansion. So too, when one dwells contemplating gratification in things that can fetter, craving increases…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

3“When, bhikkhus, one dwells contemplating danger in things that can fetter, craving ceases. With the cessation of craving comes cessation of clinging…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. [90]

4“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a sapling. Then a man would come along bringing a shovel and a basket. He would cut down the sapling at its foot … (as in §55) … he would winnow the ashes in a strong wind or let them be carried away by the swift current of a river. Thus that sapling would be cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is no more subject to future arising.

5“So too, bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating danger in things that can fetter, craving ceases…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

58. Name-and-Form

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating gratification in things that can fetter, there is a descent of name-and-form. ¹⁵⁰ Nāmarūpassa avakkanti. Spk does not comment, but in the light of other suttas we might assume the statement to mean that the craving that underlies “contemplating gratification in things that can fetter” is the principal sustaining cause for the process of rebirth, which begins with “the descent of name-and-form.” See in this connection 12:39, 12:64, and n. 115. With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases [come to be]…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

2“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a great tree, and all its roots going downwards and across would send the sap upwards. Sustained by that sap, nourished by it, that great tree would stand for a very long time. So too, when one lives contemplating gratification in things that can fetter, there is a descent of name-and-form…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

3“When, bhikkhus, one dwells contemplating danger in things that can fetter, there is no descent of name-and-form. [91] With the cessation of name-and-form comes cessation of the six sense bases…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

4“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a great tree. Then a man would come along bringing a shovel and a basket. He would cut down the tree at its foot ... he would winnow the ashes in a strong wind or let them be carried away by the swift current of a river. Thus that great tree would be cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is no more subject to future arising.

5“So too, bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating danger in things that can fetter, there is no descent of name-and-form…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

59. Consciousness

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating gratification in things that can fetter, there is a descent of consciousness. ¹⁵¹ Viññāṇassa avakkanti. At DN II 63,2-4 it is said that if consciousness were not to descend into the mother’s womb, name-and-form would not take shape in the womb. The “descent of the embryo” (gabbhassāvakkanti)—spoken of at MN I 265,35-266,6, II 156,29-157,3, and AN I 176,31—presumably refers to the descent of the consciousness that initiates conception. With consciousness as condition, name-and-form [comes to be]…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

2“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a great tree, and all its roots going downwards and across would send the sap upwards. Sustained by that sap, nourished by it, that great tree would stand for a very long time. So too, when one lives contemplating gratification in things that can fetter, there is a descent of consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

3“When, bhikkhus, one dwells contemplating danger in things that can fetter, there is no descent of consciousness. With the cessation of consciousness comes cessation of name-and-form…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

4“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a great tree. Then a man would come along bringing a shovel and a basket. He would cut down the tree at its foot ... he would winnow the ashes in a strong wind or let them be carried away by the swift current of a river. Thus that great tree would be cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is no more subject to future arising.

5“So too, bhikkhus, when one dwells contemplating danger in things that can fetter, there is no descent of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.” [92]

60. Causation

1On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling among the Kurus, where there was a town of the Kurus named Kammāsadamma. Then the Venerable Ānanda approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:¹⁵² The opening of this sutta as far as “the nether world, saṁsāra” is nearly identical with the opening of the Mahānidāna Suttanta (DN No. 15), which differs only in including the aorist avaca. The present sutta is a composite, made up of the opening of the Mahānidāna grafted on to the body of 12:55. Spk here incorporates the long opening of the commentary to the Mahānidāna, for which see Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 58-73. Spk, however, does not attempt to explain how the same opening could have such a different sequel.

2“It is wonderful, venerable sir! It is amazing, venerable sir! This dependent origination is so deep and so deep in implications, yet to me it seems as clear as clear can be.”

3“Not so, Ānanda! Not so, Ānanda! This dependent origination is deep and deep in implications. It is because of not understanding and not penetrating this Dhamma, Ānanda, that this generation has become like a tangled skein, like a knotted ball of thread, like matted reeds and rushes, and does not pass beyond the plane of misery, the bad destinations, the nether world, saṁsāra.

4“Ānanda, when one dwells contemplating gratification in things that can be clung to, craving increases. With craving as condition, [93] clinging [comes to be]…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

5“Suppose, Ānanda, there was a great tree, and all its roots going downwards and across would send the sap upwards. Sustained by that sap, nourished by it, that great tree would stand for a very long time. So too, when one lives contemplating gratification in things that can be clung to, craving increases…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

6“When, Ānanda, one dwells contemplating danger in things that can be clung to, craving ceases. With the cessation of craving comes cessation of clinging…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

7“Suppose, Ānanda, there was a great tree. Then a man would come along bringing a shovel and a basket. He would cut down the tree at its foot ... he would winnow the ashes in a strong wind or let them be carried away by the swift current of a river. Thus that great tree would be cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is no more subject to future arising.

8“So too, Ānanda, when one dwells contemplating danger in things that can be clung to, craving ceases. With the cessation of craving comes cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

1Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthı̄ in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park….

2“Bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling¹⁵³ Spk: Uninstructed (assutavā): devoid of learning, interrogation, and discrimination regarding the aggregates, elements, sense bases, conditionality, the establishments of mindfulness, etc. Worldling (puthujjana) is a “many-being,” so called because of generating many diverse defilements, etc. (puthūnaṁ nānappakārānaṁ kilesādīnaṁ jananādikāraṇehi puthujjano); and also because he is included among the many people (puthūnaṁ janānaṁ antogadhattā), in number beyond reckoning, who are engaged in a low Dhamma contrary to the Dhamma of the noble ones. Or else puthu means “reckoned as separate”; the worldling is a person separated from the noble ones, who possess such qualities as virtue, learning, etc. (puthu vā ayaṁ visuṁ yeva saṅkhaṁ gato; visaṁsaṭṭho sīlasutādiguṇayuttehi ariyehi jano ti puthujjano). This twofold etymology stems from a twofold understanding of Pāli puthu: as representing either Vedic pṛthu = numerous, many; or pṛthak = separate, distinct. The BHS form pṛthagjana indicates a preference for the latter derivation, though the Pāli commentators tend to take the former as primary.
might experience revulsion towards this body composed of the four great elements; he might become dispassionate towards it and be liberated from it. For what reason? Because growth and decline is seen in this body composed of the four great elements, it is seen being taken up and laid aside. Therefore the uninstructed worldling might experience revulsion towards this body composed of the four great elements; he might become dispassionate towards it and be liberated from it.

3“But, bhikkhus, as to that which is called ‘mind’ and ‘mentality’ and ‘consciousness’¹⁵⁴ Cittaṁ iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇaṁ iti pi. Cp. DN I 21,21: Yaṁ ... idaṁ vuccati cittan ti vā mano ti vā viññāṇan ti vā. Spk says these are all names for the mind base (manāyatana). Normally I render both citta and mano as “mind,” but since English has only two words of common usage to denote the faculty of cognition—“mind” and “consciousness”—here I am compelled to use “mentality” as a makeshift for mano. While technically the three terms have the same denotation, in the Nikāyas they are generally used in distinct contexts. As a rough generalization, viññāṇa signifies the particularizing awareness through a sense faculty (as in the standard sixfold division of viññāṇa into eye-consciousness, etc.) as well as the underlying stream of consciousness, which sustains personal continuity through a single life and threads together successive lives (emphasized at 12:38-40). Mano serves as the third door of action (along with body and speech) and as the sixth internal sense base (along with the five physical sense bases); as the mind base it coordinates the data of the other five senses and also cognizes mental phenomena (dhammā), its own special class of objects. Citta signifies mind as the centre of personal experience, as the subject of thought, volition, and emotion. It is citta that needs to be understood, trained, and liberated. For a more detailed discussion, see Hamilton, Identity and Experience, chap. 5. —the uninstructed worldling is unable to experience revulsion towards it, unable to become dispassionate towards it and be liberated from it. For what reason? Because for a long time this has been held to by him, appropriated, and grasped thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self.’¹⁵⁵ Spk: It is held to (ajjhosita) by being swallowed up by craving; appropriated (mamāyita) by being appropriated by craving; and grasped (parāmaṭṭha) by being grasped through views. “This is mine” (etaṁ mama): the grip of craving (taṇhāgāha); by this the 108 thoughts of craving are included (see AN II 212,31-213,2). “This I am” (eso ’ham asmi): the grip of conceit (mānagāha); by this the nine kinds of conceit are included (see I, n. 37). “This is my self” (eso me attā): the grip of views (diṭṭhigāha); by this the sixty-two views are included (see DN I 12-38). Therefore the uninstructed worldling is unable to experience revulsion towards it, unable to become dispassionate towards it and be liberated from it.

4“It would be better, bhikkhus, for the uninstructed worldling to take as self this body composed of the four great elements rather than the mind. For what reason? Because this body composed of the four great elements is seen standing for one year, for two years, for three, four, five, or ten years, for twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years, for a hundred years, [95] or even longer.¹⁵⁶ Because this body ... is seen standing for a hundred years, or even longer. Spk: (Query:) Why does the Blessed One say this? Isn’t it true that the physical form present in the first period of life does not last through to the middle period, and the form present in the middle period does not last through to the last period?... Isn’t it true that formations break up right on the spot, stage by stage, section by section, just as sesamum seeds pop when thrown on a hot pan? (Reply:) This is true, but the body is said to endure for a long time in continuous sequence (paveṇivasena), just as a lamp is said to burn all night as a connected continuity (paveṇisambandhavasena) even though the flame ceases right where it burns without passing over to the next section of the wick. But that which is called ‘mind’ and ‘mentality’ and ‘consciousness’ arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night. Just as a monkey roaming through a forest grabs hold of one branch, lets that go and grabs another, then lets that go and grabs still another, so too that which is called ‘mind’ and ‘mentality’ and ‘consciousness’ arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night.¹⁵⁷ Spk: By day and by night (rattiyā ca divasassa ca): This is a genitive in the locative sense, i.e., during the night and during the day. Arises as one thing and ceases as another (aññadeva uppajjati, aññaṁ nirujjhati): The meaning is that (the mind) that arises and ceases during the day is other than (the mind) that arises and ceases during the night. The statement should not be taken to mean that one thing arises and something altogether different, which had not arisen, ceases. “Day and night” is said by way of continuity, taking a continuity of lesser duration than the previous one (i.e., the one stated for the body). But one citta is not able to endure for a whole day or a whole night. Even in the time of a fingersnap many hundred thousand of koṭis of cittas arise and cease (1 koṭi = 10 million). The simile of the monkey should be understood thus: The “grove of objects” is like the forest grove. The mind arising in the grove of objects is like the monkey wandering in the forest grove. The mind’s taking hold of an object is like the monkey grabbing hold of a branch. Just as the monkey, roaming through the forest, leaves behind one branch and grabs hold of another, so the mind, roaming through the grove of objects, arises sometimes grasping hold of a visible object, sometimes a sound, sometimes the past, sometimes the present or future, sometimes an internal object, sometimes an external object. When the monkey does not find a (new) branch it does not descend and sit on the ground, but sits holding to a single leafy branch. So too, when the mind is roaming through the grove of objects, it cannot be said that it arises without holding to an object; rather, it arises holding to an object of a single kind. It should be noted that neither the sutta nor the commentary interprets the monkey simile here as saying that the untrained mind is as restless as a monkey; the point, rather, is that the mind is always dependent on an object.

5“Therein, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple attends closely and carefully to dependent origination itself thus:¹⁵⁸ Spk explains the order of this discourse thus: First, because these bhikkhus were excessively obsessed with form, the Buddha spoke as if it were improper to grasp form (because its growth and decline are seen) but not improper to grasp mind. Next (in the passage beginning, “It would be better to take as self the body”) he speaks as if it were proper to grasp the body but improper to grasp the mind (because of its incessant change). Now, in the present passage, he speaks with the aim of removing their obsession with both body and mind. ‘When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases. That is, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formations, cessation of consciousness…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

6“Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple experiences revulsion towards form, revulsion towards feeling, revulsion towards perception, revulsion towards volitional formations, revulsion towards consciousness. Experiencing revulsion, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion [his mind] is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: ‘It’s liberated.’ He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.’”

62. Uninstructed (2)

1(This sutta is identical with the preceding one from the opening down to the monkey simile. It then omits the monkey simile and continues as follows:) [96]

2“Therein, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple attends closely and carefully to dependent origination itself thus: ‘When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases.’ Bhikkhus, in dependence on a contact to be experienced as pleasant, a pleasant feeling arises. With the cessation of that contact to be experienced as pleasant, the corresponding feeling—the pleasant feeling that arose in dependence on that contact to be experienced as pleasant—ceases and subsides. In dependence on a contact to be experienced as painful, a painful feeling arises. With the cessation of that contact to be experienced as painful, the corresponding feeling—the painful feeling [97] that arose in dependence on that contact to be experienced as painful—ceases and subsides. In dependence on a contact to be experienced as neither-painful-nor-pleasant, a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling arises. With the cessation of that contact to be experienced as neither-painful-nor-pleasant, the corresponding feeling—the neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling that arose in dependence on that contact to be experienced as neither-painful-nor-pleasant—ceases and subsides.

3“Bhikkhus, just as heat is generated and fire is produced from the conjunction and friction of two fire-sticks, but with the separation and laying aside of the sticks¹⁵⁹ I read with Se and Ee nānābhāvā vinikkhepā, as against Be nānākatavinibbhogā. The simile recurs at 36:10 (IV 215,22-25) and 48:39 (V 212,21-24); in both places Be has the same reading as Se and Ee here. Spk: The sense base is like the lower firestick, the object is like the upper firestick, contact is like the friction of the two, and feeling is like the heat element. the resultant heat ceases and subsides; so too, in dependence on a contact to be experienced as pleasant…acontact to be experienced as painful…a contact to be experienced as neither-painful-nor-pleasant, a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling arises…. With the cessation of that contact to be experienced as neither-painful-nor-pleasant, the corresponding feeling ... ceases and subsides.

4“Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple experiences revulsion towards contact, revulsion towards feeling, revulsion towards perception, revulsion towards volitional formations, revulsion towards consciousness. Experiencing revulsion, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion [his mind] is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: ‘It’s liberated.’ He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.’”

63. Son’s Flesh

1At Sāvatthī.¹⁶⁰ A translation of the long commentary to this sutta is included in Nyanaponika, The Four Nutriments of Life. Spk explains that the Buddha spoke this discourse because the Bhikkhu Saṅgha was receiving abundant almsfood and other requisites, and the Buddha wanted to place before the bhikkhus “a mirror of the Dhamma for their self-control and restraint, so that, contemplating on it again and again, the bhikkhus of the future will make use of the four requisites only after due reflection.” The opening paragraph is identical with that of 12:11. [98] “Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be. What four? The nutriment edible food, gross or subtle; second, contact; third, mental volition; fourth, consciousness. These are the four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be.

2“And how, bhikkhus, should the nutriment edible food be seen? Suppose a couple, husband and wife, had taken limited provisions and were travelling through a desert. They have with them their only son, dear and beloved. Then, in the middle of the desert, their limited provisions would be used up and exhausted, while the rest of the desert remains to be crossed. The husband and wife would think: ‘Our limited provisions have been used up and exhausted, while the rest of this desert remains to be crossed. Let us kill our only son, dear and beloved, and prepare dried and spiced meat. By eating our son’s flesh we can cross the rest of this desert. Let not all three of us perish!’

3“Then, bhikkhus, the husband and wife would kill their only son, dear and beloved, prepare dried and spiced meat, and by eating their son’s flesh they would cross the rest of the desert. While they are eating their son’s flesh, they would beat their breasts and cry: ‘Where are you, our only son? Where are you, our only son?’

4“What do you think, bhikkhus? Would they eat that food for amusement or for enjoyment [99] or for the sake of physical beauty and attractiveness?”

5“No, venerable sir.”

6“Wouldn’t they eat that food only for the sake of crossing the desert?”

7“Yes, venerable sir.”

8“It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that I say the nutriment edible food should be seen.¹⁶¹ Spk: Edible food should be considered as similar to son’s flesh by way of the ninefold repulsiveness: the repulsiveness of having to go out for it, of having to seek it, of eating it, of the bodily secretions, of the receptacle for the food (i.e., the stomach), of digestion and indigestion, of smearing, and of excretion. (For details see Vism 342-46; Ppn 11:5-26; there ten aspects are mentioned, the additional one being “fruit,” i.e., the repulsive parts of the body produced by food.) A bhikkhu should use his almsfood in the way the couple eat their son’s flesh: without greed and desire, without pickiness, without gorging themselves, without selfishness, without delusion about what they are eating, without longing to eat such food again, without hoarding, without pride, without disdain, and without quarreling. When the nutriment edible food is fully understood, lust for the five cords of sensual pleasure is fully understood.¹⁶² Spk: When the nutriment edible food is fully understood: It is fully understood by these three kinds of full understanding: (i) the full understanding of the known (ñātapariññā); (ii) the full understanding by scrutinization (tīraṇapariññā); and (iii) the full understanding as abandonment (pahānapariññā ). Therein, (i) a bhikkhu understands: “This nutriment edible food is ‘form with nutritive essence as the eighth’ (see n. 18) together with its base. This impinges on the tongue-sensitivity, which is dependent on the four great elements. Thus nutriment, tongue-sensitivity, and the four elements—these things are the form aggregate. The contact pentad (contact, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness) arisen in one who discerns this—these are the four mental aggregates. All these five aggregates are, in brief, name-and-form.” Next he searches out the conditions for these phenomena and sees dependent origination in direct and reverse order. By thus seeing name-and-form with its conditions as it actually is, the nutriment of edible food is fully understood by the full understanding of the known. (ii) Next he ascribes the three characteristics to that same name-and-form and explores it by way of the seven contemplations (of impermanence, suffering, nonself, revulsion, dispassion, cessation, and relinquishment—see Vism 607; Ppn 20:4). Thus it is fully understood by the full understanding by scrutinization. (iii) It is fully understood by the full understanding as abandonment when it is fully understood by the path of nonreturning, which cuts off desire and lust for that same name-and-form. Lust for the five cords of sensual pleasure is fully understood: It is fully understood by (i) the singlefold full understanding (ekapariññā), namely, that the craving for tastes arisen at the tongue door is the same craving that arises at all five sense doors; (ii) the comprehensive full understanding (sabbapariññā ), namely, that lust for all five cords of sensual pleasure arises even in regard to a single morsel of food placed in the bowl (for food stimulates desire in all five senses); (iii) the root full understanding (mūlapariññā), namely, that nutriment is the root for all five types of sensual lust, since sensual desire thrives when people are well fed.
When lust for the five cords of sensual pleasure is fully understood, there is no fetter bound by which a noble disciple might come back again to this world.¹⁶³ Spk: There is no fetter bound by which: This teaching is taken only as far as the path of nonreturning; but if one develops insight into the five aggregates by way of these same forms, etc., it is possible to explain it as far as arahantship.

9“And how, bhikkhus, should the nutriment contact be seen? Suppose there is a flayed cow. If she stands exposed to a wall, the creatures dwelling in the wall would nibble at her. If she stands exposed to a tree, the creatures dwelling in the tree would nibble at her. If she stands exposed to water, the creatures dwelling in the water would nibble at her. If she stands exposed to the open air, the creatures dwelling in the open air would nibble at her. Whatever that flayed cow stands exposed to, the creatures dwelling there would nibble at her.

10“It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that I say the nutriment contact should be seen.¹⁶⁴ Spk: Just as a cow, seeing the danger of being eaten by the creatures living in the places she might be exposed to, would not wish to be honoured and venerated, or to be massaged, rubbed, given hot baths, etc., so a bhikkhu, seeing the danger of being eaten by the defilement-creatures rooted in the nutriment contact, becomes desireless towards contact in the three planes of existence. When the nutriment contact is fully understood, the three kinds of feeling are fully understood. When the three kinds of feeling are fully understood, I say, there is nothing further that a noble disciple needs to do.¹⁶⁵ Spk explains the full understanding of contact in the same way as for edible food, except that contact is taken as the starting point for the discernment of the five aggregates. When contact is fully understood the three feelings are fully understood because they are rooted in contact and associated with it. The teaching by way of the nutriment contact is carried as far as arahantship.

11“And how, bhikkhus, should the nutriment mental volition be seen? Suppose there is a charcoal pit deeper than a man’s height, filled with glowing coals without flame or smoke. A man would come along wanting to live, not wanting to die, desiring happiness and averse to suffering. Then two strong men would grab him by both arms and drag him towards the charcoal pit. The man’s volition would be to get far away, his longing would be to get far away, his wish would be to get far away [from the charcoal pit]. [100] For what reason? Because he knows: ‘I will fall into this charcoal pit and on that account I will meet death or deadly suffering.’

12“It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that I say the nutriment mental volition should be seen.¹⁶⁶ Spk: The charcoal pit represents the round of existence with its three planes; the man wanting to live, the foolish worldling attached to the round; the two strong men, wholesome and unwholesome kamma. When they grab the man by both arms and drag him towards the pit, this is like the worldling’s accumulation of kamma; for the accumulated kamma drags along a rebirth. The pain from falling into the charcoal pit is like the suffering of the round. When the nutriment mental volition is fully understood, the three kinds of craving are fully understood. When the three kinds of craving are fully understood, I say, there is nothing further that a noble disciple needs to do.¹⁶⁷ Spk: The three kinds of craving are fully understood: The three kinds of craving are craving for sensual pleasures, craving for existence, and craving for extermination. They are fully understood because craving is the root of mental volition. Here too the teaching is carried as far as arahantship by way of mental volition.

13“And how, bhikkhus, should the nutriment consciousness be seen? Suppose they were to arrest a bandit, a criminal, and bring him before the king, saying: ‘Sire, this man is a bandit, a criminal. Impose on him whatever punishment you wish.’ The king says to them: ‘Go, men, in the morning strike this man with a hundred spears.’ In the morning they strike him with a hundred spears. Then at noon the king asks: ‘Men, how’s that man?’–‘Still alive, sire.’–‘Then go, and at noon strike him with a hundred spears.’ At noon they strike him with a hundred spears. Then in the evening the king asks: ‘Men, how’s that man?’–‘Still alive, sire.’ –‘Then go, and in the evening strike him with a hundred spears.’ In the evening they strike him with a hundred spears.

14“What do you think, bhikkhus? Would that man, being struck with three hundred spears, experience pain and displeasure on that account?”

15“Venerable sir, even if he were struck with one spear he would experience pain and displeasure on that account, not to speak of three hundred spears.”

16“It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that I say the nutriment consciousness should be seen.¹⁶⁸ Spk: The king represents kamma; the criminal, the worldling; the three hundred spears, the rebirth-consciousness. The time the king gives his command is like the time the worldling is driven towards rebirth by King Kamma. The pain from being struck by the spears is like the resultant suffering in the course of existence once rebirth has taken place. When the nutriment consciousness is fully understood, name-and-form is fully understood. When name-and-form is fully understood, I say, there is nothing further that a noble disciple needs to do.”¹⁶⁹ Spk: Name-and-form is fully understood when consciousness is fully understood because it is rooted in consciousness and arises along with it. By way of consciousness too the teaching is carried as far as arahantship. [101]

64. If There Is Lust

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be. What four? The nutriment edible food, gross or subtle; second, contact; third, mental volition; fourth, consciousness. These are the four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be.

2“If, bhikkhus, there is lust for the nutriment edible food, if there is delight, if there is craving, consciousness becomes established there and comes to growth.¹⁷⁰ Spk explains lust (rāga), delight (nandī), and craving (taṇhā) as synonyms for greed (lobha). Consciousness becomes established there and comes to growth (patiṭṭhitaṁ tattha viññāṇaṁ virūḷhaṁ): having impelled a kamma, it “becomes established and comes to growth” through its ability to drag along a rebirth. On the establishing of consciousness, see 12:38 and n. 112, and on the descent of name-and-form, 12:39 and n. 115. Wherever consciousness becomes established and comes to growth, there is a descent of name-and-form.¹⁷¹ Spk: Wherever (yattha) is a locative referring to the round of existence with its three planes. Or else, in all instances, this locative is used with reference to the correlative term in the preceding phrase. [Spk-pṭ: This locative expression yattha ... tattha is used with reference to each preceding phrase, which is its sphere of application.] Where there is a descent of name-and-form, there is the growth of volitional formations.¹⁷² Atthi tattha saṅkhārānaṁ vuddhi. Spk: This is said with reference to the volitional formations that are the cause of a future round of existence for one abiding in the present round of results. The variation here on the usual sequence is very interesting. When “the growth of volitional formations” is placed between name-and-form and future existence, this implies that the expression corresponds to three critical terms of the standard formula—craving, clinging, and (kamma-)existence—with āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbatti signifying the process of entering the new existence.
Where there is the growth of volitional formations, there is the production of future renewed existence. Where there is the production of future renewed existence, there is future birth, aging, and death. Where there is future birth, aging, and death, I say that is accompanied by sorrow, anguish, and despair.

3“If, bhikkhus, there is lust for the nutriment contact, or for the nutriment mental volition, or for the nutriment consciousness, if there is delight, if there is craving, consciousness becomes established there and comes to growth. Wherever consciousness becomes established and comes to growth ... I say that is accompanied by sorrow, anguish, and despair.

4“Suppose, bhikkhus, an artist or a painter, using dye or lac or turmeric or indigo or crimson, [102] would create the figure of a man or a woman complete in all its features on a well-polished plank or wall or canvas. So too, if there is lust for the nutriment edible food, or for the nutriment contact, or for the nutriment mental volition, or for the nutriment consciousness, if there is delight, if there is craving, consciousness becomes established there and comes to growth. Wherever consciousness becomes established and comes to growth ... I say that is accompanied by sorrow, anguish, and despair.¹⁷³ Spk: The painter represents kamma with its adjuncts [Spkpṭ: craving and ignorance, and time and destination, etc.]; the panel, wall, or canvas represents the round with its three realms. As the painter creates a figure on the panel, so kamma with its adjuncts creates a form in the realms of existence. As the figure created by an unskilled painter is ugly, deformed, and disagreeable, so the kamma performed with a mind dissociated from knowledge gives rise to an ugly, deformed, disagreeable figure. But as the figure created by a skilled painter is beautiful and well shaped, so the kamma performed with a mind associated with knowledge gives rise to a beautiful and comely figure.

5“If, bhikkhus, there is no lust for the nutriment edible food, or [103] for the nutriment contact, or for the nutriment mental volition, or for the nutriment consciousness, if there is no delight, if there is no craving, consciousness does not become established there and come to growth. Where consciousness does not become established and come to growth, there is no descent of name-and-form. Where there is no descent of name-and-form, there is no growth of volitional formations. Where there is no growth of volitional formations, there is no production of future renewed existence. Where there is no production of future renewed existence, there is no future birth, aging, and death. Where there is no future birth, aging, and death, I say that is without sorrow, anguish, and despair.

6“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a house or a hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the northern, southern, and eastern sides. When the sun rises and a beam of light enters through a window, where would it become established?”

7“On the western wall, venerable sir.”

8“If there were no western wall, where would it become established?”

9“On the earth, venerable sir.”

10“If there were no earth, where would it become established?”

11“On the water, venerable sir.”

12“If there were no water, where would it become established?”

13“It would not become established anywhere, venerable sir.”

14“So too, bhikkhus, if there is no lust for the nutriment edible food ... for the nutriment contact ... for the nutriment mental volition … for the nutriment consciousness … consciousness does not become established there and come to growth. Where consciousness does not become established and come to growth … [104] … I say that is without sorrow, anguish, and despair.”¹⁷⁴ Spk: The kamma of the arahant is similar to the sunbeam. However, the sunbeam does exist, but because there is no place for it to settle it is said to be unestablished (appatiṭṭhitā). But the arahant’s kamma is said to be unestablished because it is nonexistent. Although he has a body, etc., no wholesome or unwholesome kamma is thereby created. His deeds are merely functional, not productive of results (kiriyamatte ṭhatvā avipākaṁ hoti). In this connection, see 12:25 and n. 81. It should be noted that Spk explains the statement that the arahant’s consciousness is unestablished to mean that his kamma is unestablished. This seems too free an interpretation. Nevertheless, I think it would be wrong to interpret the sutta as saying that after his parinibbāna the arahant’s consciousness persists in some mode that can only be described as unestablished. The present passage is clearly speaking of the arahant’s consciousness while he is alive. Its purport is not that an “unestablished consciousness” remains after the arahant’s parinibbāna, but that his consciousness, being devoid of lust, does not “become established in” the four nutriments in any way that might generate a future existence.

65. The City

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, before my enlightenment, while I was still a bodhisatta, not yet fully enlightened, it occurred to me: ‘Alas, this world has fallen into trouble, in that it is born, ages, and dies, it passes away and is reborn, yet it does not understand the escape from this suffering [headed by] aging-and-death. When now will an escape be discerned from this suffering [headed by] aging-and-death?’¹⁷⁵ Opening as at 12:10.

2“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does aging-and-death come to be? By what is aging-and-death conditioned? ’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is birth, aging-and-death comes to be; aging-and-death has birth as its condition.’

3“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does birth come to be?… existence?… clinging?… craving?… feeling?… contact?… the six sense bases?… name-and-form? By what is name-and-form conditioned?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is consciousness, name-and-form comes to be; name-and-form has consciousness as its condition.’

4“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what exists does consciousness come to be? By what is consciousness conditioned? ’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is name-and-form, consciousness comes to be; consciousness has name-and-form as its condition.’¹⁷⁶ Dependent origination is formulated in identical terms in the account of the Buddha Vipassī’s enlightenment at DN II 32,22-30. For the Buddha’s explanation of the mutual dependency of consciousness and name-and-form, see DN II 62,38-63,26. A translation of the detailed explanation at Sv II 501-3 with excerpts from Sv-pṭ can be found in Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 84-89. See too below 12:67. Spk: When there is name-and-form, consciousness comes to be: Here it should be said, “When there are volitional formations, consciousness comes to be,” and “When there is ignorance, volitional formations come to be.” But neither is mentioned. Why not? Because ignorance and volitional formations belong to a third existence and this insight is not connected with them (avijjāsaṅkhārā hi tatiyo bhavo, tehi saddhiṁ ayaṁ vipassanā na ghaṭīyati). For the Great Man (the Bodhisatta) undertakes insight by way of the present five-constituent existence (pañcavokārabhava, i.e., existence where all five aggregates are present).
(Query:) Isn’t it true that one cannot become enlightened as long as ignorance and volitional formations are unseen? (Reply:) True, one cannot. But these are seen by way of craving, clinging, and existence. If a man pursuing a lizard has seen it enter a pit, he would descend, dig up the place where it entered, catch it, and depart; he wouldn’t dig up some other place where the lizard can’t be found. Similarly, when the Great Man was sitting on the seat of enlightenment, he searched for the conditions beginning with aging-and-death. Having traced the conditions for the phenomena back to name-and-form, he searched for its condition too and saw it to be consciousness. Then, realizing “So much is the range of exploration by way of five-constituent existence,” he reversed his insight (vipassanaṁ paṭinivattesi). Beyond this there is still the pair, ignorance and volitional formations, which are like the unbroken region of the empty pit. But because they have been included by insight earlier (under craving, etc.?), they do not undergo exploration separately; hence he does not mention them.

5“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘This consciousness turns back; it does not go further than name-and-form.¹⁷⁷ This consciousness turns back (paccudāvattati kho idaṁ viññāṇāṁ). Spk: What is the consciousness that turns back here? The rebirth-consciousness and the insight-consciousness. Rebirth-consciousness turns back from its condition, insight-consciousness from its object. Neither overcomes name-and-form, goes further than name-and-form. Spk-pṭ: From its condition: Rebirth-consciousness turns back from volitional formations—the special cause for consciousness—which has not been mentioned; it does not turn back from all conditions, as name-and-form is stated as the condition for consciousness. From its object: from ignorance and volitional formations as object, or from the past existence as object.
It it possible the Bodhisatta had been seeking a self of the Upaniṣadic type, a self-subsistent subject consisting of pure consciousness that requires nothing but itself in order to exist. His discovery that consciousness is invariably dependent on name-and-form would have disclosed to him the futility of such a quest and thereby shown that even consciousness, the subtlest basis for the sense of self (see 12:61), is conditioned and thus marked by impermanence, suffering, and selflessness.
It is to this extent that one may be born and age and die, pass away and be reborn, that is, when there is consciousness with name-and-form as its condition, and name-and-form with consciousness as its condition.¹⁷⁸ Spk: To this extent one may be born (ettāvatā jāyetha vā), etc.: With consciousness as a condition for name-and-form, and with name-and-form as a condition for consciousness, to this extent one may be born and undergo rebirth. What is there beyond this that can be born or undergo rebirth? Isn’t it just this that is born and undergoes rebirth? Spk-pṭ: To this extent: that is, by the occurrence of consciousness and name-and-form mutually supporting one another. One may be born and undergo rebirth: Though the expression “A being is born and undergoes rebirth” is used, there is nothing that serves as the referent of the designation “a being” apart from consciousness and name-and-form. Hence the commentator says, “What is there beyond this?” Just this (etadeva): namely, the pair consciousness and name-and-form.
It might be noted that jāyetha, jīyetha, etc., are middle-voice optatives in the third person singular. At KS 2:73, C.Rh.D seems to have mistaken them for second person plural optatives in the active voice, while at LDB, pp. 211, 226, Walshe has used a roundabout rendering, presumably to avoid having to identify the forms. For a detailed discussion of the mutual conditionality of consciousness and name-and-form, see Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, pp. 18-22.
With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, contact…. [105] Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.’

6“‘Origination, origination’—thus, bhikkhus, in regard to things unheard before there arose in me vision, knowledge, wisdom, true knowledge, and light.

7“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘When what does not exist does aging-and-death not come to be? With the cessation of what does the cessation of aging-and-death come about?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is no birth, aging-and-death does not come to be; with the cessation of birth comes cessation of aging-and-death.’

8“It occurred to me: ‘When what does not exist does birth not come to be?… existence?… clinging?… craving?… feeling?… contact?… the six sense bases?… name-and-form? With the cessation of what does the cessation of name-and-form come about?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is no consciousness, name-and-form does not come to be; with the cessation of consciousness comes cessation of name-and-form.’

9“It occurred to me: ‘When what does not exist does consciousness not come to be? With the cessation of what does the cessation of consciousness come about?’ Then, bhikkhus, through careful attention, there took place in me a breakthrough by wisdom: ‘When there is no name-and-form, consciousness does not come to be; with the cessation of name-and-form comes cessation of consciousness.’

10“Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: ‘I have discovered this path to enlightenment, that is, with the cessation of name-and-form comes cessation of consciousness; with the cessation of consciousness comes cessation of name-and-form; with the cessation of name-and-form, cessation of the six sense bases; with the cessation of the six sense bases, cessation of contact…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’¹⁷⁹ The mutual cessation of consciousness and name-and-form is also found in the version at DN II 34,21-35,13. Spk does not comment on the expression “I have discovered the path to enlightenment” (adhigato kho myāyaṁ maggo bodhāya), but the corresponding passage of DN is commented upon at Sv II 461,5-8 thus: “Path: the path of insight. To enlightenment: for the awakening to the Four Noble Truths, or for the awakening to Nibbāna. Further, enlightenment is so called because it becomes enlightened (bujjhatī ti bodhi); this is a name for the noble path. What is meant is (that he has discovered the path) for the sake of that. For the noble path is rooted in the path of insight. Now, making that path explicit, he says, ‘With the cessation of name-and-form,’ and so forth.” This explanation hinges upon the distinction (only implicit in the Nikāyas) between the mundane preliminary portion of the path (pubbabhāgapaṭipadā), which is the “path of insight,” and the noble supramundane path (lokuttaramagga ), which directly realizes Nibbāna. Since the supramundane path is identical with enlightenment, the commentary holds that “the path to enlightenment” the Bodhisatta discovered must be the mundane path of insight. In the DN version, having discovered the path to enlightenment, the Bodhisatta Vipassī continues to contemplate the rise and fall of the five aggregates, as a result of which “his mind was liberated from the taints by not clinging.”

11“‘Cessation, cessation’—thus, bhikkhus, in regard to things unheard before there arose in me vision, knowledge, wisdom, true knowledge, and light.

12“Suppose, bhikkhus, a man wandering through a forest would see an ancient path, an ancient road travelled upon by people in the past. He would follow it and would see an ancient city, an ancient capital [106] that had been inhabited by people in the past, with parks, groves, ponds, and ramparts, a delightful place. Then the man would inform the king or a royal minister: ‘Sire, know that while wandering through the forest I saw an ancient path, an ancient road travelled upon by people in the past. I followed it and saw an ancient city, an ancient capital that had been inhabited by people in the past, with parks, groves, ponds, and ramparts, a delightful place. Renovate that city, sire!’ Then the king or the royal minister would renovate the city, and some time later that city would become successful and prosperous, well populated, filled with people, attained to growth and expansion.

13“So too, bhikkhus, I saw the ancient path, the ancient road travelled by the Perfectly Enlightened Ones of the past.¹⁸⁰ Spk elaborates minutely upon the parable of the ancient city and then draws extensive correspondences between the elements of the parable and their counterparts in the Dhamma. And what is that ancient path, that ancient road? It is just this Noble Eightfold Path; that is, right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. I followed that path and by doing so I have directly known aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. I have directly known birth ... existence ... clinging ... .craving ... feeling ... contact ... the six sense bases .... name-and-form ... consciousness ... volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation. ¹⁸¹ At this point saṅkhārā, omitted earlier, are finally introduced, and avijjā, their condition, is implied by the mention of “their origin.” [107] Having directly known them, I have explained them to the bhikkhus, the bhikkhunı̄s, the male lay followers, and the female lay followers. This holy life, bhikkhus, has become successful and prosperous, extended, popular, widespread, well proclaimed among devas and humans.”¹⁸² This passage is also at 51:10 (V 262,9-14). I follow Spk in its explanation of yāva devamanussehi suppakāsitaṁ. The point is that, despite the use of the instrumental form -ehi, the Dhamma is not proclaimed by devas and humans, but “throughout the region (inhabited) by devas and humans in the ten-thousandfold galaxy, within this extent it is well proclaimed, well taught, by the Tathāgata” (yāva dasasahassacakkavāḷe devamanussehi paricchedo atthi, etasmiṁ antare suppakāsitaṁ sudesitaṁ tathāgatena). It is possible -ehi here is a vestigial Eastern locative plural; see Geiger, Pāli Grammar, §80.3.

66. Exploration

1Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling among the Kurus, where there was a town of the Kurus named Kammāsadamma. There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus thus: “Bhikkhus!”¹⁸³ Spk: Why did he address the bhikkhus? Because a subtle Dhamma discourse, one stamped with the three characteristics, had presented itself to him. In this country (the Kuru country), it is said, the people had good roots [Spk-pṭ: supporting conditions for achievement of the noble Dhamma] and were wise [Spk-pṭ: with the wisdom of a three-rooted rebirth-consciousness and pragmatic wisdom]. They were capable of penetrating a deep Dhamma talk stamped with the three characteristics. Therefore the Buddha taught here the two Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas (DN No. 22, MN No. 10), the Mahānidāna Sutta (DN No. 15), the Āneñjasappāya Sutta (MN No. 106), the Cūḷanidāna Sutta (12:60), and other deep suttas.

2“Venerable sir!” those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

3“Do you engage in inward exploration, bhikkhus?”¹⁸⁴ Sammasatha no tumhe bhikkhave antaraṁ sammasan ti. Spk explains “inward exploration” as internal exploration of conditions (abbhantaraṁ paccayasammasanaṁ). In the exegetical literature, sammasana-ñāṇa is a technical term for the comprehension of the five aggregates by way of the three characteristics (see Paṭis I 53-54, quoted at Vism 607-8; Ppn 20:6-20). Here, however, sammasana is used in a sense that comes closer to the exegetical notion of paccayapariggaha , “discernment of conditions,” as at Vism 598-600; Ppn 19:1-13.

4When this was said, one bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: “Venerable sir, I engage in inward exploration.”

5“How do you engage in inward exploration, bhikkhu?”

6The bhikkhu then explained but the way he explained did not satisfy the Blessed One.¹⁸⁵ Spk: The Blessed One wanted him to answer by way of conditionality, but he could not grasp the Master’s intention and answered by way of the thirty-two aspects (of bodily foulness). Then the Venerable Ānanda said: “Now is the time for this, Blessed One! Now is the time for this, Fortunate One! Let the Blessed One explain inward exploration. Having heard it from the Blessed One, the bhikkhus will remember it.”

7“Then listen and attend closely, Ānanda, I will speak.”

8“Yes, venerable sir,” the bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

9“Here, bhikkhus, when engaged in inward exploration, a bhikkhu explores thus: ‘The many diverse kinds of suffering that arise in the world [headed by] aging-and-death: what is the source of this suffering, what is its origin, [108] from what is it born and produced? When what exists does aging-and-death come to be? When what does not exist does aging-and-death not come to be?’¹⁸⁶ As at 12:51, but with a different sequel. I read with Be idaṁ kho dukkhaṁ kiṁnidānaṁ. Ee here is unsatisfactory.

10“As he explores he understands thus: ‘The many diverse kinds of suffering that arise in the world [headed by] aging-and-death: this suffering has acquisition as its source, acquisition as its origin; it is born and produced from acquisition.¹⁸⁷ Idaṁ kho dukkhaṁ upadhinidānaṁ, etc. Spk: It has its source in “acquisition as the aggregates” (khandhupadhinidānaṁ); for here the five aggregates are intended by “acquisition.” On upadhi, see I, n. 21. The standard exegetical analysis of upadhi is fourfold: as defilements, aggregates, sensual pleasures, and volitional formations. As upadhi is conditioned by taṇhā, one might contend that here upadhi is synonymous with upādāna. Spk, however, does not endorse this interpretation, and the fact that upadhi is declared the basis for aging-and-death and the other types of suffering supports Spk’s gloss khandhupadhi. Possibly a double meaning is intended: upadhi as the aggregates is the immediate condition for aging-and-death, while upadhi as equivalent to upādāna is the remote condition for existence and birth, which in turn is the remote condition for aging-and-death. On upadhi as the origin of suffering, see Sn p. 141,7-8: yaṁ kiñci dukkhaṁ sambhoti sabbaṁ upadhipaccayā. When there is acquisition, aging-and-death comes to be; when there is no acquisition, aging-and-death does not come to be.’

11“He understands aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading on that is in conformity with its cessation.¹⁸⁸ Upadhinirodhasāruppagāminī paṭipadā. As at 12:51; see n. 135. He practises in that way and conducts himself accordingly. This is called a bhikkhu who is practising for the utterly complete destruction of suffering, for the cessation of aging-and-death.

12“Then, engaging further in inward exploration, he explores thus: ‘What is the source of this acquisition, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced? When what exists does acquisition come to be? When what is absent does acquisition not come to be?’

13“As he explores he understands thus: ‘Acquisition has craving as its source, craving as its origin; it is born and produced from craving. When there is craving, acquisition comes to be; when there is no craving, acquisition does not come to be.’

14“He understands acquisition, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading on that is in conformity with its cessation. He practises in that way and conducts himself accordingly. This is called a bhikkhu who is practising for the utterly complete destruction of suffering, for the cessation of acquisition.

15“Then, engaging further in inward exploration, he explores thus: ‘When this craving arises, where does it arise? When it settles down, upon what does it settle?’

16“As he explores he understands thus: ‘Whatever in the world has a pleasant and agreeable nature: it is here that this craving arises when it arises; it is here that it settles when it settles down.’¹⁸⁹ For a more elaborate treatment, see the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta, DN II 308,6-309,11. And what in the world has a pleasant and agreeable nature? The eye has a pleasant and agreeable nature in the world: it is here that this craving arises when it arises; it is here that it settles when it settles down. So too the ear, [109] the nose, the tongue, the body, and the mind have a pleasant and agreeable nature: it is here that this craving arises when it arises; it is here that it settles when it settles down.

17“Bhikkhus, whatever ascetics and brahmins in the past regarded that in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature as permanent, as happiness, as self, as healthy, as secure: they nurtured craving. In nurturing craving they nurtured acquisition. In nurturing acquisition they nurtured suffering. In nurturing suffering they were not freed from birth, aging, and death; they were not freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; they were not freed from suffering, I say.

18“Whatever ascetics and brahmins in the future will regard that in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature as permanent, as happiness, as self, as healthy, as secure: they will nurture craving. In nurturing craving they will nurture acquisition. In nurturing acquisition they will nurture suffering. In nurturing suffering they will not be freed from birth, aging, and death; they will not be freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; they will not be freed from suffering, I say.

19“Whatever ascetics and brahmins at present regard that in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature as permanent, as happiness, as self, as healthy, as secure: they are nurturing craving. In nurturing craving they are nurturing acquisition. In nurturing acquisition they are nurturing suffering. In nurturing suffering they are not freed from birth, aging, and death; they are not freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; they are not freed from suffering, I say. [110]

20“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a bronze cup of a beverage having a fine colour, aroma, and taste, but it was mixed with poison. Then a man would come along, oppressed and afflicted by the heat, tired, parched, and thirsty. They would tell him: ‘Good man, this beverage in the bronze cup has a fine colour, aroma, and taste, but it is mixed with poison. Drink it if you wish. If you drink it, it will gratify you with its colour, aroma, and taste, but by drinking it you will meet death or deadly suffering.’ Suddenly, without reflecting, he would drink the beverage—he would not reject it—and thereby he would meet death or deadly suffering.¹⁹⁰ The same simile, but with slight differences in wording, is at MN I 316,10-23.

21“So too, bhikkhus, whatever ascetics and brahmins in the past … in the future ... at present regard that in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature as permanent, as happiness, as self, as healthy, as secure: they are nurturing craving. In nurturing craving ... they are not freed from suffering, I say.¹⁹¹ Spk: The bronze cup of beverage represents worldly objects of a pleasant and agreeable nature. The man oppressed by the heat represents the worldling attached to the round; the man who invites him to drink, the people who invite the worldling to enjoy objects in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature. The man in charge of the drink, who explains its virtues and dangers, is like a spiritual friend, one’s preceptor, teacher, etc., who explains the gratification and danger in the five cords of sensual pleasure. Just as the man in the simile suddenly, without reflection, drinks the beverage and meets death or deadly suffering, so the worldling, eager to enjoy sensual pleasures, spurns the advice of his preceptor and teacher, gives up the training, and reverts to the lower life. There he commits a crime and is punished by the king, and in the next life he experiences great suffering in the four realms of misery.

22“Bhikkhus, whatever ascetics and brahmins in the past regarded that in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature as impermanent, as suffering, as nonself, as a disease, as fearful: they abandoned craving. In abandoning craving they abandoned acquisition. In abandoning acquisition they abandoned suffering. In abandoning suffering they were freed from birth, aging, and death; they were freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; they were freed from suffering, I say.

23“Whatever ascetics and brahmins in the future [111] will regard that in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature as impermanent, as suffering, as nonself, as a disease, as fearful: they will abandon craving. In abandoning craving ... they will be freed from suffering, I say.

24“Whatever ascetics and brahmins at present regard that in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature as impermanent, as suffering, as nonself, as a disease, as fearful: they are abandoning craving. In abandoning craving ... they are freed from suffering, I say.

25“Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a bronze cup of a beverage having a fine colour, aroma, and taste, but it was mixed with poison. Then a man would come along, oppressed and afflicted by the heat, tired, parched, and thirsty. They would tell him: ‘Good man, this beverage in the bronze cup has a fine colour, aroma, and taste, but it is mixed with poison. Drink it if you wish. If you drink it, it will gratify you with its colour, aroma, and taste, but by drinking it you will meet death or deadly suffering. ’ Then the man would think: ‘I can quench my thirst with water, whey, porridge, or soup, but I should not drink that beverage, since to do so would lead to my harm and suffering for a long time.’ Having reflected, he would not drink the beverage but would reject it, [112] and thereby he would not meet death or deadly suffering.

26“So too, bhikkhus, whatever ascetics and brahmins in the past … in the future ... at present regard that in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature as impermanent, as suffering, as nonself, as a disease, as fearful: they are abandoning craving. In abandoning craving ... they are freed from suffering, I say.”¹⁹² Spk: In the counterpart, the man oppressed by the heat represents the meditator at the time he is still attached to the round. When he reflects, rejects the beverage, and dispels his thirst with some other drink, this is like the bhikkhu’s abiding by the advice of his preceptor and teacher, guarding the sense doors, gradually developing insight, and attaining the fruit of arahantship. The other four beverages are like the four paths. As the man dispels his thirst with the other four beverages and goes happily wherever he wants, so the arahant, having drunk of the four paths, dispels craving and goes to the region of Nibbāna.

67. The Sheaves of Reeds

1On one occasion the Venerable Sāriputta and the Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita were dwelling at Bārāṇası̄ in the Deer Park at Isipatana.¹⁹³ Mahākoṭṭhita was the foremost disciple in the analytical knowledges (paṭisambhidā). He often appears in dialogue with Sāriputta. As C.Rh.D remarks (KS 2:79, n. 1), since both elders were arahants it is likely these dialogues were intended as “lessons” for their students rather than as genuine inquiries. Then, in the evening, the Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita emerged from seclusion and approached the Venerable Sāriputta. He exchanged greetings with the Venerable Sāriputta and, when they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and said to him:

2“How is it, friend Sāriputta: Is aging-and-death created by oneself, or is it created by another, [113] or is it created both by oneself and by another, or has it arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another?”¹⁹⁴ The underlying presuppositions of the four alternatives are eternalism, annihilationism, partial-eternalism, and fortuitous origination; see n. 37.

3“Friend Koṭṭhita, aging-and-death is not created by oneself, nor is it created by another, nor is it created both by oneself and by another, nor has it arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another. But rather, with birth as condition, aging-and-death [comes to be].”

4“How is it, friend Sāriputta: Is birth created by oneself ... Is existence ... clinging ... craving ... feeling ... contact ... the six sense bases ... name-and-form created by oneself, or is it created by another, or is it created both by oneself and by another, or has it arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another?”

5“Name-and-form, friend Koṭṭhita, is not created by oneself, nor is it created by another, nor is it created both by oneself and by another, nor has it arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another; but rather, with consciousness as condition, name-and-form [comes to be].”

6“How is it, friend Sāriputta: Is consciousness created by oneself, or is it created by another, or is it created both by oneself and by another, or has it arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another?”

7“Consciousness, friend Koṭṭhita, is not created by oneself, nor is it created by another, nor is it created both by oneself and by another, nor has it arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another; but rather, with name-and-form as condition, consciousness [comes to be].”¹⁹⁵ On the reciprocal conditionality of consciousness and name-and-form, see 12:65. [114]

8“Now we understand the Venerable Sāriputta’s statement thus: ‘Name-and-form, friend Koṭṭhita, is not created by oneself … but rather, with consciousness as condition, name-and-form [comes to be].’ Now we also understand the Venerable Sāriputta’s [other] statement thus: ‘Consciousness, friend Koṭṭhita, is not created by oneself ... but rather, with name-and-form as condition, consciousness [comes to be].’ But how, friend Sāriputta, should the meaning of this statement be seen?”

9“Well then, friend, I will make up a simile for you, for some intelligent people here understand the meaning of a statement by means of a simile. Just as two sheaves of reeds might stand leaning against each other, so too, with name-and-form as condition, consciousness [comes to be]; with consciousness as condition, name-and-form [comes to be]. With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases [come to be]; with the six sense bases as condition, contact…. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

10“If, friend, one were to remove one of those sheaves of reeds, the other would fall, and if one were to remove the other sheaf, the first would fall. So too, with the cessation of name-and-form comes cessation of consciousness; with the cessation of consciousness comes cessation of name-and-form. With the cessation of name-and-form comes cessation of the six sense bases; with the cessation of the six sense bases, cessation of contact…. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

11“It is wonderful, friend Sāriputta! It is amazing, friend Sāriputta! How well this has been stated by the Venerable Sāriputta. We rejoice in the Venerable Sāriputta’s statement on these thirty-six grounds:¹⁹⁶ Cp. 12:16. Spk: On thirty-six grounds: for thirty-six reasons, obtained by taking three cases in relation to each of the twelve terms. The first is the quality of being a speaker on the Dhamma, the second the practice, the third the fruit of the practice. By the first method the excellence of the teaching is discussed, by the second the plane of the trainee (sekha), by the third the plane of the arahant (asekha, one beyond training). If, friend, a bhikkhu teaches the Dhamma for the purpose of revulsion towards aging-and-death, for its fading away and cessation, he can be called a bhikkhu who is a speaker on the Dhamma. [115] If a bhikkhu is practising for the purpose of revulsion towards aging-and-death, for its fading away and cessation, he can be called a bhikkhu who is practising in accordance with the Dhamma. If through revulsion towards aging-and-death, through its fading away and cessation, a bhikkhu is liberated by nonclinging, he can be called a bhikkhu who has attained Nibbāna in this very life.

12“If, friend, a bhikkhu teaches the Dhamma for the purpose of revulsion towards birth ... existence ... clinging ... craving ... feeling ... contact ... the six sense bases ... name-and-form … consciousness ... volitional formations … ignorance, for its fading away and cessation, he can be called a bhikkhu who is a speaker on the Dhamma. If a bhikkhu is practising for the purpose of revulsion towards ignorance, for its fading away and cessation, he can be called a bhikkhu who is practising in accordance with the Dhamma. If through revulsion towards ignorance, through its fading away and cessation, a bhikkhu is liberated by nonclinging, he can be called a bhikkhu who has attained Nibbāna in this very life.”

68. Kosambı̄

1On one occasion the Venerable Musı̄la, the Venerable Saviṭṭha, the Venerable Nārada, and the Venerable Ānanda were living at Kosambı̄ in Ghosita’s Park.¹⁹⁷ Spk does not identify these elders. Saviṭṭha appears at AN I 118-19, Nārada at AN III 57-62.

2Then the Venerable Saviṭṭha said to the Venerable Musı̄la: “Friend Musı̄la, apart from faith, apart from personal preference, apart from oral tradition, apart from reasoned reflection, apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it,¹⁹⁸ These five grounds for the acceptance of a thesis recur at 35:153 and are examined critically by the Buddha at MN II 170,26-171,25; see too MN II 218,15-21. Here they are being contrasted with personal knowledge (paccattameva ñāṇa). For a detailed discussion, see Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp. 182-88, 274-76. Spk: One person accepts something through faith (saddhā) by placing faith in another and accepting what he says as true. Another accepts something through personal preference (ruci) when he approves of some thesis by reflecting on it and then takes it to be true. One accepts a thesis by oral tradition (anussava) when one thinks: “This has come down from ancient times by oral tradition, so it must be true.” For another, as he thinks, a certain thesis appears valid, and he concludes, “So it is”: he accepts it by reasoned reflection (ākāraparivitakka). (Jayatilleke discusses ākāra as meaning “reason” at p. 274.) In the fifth case, as one reflects, a view arises by pondering some hypothesis; this is acceptance of a view after pondering it (diṭṭhinijjhānakkhanti).
does the Venerable Musı̄la have personal knowledge thus: ‘With birth as condition, aging-and-death [comes to be]’?”

3“Friend Saviṭṭha, apart from faith, apart from personal preference, apart from oral tradition, apart from reasoned reflection, apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, I know this, I see this: ‘With birth as condition, aging-and-death [comes to be].’” [116]

4“Friend Musı̄la, apart from faith ... apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, does the Venerable Musı̄la have personal knowledge thus: ‘With existence as condition, birth’?… ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations’?”

5“Friend Saviṭṭha, apart from faith ... apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, I know this, I see this: ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations.’”

6“Friend Musı̄la, apart from faith ... apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, does the Venerable Musı̄la have personal knowledge: ‘With the cessation of birth comes cessation of aging-and-death’? … [117] … ‘With the cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations’?”

7“Friend Saviṭṭha, apart from faith .... apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, I know this, I see this: ‘With the cessation of birth comes cessation of aging-and-death.’… ‘With the cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations.’”

8“Friend Musı̄la, apart from faith, apart from personal preference, apart from oral tradition, apart from reasoned reflection, apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, does the Venerable Musı̄la have personal knowledge thus: ‘Nibbāna is the cessation of existence’?”¹⁹⁹ Bhavanirodho nibbānaṁ. Spk: Nibbāna is the cessation of the five aggregates.

9“Friend Saviṭṭha, apart from faith, apart from personal preference, apart from oral tradition, apart from reasoned reflection, apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, I know this, I see this: ‘Nibbāna is the cessation of existence.’”

10“Then the Venerable Musı̄la is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed.”

11When this was said, the Venerable Musı̄la kept silent.²⁰⁰ Spk: The elder Musīla was an arahant, but without saying whether or not it was so he just kept silent.

12Then the Venerable Nārada said to the Venerable Saviṭṭha: “Friend Saviṭṭha, it would be good if I were asked that series of questions. Ask me that series of questions and I will answer you.”²⁰¹ Spk: Why did he speak up? It is said that he reflected thus: “This proposition—‘Nibbāna is the cessation of existence’—can be understood even by trainees. But this elder (Saviṭṭha) places that one (Musīla) on the plane of the arahant. I will make him understand this matter correctly.”

13“Then let the Venerable Nārada get to answer that series of questions. I will ask the Venerable Nārada that series of questions, and let him answer me.”

(Here the Venerable Saviṭṭha asks the Venerable Nārada the same series of questions as were addressed to the Venerable Musı̄la, and he answers in exactly the same way.)

14“Then the Venerable Nārada is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed.” [118]

15“Friend, though I have clearly seen as it really is with correct wisdom, ‘Nibbāna is the cessation of existence,’ I am not an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed.²⁰² Spk: Clearly seen ... with correct wisdom: clearly seen with path wisdom together with insight. I am not an arahant: he indicates this because he stands on the path of nonreturning. But his knowledge that “Nibbāna is the cessation of existence” is a type of reviewing knowledge (paccavekkhaṇañāṇa ) apart from the nineteen (regular) types of reviewing knowledge (see Vism 676; Ppn 22:19-21). Suppose, friend, there was a well along a desert road, but it had neither a rope nor a bucket. Then a man would come along, oppressed and afflicted by the heat, tired, parched, and thirsty. He would look down into the well and the knowledge would occur to him, ‘There is water,’ but he would not be able to make bodily contact with it.²⁰³ Na ca kāyena phusitvā vihareyya, lit. “but he would not dwell having contacted it with the body.” Spk glosses: “He would not be able to draw out the water.” So too, friend, though I have clearly seen as it really is with correct wisdom, ‘Nibbāna is the cessation of existence,’ I am not an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed.”²⁰⁴ Spk: The seeing of water in the well represents the seeing of Nibbāna by the nonreturner. The man afflicted by heat represents the nonreturner; the water bucket, the path of arahantship. As the man oppressed by heat sees water in the well, the nonreturner knows by reviewing knowledge, “There exists a breakthrough to the path of arahantship” (reading with Se arahattaphalābhisamaya). But as the man lacking the bucket cannot draw out the water and touch it with the body, so the nonreturner, lacking the path of arahantship, cannot sit down and become absorbed in the attainment of the fruit of arahantship, which has Nibbāna as its object. It would be a misunderstanding of Nārada’s reply to take it as a rejoinder to Musīla’s tacit claim that he is an arahant (the interpretation adopted by Gombrich, How Buddhism Began, pp. 128-29). The point is not that Musīla was unjustified in consenting to that title, but that Saviṭṭha drew an incorrect inference, for he held the wrong belief that the defining mark of an arahant is the understanding of dependent origination and the nature of Nibbāna. This understanding, rather, is common property of the trainee and the arahant. What distinguishes the arahant from the trainee is not his insight into dependent origination (and other principles of the Dhamma) but the fact that he has used this insight to eradicate all defilements and has thereby gained access to a unique meditative state (called in the commentaries arahattaphalasamāpatti, the fruition attainment of arahantship) in which he can dwell “touching the deathless element with his body.” At 48:53, too, the expression kāyena phusitvā viharati highlights the essential difference between the sekha and the asekha; see V, n. 238. For parallel texts on the difference between the stream-enterer and the arahant, see 22:109-110 (stated in terms of the five aggregates) and 48:2-5, 26-27, 32-33 (in terms of the faculties).

16When this was said, the Venerable Ānanda asked the Venerable Saviṭṭha: “When he speaks in such a way, friend Saviṭṭha, what would you say about the Venerable Nārada?”

17“When he speaks in such a way, friend Ānanda, I would not say anything about the Venerable Nārada except what is good and favourable.”²⁰⁵ In all three eds. the question begins with evaṁvādī tvaṁ and the reply with evaṁvādāhaṁ. However, since it was Nārada who just spoke, it seems we should read the question portion as evaṁvādiṁ tvaṁ and resolve evaṁvādāhaṁ in the reply into evaṁvādiṁ ahaṁ. Neither Spk nor Spk-pṭ offers any help here, but a note in Be of the text suggests this amendation. The Ee reading of a parallel passage at 55:23 (V 374,24-27) has the reading I prefer, though there Be and Se have the same reading as here. At MN II 214,14 foll. we find evaṁvādāhaṁ in a context where it would have to be resolved as an accusative plural, evaṁvādino (nigaṇṭhe) ahaṁ, which further supports my proposal regarding the present passage.

69. The Surge

1Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthı̄ in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. There the Blessed One said:

2“Bhikkhus, the ocean surging causes the rivers to surge; the rivers surging cause the streams to surge; the streams surging cause the lakes to surge; the lakes surging cause the pools to surge. So too, ignorance surging causes volitional formations to surge; volitional formations surging cause consciousness to surge; consciousness surging causes name-and-form to surge; name-and-form surging causes the six sense bases to surge; the six sense bases surging cause contact to surge; contact surging causes feeling to surge; feeling surging causes craving to surge; craving surging causes clinging to surge; clinging [119] surging causes existence to surge; existence surging causes birth to surge; birth surging causes aging-and-death to surge.

3“Bhikkhus, the ocean receding causes the rivers to recede; the rivers receding cause the streams to recede; the streams receding cause the lakes to recede; the lakes receding cause the pools to recede. So too, ignorance receding causes volitional formations to recede; volitional formations receding cause consciousness to recede ... birth receding causes aging-and-death to recede.”

70. Susı̄ma

1Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary.

(i)

2Now on that occasion the Blessed One was honoured, respected, esteemed, venerated, and revered, and he obtained robes, almsfood, lodgings, and medicinal requisites. The Bhikkhu Saṅgha too was honoured, respected, esteemed, venerated, and revered, and the bhikkhus too obtained robes, almsfood, lodgings, and medicinal requisites. But the wanderers of other sects were not honoured, respected, esteemed, venerated, and revered, and they did not obtain robes, almsfood, lodgings, and medicinal requisites.

3Now on that occasion the wanderer Susı̄ma was residing in Rājagaha along with a large company of wanderers. [120] Then his company said to the wanderer Susı̄ma: “Come, friend Susı̄ma, lead the holy life under the ascetic Gotama. Master his Dhamma and teach it to us. We will master his Dhamma and preach it to the lay people. Thus we too will be honoured, respected, esteemed, venerated, and revered, and we too will obtain robes, almsfood, lodgings, and medicinal requisites.”

4“All right, friends,” the wanderer Susı̄ma replied. He then approached the Venerable Ānanda and exchanged greetings with him. When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and said to him: “Friend Ānanda, I wish to lead the holy life in this Dhamma and Discipline.”

5Then the Venerable Ānanda took the wanderer Susı̄ma and approached the Blessed One. He paid homage to the Blessed One, and then he sat down to one side and said to him: “Venerable sir, this wanderer Susı̄ma says that he wishes to lead the holy life in this Dhamma and Discipline.”

6“Well then, Ānanda, give him the going forth.” The wanderer Susı̄ma then received the going forth and the higher ordination under the Blessed One.²⁰⁶ This sutta is discussed in relation to its Chinese counterpart by Gombrich, How Buddhism Began, pp. 123-27. Spk: Susīma had approached the Venerable Ānanda, thinking, “He is the most learned disciple, and also the Teacher frequently reports to him the Dhamma he has spoken on various occasions; under him I will be able to learn the Dhamma quickly.” Ānanda brought him to the Buddha because he knew that Susīma had been a teacher in his own right and he was apprehensive that after going forth he might try to bring discredit to the Dispensation. The Buddha understood that Susīma’s motive in taking ordination was “theft of the Dhamma,” which made his entry into the Dispensation impure, but he foresaw that Susīma would shortly undergo a change of heart and attain arahantship. Hence he instructed Ānanda to give him the going forth.
It is puzzling that here, when it was most necessary to do so, the Buddha makes no mention of the probationary period normally imposed on wanderers of other sects who wish to enter the Buddhist order; perhaps the Buddha had foreseen that Susīma would have been discouraged by such a stipulation and would not have applied for admission, thus losing the chance to gain liberation.

(ii)

7Now on that occasion a number of bhikkhus had declared final knowledge in the presence of the Blessed One, saying: “We understand: Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.” The Venerable Susı̄ma heard about this, [121] so he approached those bhikkhus, exchanged greetings with them, and then sat down to one side and said to them: “Is it true that you venerable ones have declared final knowledge in the presence of the Blessed One, saying: ‘We understand: Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being’?”²⁰⁷ Spk: Those bhikkhus, having received a meditation subject from the Teacher, entered upon the three-month rains residence, and during the rains, striving and struggling, they attained arahantship. At the end of the rains they went to the Teacher and informed him of their attainment. When Susīma heard about this he thought: “Final knowledge (aññā) must be the supreme standard in this Dispensation, the essential personal transmission of the teacher (paramappamāṇaṁ sārabhūtā ācariyamuṭṭhi, lit. ‘teacher’s fist’). Let me inquire and find out about it.” Therefore he approached those bhikkhus. The stock description of the five abhiññās that follows is commented upon in detail in Vism, chaps. 12 and 13.

8“Yes, friend.”

9“Then knowing and seeing thus, do you venerable ones wield the various kinds of spiritual power, such that: having been one, you become many; having been many, you become one; you appear and vanish; you go unhindered through a wall, through a rampart, through a mountain as though through space; you dive in and out of the earth as though it were water; you walk on water without sinking as though it were earth; seated cross-legged, you travel in space like a bird; with your hand you touch and stroke the moon and sun so powerful and mighty; you exercise mastery with the body as far as the brahmā world?”

10“No, friend.”

11“Then knowing and seeing thus, do you venerable ones, with the divine ear element, which is purified and surpasses the human, hear both kinds of sounds, the divine and human, those that are far as well as near?”

12“No, friend.”

13“Then knowing and seeing thus, do you venerable ones understand the minds of other beings and persons, having encompassed them with your own minds? Do you understand a mind with lust as a mind with lust; a mind without lust as a mind without lust; a mind with hatred as a mind with hatred; a mind without hatred as a mind without hatred; a mind with delusion [122] as a mind with delusion; a mind without delusion as a mind without delusion; a contracted mind as contracted and a distracted mind as distracted; an exalted mind as exalted and an unexalted mind as unexalted; a surpassable mind as surpassable and an unsurpassable mind as unsurpassable; a concentrated mind as concentrated and an unconcentrated mind as unconcentrated; a liberated mind as liberated and an unliberated mind as unliberated?”

14“No, friend.”

15“Then knowing and seeing thus, do you venerable ones recollect your manifold past abodes, that is, one birth, two births, three births, four births, five births, ten births, twenty births, thirty births, forty births, fifty births, a hundred births, a thousand births, a hundred thousand births, many aeons of world-contraction, many aeons of world-expansion, many aeons of world-contraction and expansion thus: ‘There I was so named, of such a clan, with such an appearance, such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my life span; passing away from there, I was reborn elsewhere, and there too I was so named, of such a clan, with such an appearance, such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my life span; passing away from there, I was reborn here’? Do you thus recollect your manifold past abodes with their modes and details?”

16“No, friend.”

17“Then knowing and seeing thus, do you venerable ones, with the divine eye, which is purified and surpasses the human, see beings passing away and being reborn, inferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate, and understand how beings fare on in accordance with their kamma thus: ‘These beings who engaged in misconduct of body, [123] speech, and mind, who reviled the noble ones, held wrong view, and undertook actions based on wrong view, with the breakup of the body, after death, have been reborn in a state of misery, in a bad destination, in the nether world, in hell; but these beings who engaged in good conduct of body, speech, and mind, who did not revile the noble ones, who held right view, and undertook action based on right view, with the breakup of the body, after death, have been reborn in a good destination, in a heavenly world’? Thus with the divine eye, which is purified and surpasses the human, do you see beings passing away and being reborn, inferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate, and understand how beings fare on in accordance with their kamma?”

18“No, friend.”

19“Then knowing and seeing thus, do you venerable ones dwell in those peaceful deliverances that transcend forms, the formless attainments, having touched them with the body?”²⁰⁸ Spk-pṭ: The formless jhānas and deliverance from perception (āruppajjhāna-saññāvimokkhā).

20“No, friend.”

21“Here now, venerable ones: this answer and the nonattainment of those states, how could this be, friends?”²⁰⁹ The text enclosed in brackets in Ee should be deleted and the question read as in Be and Se thus: Ettha dāni āyasmanto idañ ca veyyākaraṇaṁ imesañ ca dhammānaṁ asamāpatti, idaṁ no āvuso kathan ti. I take the no to be merely an interrogative particle (= nu).

22“We are liberated by wisdom, friend Susı̄ma.”²¹⁰ Paññāvimuttā kho mayaṁ āvuso Susīma. Spk: He shows: “Friend, we are without jhāna, dry-insighters, liberated simply by wisdom” (āvuso mayaṁ nijjhānakā sukkhavipassakā paññāmatten’ eva vimuttā). Spk-pṭ: Liberated simply by wisdom: not both-ways-liberated (na ubhatobhāgavimuttā). While Spk seems to be saying that those bhikkhus did not have any jhānas, the sutta itself establishes only that they lacked the abhiññās and āruppas; nothing is said about whether or not they had achieved the four jhānas. It is significant that Susīma’s questions do not extend to the jhānas, and it is even possible (though contrary to the commentaries) that nijjhānaka should be understood, not as the deprivative “without jhāna,” but as an agent noun from nijjhāna, pondering, hence “ponderers.” In any case, the sutta goes no further than to distinguish the paññāvimutta arahant from other arahants who have the six abhiññās and the formless attainments, and thus it offers nothing radically different from the Nikāyas as a whole.
The commentaries explain the paññāvimutta arahant to be of five kinds: those who attain one or another of the four jhānas, and the “dry-insighter” (sukkhavipassaka) who lacks mundane jhāna but still has the supramundane jhāna inseparable from the noble path (see Sv II 512,19-28). On the contrast between paññāvimutta and ubhatobhāgavimutta arahants, see MN I 477-78; Pp 14, 190-91.

23“I do not understand in detail, friends, the meaning of what has been stated in brief by the venerable ones. It would be good if the venerable ones would explain to me in such a way that I could understand in detail what has been stated in brief.” [124]

24“Whether or not you understand, friend Susı̄ma, we are liberated by wisdom.”

(iii)

25Then the Venerable Susı̄ma rose from his seat and approached the Blessed One. Having approached, he paid homage to the Blessed One, sat down to one side, and reported to the Blessed One the entire conversation he had had with those bhikkhus. [The Blessed One said:]

26“First, Susı̄ma, comes knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma, afterwards knowledge of Nibbāna.”²¹¹ Pubbe kho Susīma dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇaṁ, pacchā nibbāne ñāṇaṁ. Spk: Insight knowledge is “knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma,” which arises first. At the end of the course of insight, path knowledge arises; that is “knowledge of Nibbāna,” which arises later. Spk-pṭ: The “stability of the Dhamma” is the stableness of phenomena, their intrinsic nature (dhammānaṁ ṭhitatā taṁsabhāvatā): namely, impermanence, suffering, nonself. Knowledge of that is “knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma.” See too n. 51, n. 105. A chapter on dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇa is at Paṭis I 50-52, where it is explained as the knowledge of the relations between each pair of factors in paṭicca-samuppāda.

27“I do not understand in detail, venerable sir, the meaning of what was stated in brief by the Blessed One. It would be good if the Blessed One would explain to me in such a way that I could understand in detail what has been stated in brief.”

28“Whether or not you understand, Susı̄ma, first comes knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma, afterwards knowledge of Nibbāna.²¹² Spk: Why is this said? For the purpose of showing the arising of knowledge thus even without concentration. This is what is meant: “Susīma, the path and fruit are not the issue of concentration (samādhinissanda), nor the advantage brought about by concentration (samādhi-ānisaṁsā), nor the outcome of concentration (samādhinipphatti). They are the issue of insight (vipassanā), the advantage brought about by insight, the outcome of insight. Therefore, whether you understand or not, first comes knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma, afterwards knowledge of Nibbāna.” Spk-pṭ: Even without concentration (vinā pi samādhiṁ): even without previously established (concentration) that has acquired the characteristic of serenity (samathalakkhaṇappattaṁ ); this is said referring to one who takes the vehicle of insight (vipassanāyānika).
If understood on its own terms, the text establishes only that arahantship can be attained without the supernormal powers and the formless attainments. Read in the light of Spk and Spk-pṭ, it may be seen to affirm the existence of a “vehicle of bare insight” which begins directly with mindful contemplation of mental and physical phenomena, without depending on a base of concentration by means of the jhānas or access concentration (upacārasamādhi). Though the suttas themselves say nothing about a system of bare insight meditation, some contemporary teachers regard the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta as propounding such a method and appeal to Spk and Spk-pṭ for additional support.

29“What do you think, Susı̄ma, is form permanent or impermanent?” –“Impermanent, venerable sir.”²¹³ Spk: Having known him to be capable of penetration, the Buddha speaks thus giving a Dhamma teaching with three turns, at the conclusion of which the elder attained arahantship. Spk-pṭ: The “three turns” (teparivaṭṭaṁ) are by way of the turning over of the three characteristics in relation to the five aggregates. The catechism on the three characteristics recurs throughout the Khandha-saṁyutta, as at 22:49, 59, 79, 80, 82etc.
–“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”–“Suffering, venerable sir.”–“Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?”–“No, venerable sir.”

30“Is feeling permanent or impermanent?… Is perception permanent or impermanent?… Are volitional formations permanent or impermanent?… Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?” [125]–“Impermanent, venerable sir.”–“Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?”–“Suffering, venerable sir.”–“Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’?”–“No, venerable sir.”

31“Therefore, Susı̄ma, any kind of form whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all form should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’

32“Any kind of feeling whatsoever … Any kind of perception whatsoever … Any kind of volitional formations whatsoever … Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all consciousness should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’

33“Seeing thus, Susı̄ma, the instructed noble disciple experiences revulsion towards form, revulsion towards feeling, revulsion towards perception, revulsion towards volitional formations, revulsion towards consciousness. Experiencing revulsion, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion [his mind] is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: ‘It’s liberated. ’ He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.’

34“Do you see, Susı̄ma: ‘With birth as condition, aging-and-death [comes to be]’?”

35“Yes, venerable sir.”

36“Do you see, Susı̄ma: ‘With existence as condition, birth’?… ‘With clinging as condition, existence’?… [126] … ‘With craving as condition, clinging’?… ‘With feeling as condition, craving’?… ‘With contact as condition, feeling’?… ‘With the six sense bases as condition, contact’?… ‘With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases’?… ‘With consciousness as condition, name-and-form’? … ‘With volitional formations as condition, consciousness’? … ‘With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]’?”

37“Yes, venerable sir.”

38“Do you see, Susı̄ma: ‘With the cessation of birth comes cessation of aging-and-death’?”

39“Yes, venerable sir.”

40“Do you see, Susı̄ma: ‘With the cessation of existence comes cessation of birth’?… ‘With the cessation of clinging comes cessation of existence’?… ‘With the cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations’?”

41“Yes, venerable sir.”

42“Knowing and seeing thus, Susı̄ma, do you wield the various kinds of spiritual power, such that: having been one, you become many ... and exercise bodily mastery as far as the brahmā world?”²¹⁴ Spk: This query is started in order to make it evident that those bhikkhus were dry-insighters without jhāna (or: “dry-insight ponderers”). This is the purport here: “You are not the only dry-insighter without jhāna; those bhikkhus were also such.”

43“No, venerable sir.”

44“Then knowing and seeing thus, Susı̄ma, do you, with the divine ear element, which is purified and surpasses the human, hear both kinds of sounds, the divine and human, those that are far as well as near?” [127]

45“No, venerable sir.”

46“Then knowing and seeing thus, Susı̄ma, do you understand the minds of other beings and persons, having encompassed them with your own mind?”

47“No, venerable sir.”

48“Then knowing and seeing thus, Susı̄ma, do you recollect your manifold past abodes with their modes and details?”

49“No, venerable sir.”

50“Then knowing and seeing thus, Susı̄ma, do you, with the divine eye, which is purified and surpasses the human, see beings passing away and being reborn and understand how beings fare on in accordance with their kamma?”

51“No, venerable sir.”

52“Then knowing and seeing thus, Susı̄ma, do you dwell in those peaceful deliverances that transcend forms, the formless attainments, having touched them with the body?”

53“No, venerable sir.”

54“Here now, Susı̄ma: this answer and the nonattainment of those states, how could this be, Susı̄ma?”

(iv)

55Then the Venerable Susı̄ma prostrated himself with his head at the Blessed One’s feet and said: “Venerable sir, I have committed a transgression in that I was so foolish, so confused, so inept that I went forth as a thief of the Dhamma in such a well-expounded Dhamma and Discipline as this. Venerable sir, may the Blessed One pardon me for my transgression seen as a transgression for the sake of future restraint.”

56“Surely, Susı̄ma, you have committed a transgression in that you were so foolish, so confused, so inept that you went forth as a thief of the Dhamma in such a well-expounded Dhamma and Discipline as this.²¹⁵ Dhammatthenaka. The formula for confession and pardon is also at 16:6 (II 205,10-16). [128] Suppose, Susı̄ma, they were to arrest a bandit, a criminal, and bring him before the king, saying: ‘Sire, this man is a bandit, a criminal. Impose on him whatever punishment you wish.’ The king would say to them: ‘Come, men, bind this man’s arms tightly behind his back with a strong rope, shave his head, and lead him around from street to street and from square to square, beating a drum. Then take him out through the southern gate and to the south of the city cut off his head.’ What do you think, Susı̄ma, would that man experience pain and displeasure on that account?”

57“Yes, venerable sir.”

58“Although that man would experience pain and displeasure on that account, going forth as a thief of the Dhamma in such a well-expounded Dhamma and Discipline as this has results that are far more painful, far more bitter, and further, it leads to the nether world. But since you see your transgression as a transgression and make amends for it in accordance with the Dhamma, we pardon you for it. For it is growth in the Noble One’s Discipline when one sees one’s transgression as a transgression, makes amends for it in accordance with the Dhamma, and undertakes future restraint.” [129]

1Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvatthı̄ in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. There the Blessed One said:

2“Bhikkhus, those ascetics or brahmins who do not understand aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation: these I do not consider to be ascetics among ascetics or brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones do not, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of asceticism or the goal of brahminhood.

3“But, bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who understand aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation: these I consider to be ascetics among ascetics and brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of asceticism and the goal of brahminhood.”

72–81. Birth, Etc.

4“Bhikkhus, those ascetics or brahmins who do not understand birth … existence … clinging … craving … feeling … contact ... the six sense bases … name-and-form … consciousness [130] … volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation: these I do not consider to be ascetics among ascetics or brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones do not, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of asceticism or the goal of brahminhood.

5“But, bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who understand these things: these I consider to be ascetics among ascetics and brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of asceticism and the goal of brahminhood.”

1At Sāvatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, one who does not know and see as it really is aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, should search for a teacher in order to know this as it really is.²¹⁷ Spk: Whether it be the Buddha or a disciple, the one in dependence upon whom one gains path knowledge is called a teacher (satthā, a word usually reserved for the Buddha); he should be sought for. 13 Abhisamayasaṁyutta
[131]

2“Bhikkhus, one who does not know and see as it really is birth … existence … clinging … craving … feeling … contact ... the six sense bases … name-and-form … consciousness … volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation, should search for a teacher in order to know this as it really is.”

83. Training

1“Bhikkhus, one who does not know and see as it really is aging-and-death … volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation, should practise the training in order to know this as it really is.”

84–93. Exertion, Etc.

2“Bhikkhus, one who does not know and see as it really is aging-and-death … volitional formations, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation, should make an exertion … [132] arouse a desire … arouse enthusiasm … be unremitting … arouse ardour … apply energy … practise perseverance … practise mindfulness … practise clear comprehension … practise diligence in order to know this as it really is.”

[133]